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INTRODUCTION
l. BACKGROUND.
During recent years there has been among acadamics a considerable
interest in topics related to labour-management and labour-
managed firms. Several theoretical and empirical studies have
been carried through. Economists have analysed labour-managed
firms with the intention of examining the effect on resource
allocation in the economy when production activities are organis-
ed in this special manner. This thesis is intended to be a
contribution to the study of some, in my opinion interesting, .
features of labour-managed firms. I think that the problems
raised are relevant and of importance when discussing oganisation
of firms, and productive activity in general.
The special ground for my interest in studies of labour-managed
firms is the idea that labour-management represents an interes-
ting experiment in the search for the best way of organising
production. Although several attempts to organise firms as
labour-managed seem to have failed, the idea that the workers
control their own working conditions should involve several
desirable aspects which deserve a closer analysis. There should
a priori be no reason to believe that a system where workers hire
capital should do worse than a system where capital hires labour.
Therefore it is of some interest to investigate why labour-
management has so far carried relatively little success.
specifically I will aim at illuminating conditions for the
emergence and survival of firms where at least some degree of
labour-management constitutes an important feature, and investi-
gate how such firms operate under different economic conditions.
If there are special goals with respect to efficiency and income
distribution, it is of interest to see how the firms can be
controlled to meet these objectives. As implementation of
2idealized models may create problems, it is important to see what
kind of c0mprimises which are viable and simultaneously compa-
tible with a definition of labour-management. Then it may be the
case that labour-managed firms are not as rare as it seems. I
hope to make a contribution to the discussion of these problems.
I consider the idea .of letting workers run the firm as an
interesting social experiment. This is the main intention of
writing a thesis on this subject. I do not consider the effect
of labour-management on the extraction of human resources in a
firm, altough I think this is important. Several authors in the
field of labour-management have drawn attention to the possibly
better social relations within a firm when employees have a say
in decisions. This may compensate for other problems arising
when workers participate in decision making, which should be
remembered if some postulates or results seem pessimistic. The
analyses are strictly partial in the sense that only some
relevant aspects are discussed, while other - possibly as least
as important - matters are not considered.
2. Problems addressed.
My intention is to investigate labour-managed firms whic~are
intended to operate ~ in a western capaitalist economy. Much
of the literature has been concerned with socialist labour-
managed firms operating in a socialist economy. In many contexts
it may be important to distinguish between firms in the different
environments. Specifically, a labour-managed firm in a capital-
ist economy may meet problems which will not exist in a socialist
economy, which will again affect the optimal way of organising
the firm.
An important class of problems to be addressed relates to finance
of labour-managed firms. I argue that establishment and opera-
tion of labour-managed firms will be impeded by a credit ration-
ing. Credit rationing is interpreted as a situation where the
firm is restricted in its choice of financial position. In
particular the problem exists in capitalist economies where
3labour-managed firms constitute the exception to the general way
of organising production. Credit rationing will influence the
optimal financial structure of the firm. As joint-stock firms
dominate in capitalist economies, labour-managed firms will tend
to choose the same mode of finace. A subject investigated is
labour-managed firms financed by means of shares. The share
financed 'labour-managed firm is interesting from another point of
view also. If the workers own shares, the firm will find itself
in a new situation with respect to distribution of the firm's
income among the workers. I will try to characterize partial
equilibria of share financed labour-managed firms. In particular
I will be concerned with choice of employment level and different
modes of finance, and possible conflicts between insiders and
outsiders which may be capital suppliers and/or potentially new
workers. The idea of investigating this specific problem has its
root in a local event. In 1985 the workers at a shipyard in
Bergen took over the firm and established Solheimsviken AS as a
labour-managed share financed firm. Three articles in chapter 5
are devoted to analyses of share financed labour-managed firms.
One of the articles is written together with Norman J. Ireland
and Peter J. Law at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England.
Taxation of labour-managed firms is another field of interest.
Existing theory concentrates on efficiency improving taxation.
It aims at solving problems of finding an optimal size of the
firm, and an optimal supply of labour from the workers who are
members of a collective. I concentrate on the latter efficiency
problem. The taxation rules derived in the litterature on
labour-managed firms make use of unrealistic assumptions with
respect to, information availability. ,When the workers are hete-
rogeneous, incentive-incompatibility of the first-best taxation
system causes problems as the tax rates will vary over indivi-
duals. The same objections are valid which are made against
lump-sum taxation. Therefore I have chosen to analyse the
taxation of workers in labour-managed firms as a second-best
taxation problem. This enables me to focus also on distrubutio-
nal aspects of taxation in economies consisting in labour-managed
firms. In addition to a normative analysis, I wish also to make
4a more systematic positive analysis of the effect of different
tax rules on the decisions of the firm and the workers. I want
to focus on the close relation which exists between the taxation
of workers and firms. Two articles in chapter_4 deal with
taxation problems.
In the optimal taxation litterature indirect objective functions
are widely used to characterize optima and investigate effects og
taxation. This framework is not widely used in the theory of
labour-managed firms. I consider it appropriate to carry through
an analysis of the labour-managed firm and its workers by means
of indirect objective functions. Hitherto existing analyses
using the duality approach have concentrated on the firm's
optimization problem. I will characterize the individual
workers' choise of labour supply by using expenditure functions
and indirect utility functions. The article on indirect objec-
tive functions constitute chapter 3.
As a background for my analyses, I consider it valuable and
necessary to conduct an overview over and discussion of existing
theory and literature. I have chosen to devide these surveys
into two parts. The first one is to some degree rather general,
but with some concentration on employment and labour supply
decisions. In the other survey article I concentrate on litera-
ture on the finance of labour-managed firms. This division is
chosen for two reasons. Firstly the articles become shorter, and
the different models and conclusions are more clearly set out.
Secondly it enables me to concentrate on and draw attention to
some problems which will be particularly dealt with in other
parts of my thesis. The literature review articles are found in
chapter 2.
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, AN OVERVIEW OP SOME LITERATURE ON ALLOCATION· OF LABOURIN ECONOMIES CONSISTING OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS.
by
Jan Erik Askildsen
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on labour-managed firms (LM-firms) and economies
consisting of LB-firms (LM-economy) has grown rapidly during
recent years. The seminal paper by ~lard (1958) examined a model
of the Yugoslav LM-firm - termed the I11yrian firml} - the hith-
erto largest experiment on labour-management. Subsequent import-
ant contributions considered producer cooperatives in the.
Soviet Union (Domar (1966» as well as China (Sen (1966}), and
during the latest years a lot of empirical studies have been
made on Yugoslav U'l-firms as well as U1-firms in Western
countries. The basic model is, however, the one devloped by
~Jard.
lo
In this survey I will present what I consider the main contribu-
tions to the theory of Ul-firms. The literature on allocation of
capital will however not be reviewed in this article. The start-
ing point is the Illyrian firm. But I will be much concerned
with extensions and modifications of the model, and discuss how
these will affect efficiency results as well as comparative
statics. Comparisons with profit-maximizing firms (PM-firms) and
a capita~ist economy consisting of PM-firms (PM-economy) play an
important role in the existing literature, and therefore simi-
larities and discrepancies will be commented upon.
In a subsequent chapter of this thesis I will be concerned with
.LM-firms operating in a predominantly PH-economy. Specifically I
argue that such a firm may have problems in obtaining finance,
which may result in the necessity of giving some concessions to
capital suppliers. As a point of reference I will therefore in
this article present some of the contributions to the theory of
-.
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how an LM-firm operates under first-best conditions and in a
predominantly LH-economy. Hy main interest is examining decisi-
ons regarding production and employment of labour. Allocation of
capital and the finance of an LI1-firm is discussed in a separate
literature survey. Individual labour supply decisions will be
discussed, although not given an extensive treatment, as the
subject constitutes a major part of a subsequent chapter of this
thesis.
I start out by defining an LM-firm, and thereafter I discuss the
Illyrian model. Several extensions are then discussed, allowing
for different ways of taking the utility level of employment
into consideration, as well as individual labour supply. The
effect on employment and production of introducing uncertainty
will be examined also. Host of the analysis is partial and re-
lated to the representative firm. But some general equilibrium
results are presented, and the possibilities of obtaining a
Pareto optimal allocation of resources underlies much of the
analysis.
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2. DEFINITION
I will define an LM-firm as a firm where its workers own and
control the firm in which they work. All important decisions
regarding production, investment and employment are taken by the
workers collectively. In particular they have agreed upon rules
under which workers are to be recruited and dismissed. The ob-
jective'of the firm is to produce one or more products in such a
way that the utility of the worker-members is maximized. In most
models to be discussed this is interpreted as the maximization
of dividend (wage, payment) per work unit, e.g. per worker or
per hour of work. Generally, of course, the workers are free to
choose any maximand to which a majority can agree. Also, the
workers are free to delegate some decision-making to an elected
management, which is then supposed responsible to the work-
force.
The definition given here is somewhat weaker than the one given
by e.g. Putterman (1984), who points out that the definition
should not presuppose "additional things" like egalitarianism in
income distribution or direct democracy in decision making. But
he assumes that the political process should be egalitarian,
which is an assumption I find unnecessarily strong, as there may
in several occasions be good reasons to have a differing number
of votes per worker. The main point is whether the ultimate
decisions rest with worker-members of the firm. But then, of
course, it becomes more difficult to qualify what are the pre-
cise properties of an LM-firm. Thus, we may formulate models in
which it is allowed to hire workers on short-term contracts
without giving these workers voting rights, see e.g. Domar
(1966) and Hiyazaki (1984), or the firm may be assumed to oper-
ate under conditions where external suppliers of funds influence
the firm's maximand, see e.g. McCain (1977). Also membership can
be traded, as discussed by e.g. Sertel (1982, ch. 2).
Although some of these qualifications may involve a dilution of
the pure idea of workers' self-management, I think they shold be
included among acceptable concessions. There are two reasons for
- 4 -
this. Firstly, the phenomena will most probably be present in an
LM-economy, unless the economic system is organized in a
particularly favourable and ideal manner. Such an economy may be
useful as a point of reference. But the theory of the LM-firm
and the LM-economy should also have an applied perspective in
the sense that our models capture reasonable characteristics of
a "real" firm. Secondly, the deviations from the pure model of
an LM-firm are not necessarily as serious as they may seem at
first glance. Existence of hired workers may simply be the
result of an inter-firm labour market for the exchange of
labour-services among self-managed firms, and an inegalitarian
political structure within a firm - unequal votes per worker -
may reflect seniority which will always exist. Therefore, I find
it reasonable to let the characteristica mentioned be part of a
definition of an U1-firm. However, we may define a subset of
LM-firms which we call "pure LM-firms". Most of the literature
reviewed in this article belongs to the theory of the pure
LM-firm, which also reflects the state of the art. vfuat is
commonly denoted the Illyrian firm, is such a pure model.
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3. THE ILLYRIAN FIRM.
As it was formulated in the seminal work of Hard (1958), and
further analysed by Domar (1966), Vanek (1970) and Heade (1972),
the LM-firm is supposed to maximize sales minus non-labour costs
per worker. The time perspective is short run, and each worker
is assumed to supply a given (equal) amount of labour. The level
of employment (membership) is the single variable input, and it
alone will determine the level of production. Thus, the Illyrian
firm is assumed to
(l) Max
N
PX-rK
y = N
where y is dividend paid to each worker, P is price, X is pro-
duction, where we write X = f(K,N), rK is non-labour costs which
are assumed fixed in the short run, and N is number of workers
(members) of the firm. Hith usual restrictions on production
possibilities, involving positive and decreasing marginal pro-
ductivities, the LM-firm's optimal allocation of labour is given
by equality between dividend per worker and value marginal pro-
duct of labour (VHPN), i. e.
(2) Y = VM~ = P • af(K,N) = PfN aN N·
The optimal choice of employment can be shown in a diagram,
see Figure l.
This gives rise to the well known negatively sloping supply
curve of LH-firms. Doing comparative statics on the first order
conditions yields
(3) ~ < O => ~ < O when rK = rK.
Y
VMPN
l
Y
- 6 -
l
N N
Flgure-l: Optimal employm~nt level of the Illyrian firm.
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We show this in a diagram similar to Fig. l, see Figure 2.
Although the result does not seem unambiguous by referring to
Figure 2, it should be noted that it will hold whenever
~_ > of~~;N), which is met for the maximand (1). The explanation
is simple. As long as non-labour factors are given, and labour
productivity is decreasing, it will always pay remaining workers
to reduce the size of the firm'and capture economic rent, or
value due theoretically to the fixed factors. However, if the
costs for the use of factors are strictly positive (fixed costs,
lump-sum taxes), the burden of these costs per worker increases
as membership contracts until at some stage it will not pay to
decrease the level of employment anymore. But if price increas-
es, each worker can tolerate an increased fixed cost burden,
which makes a further reduction of the employment level profit-
able.
This line of reasoning indicates, as it is pointed out by Green-
wald (1979) and Miyazaki and Neary (1983), that the reaction of
the LM-firm to a price change can be decomposed into a Slutsky-
equation, showing a pure price effect for a given compensated
utility (income) and a fixed cost effect, given price. According
to Figure 2, the latter dominates, and the two effects can be
shown as in Figure 3 by noting that the utility indifference
curves are horizontal as employment-does not matter.
o 1The movement from N to N represents the price effect, which is
positive, while the employment reduction, NI to N2, is explained
. ~1by the f~xed cost effect. y is the fixed cost compensated divi-
dend curve. Obviously, by using ~his way of reasoning, the
effect of an increased fixed cost burden is to increase employ-
ment. vihen marginal productivity of labour is decreasing (the
production function is strictly concave), the fixed cost effect
will dominate the price effect.
- 8 -
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Figure 2: Employment levels of the Illyrian firm, with price
levels pO and pl, pl > pO.
° °u =y
Figure 3:
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Decomposition of a price change.
NO _ NI represents a pure price effect (S), while
NI _ N2 is the fixed cost effect (F).
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Vanek (1970) argues, on the other hand, that this negative supp-
ly response may vanish when multi-product firms are analyzed.
Given some substitution possibilities in production, supply
elasticities will be higher in multi-product than in single-
product firms, arising from the fact that production within a
firm of the various products will be adjusted to relative pric-
es. Furthermore,' the effect on employment is no longer unambig-
uous when joint production is studied.
The model is intended to resemble a socialist LM-firm. Capital
is collectively owned, and income distribution is eqalitarian.
The time-perspective is short-run in the sense that capital
level and firm structure are given. Evaluated by the definition
given above, the assumptions under which the firm is supposed to
operate are fairly restrictive. Thus, it will not necessarily
give a good representation of how an LM-firm will operate. But
it points to one important characteristic of an LM-firm, viz.
the fixed cost effect. Employment level is changed only if this
results in increased income per worker.' Thus, the Illyrian
firm's problem is the maximization of an economic surplus, and
fixed costs are what give incentives to employing additional
workers sharing in the burden. This effect has to be taken into
consideration when analysing LM-firms.
- 11 -
4. SOME EXTENSIONS OF THE ILLYRIAN MODEL.
There is an obvious extension of the utility approach presented
above. In effect the Illyrian firm is maximizing the income
(utility) of the remaining workers, irrespective of whom and how
many this affects. Later in this article it will be shown how
the comparative static responses will change if the utility of
~ worker-members (members at a particular point of time) is
maximized. But we may go even further and say that the level of
employment has a general interest, e.g. that the firms (the
workers) are concerned with the employment of the total
work-force, say in a given region. As a special case, the
work-force of concern may be the workers employed in the firm.
It will be shown below that this view of the LM-firm is general
in the sense that other models emerge as special cases (see
also section 6). A formulation which takes employment level
explicitly into account, seems reasonable also from an applied
point of view. Trade-unions are often modeled as agents which
are concerned with income and employment level. This may be
so because this is the way trade-union members are thinking. But
these workers are also those who run LM-firms. Furthermore, the
introduction of employment considerations involves the
~
introduction of a collectivistic attitude, while the Illyrian
model is strictly individualistic.
Because of the generality of the formulation, where the Illyrian
model emerges as a special case, I find it reasonable to include
a comparative static analysis of the Illyrian firm's long run
allocation of capital and labour in this section.
Law (1977) and Smith (1984) have analyzed an LM-firm with the
utility function
(4) v(y,N),
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i.e. a firm where the level of employment matters as well. Obvi-
ously the employment level cannot fall short of the employment
level of the I11yrian firm if a positive utility is attached to
employment. Furthermore, as this model is more general than the
I11yrian model, in the sense that the I11yrian model emerges
when vN = ~ = O, we use (4) when explaining the LH- firm's
long-run optimization. Wh~n v(y,N) is maximized w.r.t. Nand K,
with the production function X = f(K,N) and y given by (1), we
obtain the first order conditions
(Sa) PfN = • N
(Sb) PfK = r
Subscripts denote partial derivatives, which are all positive.
Using the definition of y in (Sa) and substituting for r from
(Sb) into (Sa), we get
(6)
vN N2
[f~ + f~ - X] + v r = O
y
Then we see immediately, by using Euler's theorem, that optimum
requires production to take place at constant returns to scale
when vN = o. If the equilibrium is unique, this presupposes a
U-shaped cost- function. Furthermore, when vN > O, again using
Euler's theorem, we see that production takes place at
decreasing returns, and employment and production are higher
than in the I11yrian firm with identical techno1ogy.2) The
equilibrium production and employment levels are sketched in
Figure 4a, b.
In Figure 4, xI and NI refer to the I11yrian levels, whereas
XV and NV are the preferred levels when vN > O. It should be
Average
cost
= AC
- 13 -
AC
x
a) Production
y
N
b) Employment
Pigure 4: Optimal production and employment levels of
labour-managed firms.
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noted that Figure 4a) holds when both factors are variable only,
whereas Figure 4b) may represent short-run as well as long-run
equilibrium.
\fuen doing comparative statics on the first order conditions in
(5) when vN > O,. it is advantageous to apply a specific utility
function. Thus, both Law (1977) and Smith (1984) use a Cobb-
Douglas function. An interesting thing to note is that the
short-run negative supply response prevails, although this re-
sult is not general in the sense that there may be functional
forms giving other results. The marginal utility of additional
employment in the range of operation is the vital factor.
The long-run responses are generally ambiguous. Ireland and Law
(1984) have showed that the Illyrian firm, i.e. where vN = O,
with a homothetie technology and a U-shaped average-cost func-
tion, will not respond to price changes or changes in the cost.
of non-labour factors. Generally the responses may be either,
depending on whether the technology is (locally) K-biased or
N-biased (see Ireland and Law (1985». A K-biased technology can
be defined as a technology where the capital/labour-ratio in-
creases in the scale of operation. Then the output response to a
price increase is negative, whereas the response is the "non-
perverse" when technology is N-biased. In the latter case, the
explanation can be given in terms of labour becoming relatively
cheaper as scale of operation increases. A marginal price in-
crease will then induce the workers to take on marginally more
workers.
\fuen vN > O, still these technical aspects matter. But the value
of vN plays a role as well. Thus, whereas the Illyrian firm with
a homothetie technology and a U-shaped cost curve does not
respond to price changes, the response is positive when vN > O,
given the same homothe~ic technology.
Another interesting aspect emerging from (6) and Figure 4a) when
vN = O, is the fact that the Illyrian firm will always produce
- 15 -
at a minimum of costs, assuming an equilibrium can be found
where N > l. This has lead Ireland and Law (1985) to formulate a
minimum cost function
( 7) C(y,r) = min yN + rK s.t f(K,N) > -X
-which shows the minimum cost of producing the production level X
(XI in Figure 4a». Corresponding to the cost function repre-
senting optimum in PM-firms, the properties of this cost func-
tion can be used to derive the comparative static results repor-
ted above. However, quite a lot of algebra is needed, and I will
not go any fur~her into that problem here.3)
Also Hey (1981a) defines a cost function to derive comparative
static responses. He is interested in formulating a unified
framework in which PH-firms as well as U1-firms can be studied.
Thus, Hey defines the cost functions as minimum total costs con-
sistent with producing X and minimum capital costs consistent
with producing ~ for Pfvl-and Ll1-firms respectively. Using sub-
scripts L to denote LH-firm and P to denote PH-firm, the two
firms maximize
(8a)
with respect to ~ and X respectively. In both cases the first
order condition is
(9)
ec.
P = ___1es ,J
j = L, P~ q.
J
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although the interpretation differs according to the definition
of the cost-functions. According to second order conditions
o2c~--~2 > O, and comparative static responses are obtained in a
o (qj)
straightforward manner. Specifically, ~ as well as X increase
when price increases. By noting that marginal productivity of
labour is decreasing in N for given capital K = K, it
immediately follows that the LM-firm reduces production in the
short run, which corresponds to Ward's initial result.
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5. INDIVIDUAL LABOUR SUPPLY.
Now, in the above models, and in models to be discussed below,
the individual workers supply an equal amount of work. This
justifies the maximization of payout (dividend) per worker. On
the other hand, it has been argued, see e.g. Ireland and Law
(1982), that a producer cooperative is primarily concerned with
the utility of its work-force, and that the proper maximand
should be the maximization of a utility function with income and
hours of work as arguments. This should represent the choice
made by each individual worker, and it should be easily adopted
when the work-force is fairly homogeneous.
Sen (1966) was the first to acknowledge the importance of indi-
vidual labour supply decisions in the firm's optimization pro-
gramme. He noted that the principle of paying every worker the
same amount irrespective of work done corresponds to the Harxian
concept litaeach according to his needs". The obvious alterna-
tive is making payment litaeach according to his work", and the
two principles will generally not give the same result.
Athough the.problems related to individual labour supply will be
further examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis, I find
it illustrative to sketch the workers' choice of how long hours
to work. Let u(y,~) be a quasiconcave utility function where ~
is the labour supply of the representative worker i, and assume
that all workers are identical. \/e substitute into u(y,~) for
PX - rKy = L • ~,
N
~iwhere L = L = N~ is
i=l
lem is
total number of hours worked. The prob-
(10) Hax u (px L rK • ~, ~)
~
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which yields the first order condition
u
..:J...=p.
Ul
~f(K,L} ~L 1 PX - rK (1 oL 1)
aL ~ L + L - TI :r;
u > O and u < O are·partial derivatives w.r.t. income and
y 1
leisure respectively. If there is full cooperation in fixing
individual labour supply, i.e. ~~ = N, we see that the marginal
rate of substitution between income and leisure equals the mar-
ginal productivity of labour, which is characterized by Sen
(1966) as the condition for a socially optimal allocation of
labour. The optimality condition holds when VHPL = y also. But
as pointed out by Sen as well as Vanek (1970), and shown above,
this is fulfilled only if the production function exhibits lo-
cally constant returns to scale. Thus, if there are decreasing
returns, which can be represented as a free factor of
production, or a scarce factor in collective supply, the workers
will always benefit from reducing the employment level and
increasing their individual labour supply, so as to capture as
large a part of the economic rent as possible, and individual
labour supply is too ~arge compared to the social optimum.4}
However, if i were given, i.e. compensation is made by a fixed
amount per worker irrespective of work done, then each worker
recieves only !thOf his value marginal product of labour. In
the first order condition above the second term on the right
hand side disappears, and only full cooperation, oL = N, will01
secure optimality. Labour supply will in other instances be too
low because of undercompensation. Thus, in circumstances where
full cooperation does not exist in deciding on individual labour
supply, the two rules for making payment will induce respective-
ly too high and too low labour supply compared to the social
optimum.
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Sen formulates an income distribution rule involving some part
of dividend, y, being paid according to work and the rest (l-y),
being paid on a per capita basis. Furthermore, Sen assumes that
the members of the collective may also take into account the
welfare of the other members. This sympathy towards others
ranges from O to l, the last number involving "full" sympathy
towards all other individuals.
In the case of full sympathy, the allocation of labour and pro-
duction will be efficient irrespective of the value of y. Other-
wise efficiency requires O < y < l if the producer cooperative
owns some factor other than labour, and y = l if the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale and all non-labour
factors are hired. As pointed out by Browning (1982), in this
context (l-y) acts as a Pigouvian tax on the use of a collective
g o o d to which the cooperative has free access, preventing 1:.he
workers from supplying too much labour. It should be noted that
Sen's analysis presupposes a Nash-Cournot reaction function when
considering individual labour supply, and that labour is homo-
geneous. If the workers instead colluded in deciding on
individual labour supply, they would always be able to reach an
efficient allocation of labour, given the firm's employment
level.
Browning (1982) argues, however, that the result is not robust.
He shows that it is valid in the case of homogeneous labour
only. If labour is heterogeneous, the allocation of labour re-
sulting from a Uash-Cournot assumption can generally be improved
upon, i.e. there exists no value of y guaranteeing Pareto-opti-
mality.
Like Sen Browning also assumes that factors of production other
than labour may be available at zero cost. However, by assuming
that all non-labour factors are hired at their market price,
allocation of labour will be'efficient when y = l. Letting li be
labour supplied by worker i, i=l, ...,N, this is seen by assuming
N . N .
(PX-rK) = g( I l~) < O when L = I l~ = o, i.e. there are fixed
i=l i=l
PX -rK
- rK
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'" (PX-rK) = geL)
'"
Figure 5: Optimal size of LM-firms with/without fixed costs,
and when labour is the only variable factor.
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<costs. Alternatively, if ~(L) = o when L = O, we must have a
production function with first increasing and then decreasing
marginal productivities, see Ireland and Law (1984). The cases
when g(O} < O and g(O} = O respectively are shown· below (Figure
5). We assume full cooperation in fixing individual labour
supply.
I hOl d (PX-rK) l o l d o o'n A, t e marg~na rewar L aqua s marg~na pro uct~v~ty
(it = ~), i.e. an efficient amount of labour is supplied. With
costless access to a factor of production, and non-homogeneous
workers, the labour allocation will generally not be efficient.
As it was shown by Sen (1966), a solution to the first of these
problems - a free factor - requires a special reward function
(see above). In the la~ter case - heterogeneity of the workforce
- efficiency may be obtained with special reward functions if
special restrictions on the profit (dividend) function are
satisfied. The issue is further discussed by Browning (1982).
i -From Figure 5 we see that when l = 1 for all i, and only N is
variable, there is no equilibrium size of the LM-firm involving
more than l worker if rK = O.
Berman (1977) looks at the various dividend sharing rules from a
somewhat different viewpoint. He argues that in the short run it
is not realistic to assume that the number of workers can be
varied, i.e. he finds it unrealistic that LM-firms will dismiss
workers so as to increase the income of the remaining workers.
Instead he assumes, like Sen, that the number of hours to be
worked is variable. By assuming that each worker can change his
labour supply, we saw above that the allocation of labour will
be efficient when there is perfect collusion between the workers
in fixing the labour supply. In Bonin (1977) and Chinn (1979)
the degree of cooperation in fixing hours of work is determined
by the elasticity of total labour supply with respect to the
individual supply, i.e. by
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Here i~n ~ l, and n = l means perfect collusion. Ireland and
Law (1981) summarize the views of Berman (1977), Bonin (1977),
Chinn (1979) and Sen (1966), and examine the effect on labour
supply and production of changes in prices and other parameters.
In particular they show that the effect on labour supply of
price changes will be similar, although not identical, to the
ones which occur when wage changes in PM-firms, and the slope
of the short-run supply curve of the LM-firm is ambiguous when N
is given. Furthermore they indicate equivalence with respect to
labour allocation between Sen' s factor of sympathy in a model
with Nash-Cournot reaction functions, and the labour supply
elasticity (n). That is, complete sympathy towards fellow work-
e r s or complete collusion in fixing individual labour supply are
sufficient for obtaining an efficient resource allocation .
.
It is probably a matter of discussion how important it is to
allow for individual labour supply decisions in a model of a
cooperative firm. Sen's and Chinn's analyses refer to Chinese
agricultural cooperatives, while Bonin's discussion relates to
Soviet cooperatives. The problems connected to a free factor of
production seems relevant in the economies in question, as land
may be provided at zero cost brthe government, or at least not
supposed to be paid its marginal value product. Whether the
workers will in reality determine their labour supply
individually or collectively is much of an empirical question,
dependent among other things also on possible legal regulations.
Generally it does not seem unrealistic to assume variability of
labour supply in an LM-firm. It may take the form of overtime
and adjusted holidays according to individual preferences. Then,
considered as a positive analysis, it focuses on interesting
incentive problems, which will be further discussed in another
part of this thesis.
- 23 -
6. CONSTANT SHORT-RUN EMPLOYHENT LEVEL.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the number of hours to be
worked can be varied in the short run. But according to several
authors employment should be assumed fixed, contrary to the
models formulated by Ward (1958) and Domar (1966). The reason
for this may be that it is contrary to the idea of worker coop-
eratives to dismiss workers (cf. Berman 1977), or perhaps be-
cause of solidarity or difficulties in deciding who are to leave
the cooperative when this is the optimal policy. t1eade (1972)
formulates some rules which he finds appropriate for an LH-firm.
Although his model allows for a variable employment level, he
lays down some conditions for termination of membership. These
are "(a) that the partner concerned wishes to leave and (b) that
he should obtain from the remaining partners permission to with-
draw".5) The justifications of the rules are on the one hand
that no one can be forced to accept worse conditions than those
of the members remaining in the collective. But at the same time
no one can leave the collective and all its obligations to get
better terms than those remaining without general agreement or
compensation. This corresponds to the view taken by Robinson
(1967), who argues that worker cooperatives will never dismiss
workers with the sole objective of increasing the income of the
(luckily) remaining workers.
It seems reasonable to assume that employment is fixed in the
short run but that it can be varied in a medium and long-run
time-perspective. Berman .and Berman (1978) assume that in the
long run LH-firms choose total number of hours to be worked.
This is done by voting procedures where individual preferences
concerning income, working hours and the firm's size (employment
level) are taken into account. The optimal size of the firm, and
responses to price changes, are as reported above, and it will
be further discussed in another chapter of this thesis. We will
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therefore turn now to an explanation of why the short-run em-
ployment level can be considered constant, or at least weakly
responsive to price changes.
A model giving this result is formulated by Steinherr and Thisse
- .
(1979). They argue that the workers who vote for membership
reduction will take into consideration the possibility they face
themselves to be made redundant. Then, if redundancies are made
randomly, so that all workers have the same possibility of being
dismissed, and the workers are not risk-lovers, or if the work-
ers maximize the utility of all workers so that redundant work-
ers have to be compensated, then no dismissals will take place.
To illustrate the point, assume that the firm maximizes a utili-
ty function
a) VeN) = v(w) if N = °
(11) b) VeN) v(y(N») N NO-N if ° N < NO= • -:u + v(w)-:-J) <N N
c) VeN) = v(y(N») if N ;> NO
where NO is the initial work-force, and w is the original divi-
dend equal to the market wage rate and the value marginal pro-
Nduct of labour. =rr represents the probability of remaining with
NO
the firm, while ~ is the probability of being made redundant.
N
yeN), defined in (l), is dividend at employment level N. v(w)
and v(y) are concave if the workers are risk-averse.
Assume that the price increases from pO to pl. He ~now from
lFigure 2 that the optimal employment level reduces to N when
income per remaining worker is maximized. Let us maximize (llb)
w.r.t. N to see whether an income-maximizing employment level
can be found. \Je get
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(12) cV °"'5Ef = ° => V' (y) • (PfN-y) + v{y) - v{w) = 0, ° < N < N
which we write as
when the workers are risk-neutral. But as w = y{NO) = pOfN and
plfN > pOf! we see from Figure 2 that this expression is posi-
tive for P > pO and N E [Nl,NO], and no equilibrium employment
level can be found with a reduqtion in the work-force. If the
workers are risk-averse, this result is even further strengthen-
ed, while it may not hold if the workers are risk-lovers.
However, the level of membership will not be increased either,
as we see by maximizing (llc) w.r.t. N:
(13) P f(N,K) - rK < 0,N
This result is easily confirmed by inspection of Figure 2. Thus,
because of the way the marginal utility of a change in employ-
ment changes sign around the initial employment level, no utili-
ty increasing employment adjustment can take place. The results
hold even though expected income may increase by a membership
reduction. The reason for this somewhat peculiar outcome is the
fact that the members are willing to employ all workers willing
to accept a payout w < pl~. However, when membership exceeds
the initial level NO, the workers become "ordinary" income maxi-
mizers without a specified opportunity cost. This makes the
model somewhat questionable, as we see that adjustments may be
made which will increase income, see Figure 2.
Steinherr and Thisse show that the same result is obtained also
if the firm maximizes the welfare of all initial workers. If
- 26 -
e.g. dismissed workers have to be fully compensated by the re-
maining workers if they suffer an income loss, a price increase
will never result in reduction of employment. Assume that the
dismissed workers were to receive y(NO) - w, where y(NO) is the
income the workers would get if remaining with the firm. Then
remaining workers will gain (y(NO)-plfN) < (y(NO)-w) as
plfN > w, and membership reduction is not profitable.
6)
Smith (1984) has pointed out that the maximization of the utili-
ty of a pool of workers, i.e. the maximand (llb) without any
restriction as to the level of N, will lead to a level of em-
ployment where PfN = w, and income y > w as shown in Figure 6
below.
vJith w as the reservation wage, the equilibrium contains an
implicit definition of a utility function v(y,N). This corre-
sponds to the result in (4) obtained when the utility function
was explicitly defined as v(y,N). Thus, with a proper definition
of an opportunity cost of labour, and a restricted pool of work-
ers, the result emerging from Figure 6 below shows the same
willingness to pay for increasing employment, compared to the
Illyrian firm, as may be attained by formulating the utility of
employment explicitly. It should be noted also that this repre-
sents an efficient production decision, whereas efficiency does
not necessarily hold in the Steinherr-Thisse model, which we see
from the fact that first order conditions may not be met by
equality. This is due to the shift in the maximand which does
t 11 f . f °no a ow or compensat~ons or N > N •
Other results may be derived by changing some of the underlying
assumptions. One of these assumptions seems important. It is
assumed that all workers are treated in the same way,
irrespective of seniority and other factors determining the
workers' status in the firm. Also new workers are given equal
status. In reality we would probably find arrangements favouring
w- 27 -
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.F19Qre-6:_~mployment level of an LM-firm with an implicit
utility function defined over income and employment.
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special groups of workers. It would be reasonable to take into
account formation of coalitions within the firm. Surplus would
then be devided according to the outcome of negotiations between
distinct groups. On the other hand, the model constitutes an
important contribution by taking into consideration more than
income when investigating an LM-firm. As such it represents a
progress compared to the Illyrian model, although the political
process is probably much more complicated than the model
indicates.
~fuat I will denote a further sophistication in modelling the
LM-firm is undertaken by Miyazaki and Neary (1983) who model the
LM-firm as a contract-based production coalition of workers.
They assume that the firm faces uncertain market prospects
(price), and the contract specifies state-contingent employment
levels and dividends. Their main target is to investigate
responses to different states of nature ex post, and for diffe-
rent assumptions as to how risk is carried. The key to the ana-
lysis is the decomposition of price canges into a price effect
and a fixed cost effect (Slutsky-equation), and the assumption
that the firm maximizes the expected mean utility of income. The
general result is that layoffs occur only if the value marginal
product of labour falls short of the exogenously given oppor-
tunity cost of the workers, which corresponds to Steinherr and
"Thisse's result given an intitial equilibrium. This means that
price responses occur only in "bad" states of nature. Assume
firstly that no compensation schemes exist. Although expected
utility is high enough to induce the workers not to shut the
firm down, states of nature may occur in which the ex post wage
is below the reservation wage. The workers will then prefer not
to work but some of them will have to do so because of the
firm's fixed cost constraint (i.e. to avoid bankruptcy). Now,
whereas the price effect in the Slutsky equation is always
positive, the fixed cost effect is negative in these bad states
of nature when workers prefer not working7). On the other hand,
the sign of the fixed cost effect is reversed when the take-home
wage exceeds the opportunity cost of work. Then the total effect
of a price increase (better state of nature) is ambiguous in the
worst states and positive (non-perverse) in the better states.
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The two outcomes can be illustrated as in the figures 7 a) and
b). w is the reservation wage, and we follow the approach used
by Smith (1984).
Vo and vI represent the implicitly defined utility functions.
Note that they make a kink at w, as reduced employment is desir-
ed for y < w. N represents the size of the pool of workers.
vfuereas for bad states of nature there exist segments of an
upward as well as downward sloping supply curve when there are
no insurance or transfer arrangements in existence, Miyazaki and
Neary show that the ambiguity disappears if the workers can
insure themselves completely against income fluctuations, either
by risk shifting which insures debt obligations, or by compen-
sation schemes operating between employed and non-employed work-
ers. Then the fixed cost effect disappears, and the supply curve
is upward sloping in states of nature where N < N is optimal.
Some of the objections raised against the Steinherr and Thisse-
model may be raised against the approach taken by Miyazaki and
Neary as well. Specifically they do not consider formation of
subcoalitions and discrimination of some workers. But their
contractual approach seems an important progress. It implies
that the firm is considered a coalition among workers with con-
stant membership size in the short run. Then the firm is more
than just a production unit. Long term interests can be
separated in contracts from short term interests. In this way
the employment level in the short run depends on what alter-
natives are available to the workers. One important aspect,
which is not explicitly discussed, is the affect of a govern-
mental dole to laid-off workers on the work-incentives of LM-
firms. Thus, the self-insurance arrangements of LM-firms, which
the authors discuss, may be important for the possibilities of
attaining an efficient resource allocation in an LM-economy.
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Figure 7: Employment in different states of nature, when the
LM-workers are assumed to maximize the expected ex-
ante mean utility of income.
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7. UNCERTAINTY.
On the background of the discussion above, I consider it fruit-
ful to explore the theory of the LH-firm under uncertainty.
Apparently the introduction of uncertainty alters the optimal. ,-
behaviour of the firm, as happens when P~1-firms are concerned.
The all-important factor here is the firm's attitude to risk.
Sandmo (1971) has investigated the functioning of the PM-firm
which maximizes the expected utility of profit. If price is the
uncertain parameter, the risk-neutral firm facing an expected
price P will make the same production and employment decisions
as the firm facing the price P with certainty. However, if the
firm is risk-averse, i.e. its utility function is concave,
assuming it can be defined, then the firm facing P will produce
less if P is an expected price with known distribution than if- .p is a market price known with certainty.
A question is whether this result carries over to the LH-firm's
optimal behaviour. Using the short-run framework developed by
Sandmo, the problem is analysed by Huzondo (1979), Hawawini and
Michel (1979), Ramachandran, Russel and Seo (1979), Bonin (1980)
and Hey and Suckling (1980) when price uncertainty is consider-
ed, while Hawawini and Hichel (1983) consider production uncer-
tainty. The firm is assumed to maximize the expected utility of
dividend, y, i.e.
(14) Max V = E [u (y) ]
N
where y PX-F= ---r '
and F is fixed costs (non-labour costs). The first order condi-
tion is
(15) E[u' (y) (PfN-y)] = O
which may be written, using laws of variance, as
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Cov [u'.(yL (p fN -y) J(16)
The effect on production of uncertainty and risk aversion de-
pends on the covariance term. It is zero when the firm is risk-
neutral, leaving the firm with the same employment and produc-
tion as if the firm were facing the price E (P) \V'ith certainty.
But if the firm is risk averse, by noting that both elements in
the covariance term are negatively correlated to price since
u" (y) < O and fN < ~, we find that
(17) Cov[u'(y),(PfN-y)] > O => .E[PfN] < E[y].
As marginal productivities are decreasing, this means that a
slight increase in risk aversion, when the firm is initially
risk-neutral, results in increased employment and production,
contrary to what is the optimal reaction of the PM-firm. The
result holds true irrespective of whether the uncertainty appli-
es to the market prospects (p) or the production activity (fN).
The explanation of this result is quite simple. In a certain
environment the workers of an LM-firm will vote for reduction in
employment (fNN < O) until the burden of fixed costs makes fur-
ther employment reductions unprofitable. However, uncertainty
represents for the risk averse workers a burden similar to fixed
costs which it is advantageous to share with more risk-takers.
On the other hand, if forward markets exist the workers can
hedge so as to avoid the risk, and the firm produces the same
output as under certainty if the forward price equals the cer-
tainty price, see Hey (198lb). Also, as pointed out by Ireland
and Law (1982, ch , 7.3), the Ll1-firm can reduce its risk by
participating in several markets (multi-product firm).
Several comparative static responses have been investigated in
the literature. Of most interest is the effect of changes in
fixed costs (or lump-sum taxes), expected price, and different
tax rates (unit-labour tax, ad valorem tax). Assuming decreasing
absolute risk aversion, it turns out that the responses are
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generally opposite to those of the Pl-'l-firm(except for a change
in ad valorem tax, in which case the response is ambiguous), and
for changes in fixed costs and expected price the responses
correspond to the respective changes when the LH-firm faces no
uncertainty8) (see Huzondo (1979), Bonin (1980».
Now, the alternative framework presented by Hey (198la), which
we have discussed previously, is useful under uncertainty as
well, see Hey and Suckling (1980) also. Let us define q. as
)
Xp and (~)L respectively. 'V/ritethe cost functions as C(qj).
Each firm chooses q such that
(18) E[v(Y)] = E[v(Pq-C(q»)]
is maximized. The first order condition is
(19) E[v'(y)(p-C'(q»)] = 0,
and the results obtained by Sandmo (1971) applies to the LH-firm
as well. The short run results derived by Huzondo (1979) and
Bonin (1980) are then easily derived by assuming capital fixed.
E.g., as a change from a fixed price to a random price with the
same mean induces reductions in Xp and (;)L' assuming risk
aversion, the latter implies an inrease in employment and
production as marginal productivity of labour is decreasing,
given a level of non-labour factors.9)
Introducing variable individual work effort does not signifi-
cantly alter the results reported above. The question is exami.n-
ed by Bonin (1977) and Ireland (1981). vfuereas Ireland (1981)
compares the effect of price uncertainty on employment and indi-
vidual labour supply in LH- and PM-firms, Bonin (1977) investi-
gates the allocation of labour between a private and collective
firm facing price and productive uncertainty respectively. The
additional results refer to the individual labour supply deci-
sions. Because of income effects they are generally ambiguous.
However, by using utility funcions where the degree of risk
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aversion is independent of labour supply, e.g. a utility func-
tion which is additive in income and leisure, it is shown that
risk averse workers try to avoi~ risk by reducing labour supply
to the risky project.
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8. EFFICIENCY AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM.
In the literature reviewed so far, U1-firms are assumed to exist
within a market economy, which may be a pure LH-economy or an
economy consisting of different types of firms, also involving
PH-firms. The market and technological restrictions which exist,
are the same as those known generally from pure PH-economies.
The individual agents are assumed to behave according to the
same objectives, independent of economic system, i.e. the analy-
ses consider utility maximizing workers choosing between levels
of leisure and consumption. Thus, any firm faces the same exo-
genous market restriction. Such similarities in modelling pr1-
and LM-economies are advantageous in the sense that comparisons
between the two systems and types of firms are easily made.
Indeed, many papers have been concerned with such comparisons.
These can be grouped into two categories. Some aim to establish-
ing equivalences between the two systems, i. e , pointing out
similarities and differences arising from a given set of assump-
tions. Thus, Dreze (1974, 1976, 1985) studies properties of
market equilibrium in the two types of economies, while e.g.
Heade (1972) and Ireland and Law (1981) compare the comparative
statics of PH- and LH-firms in a partial equilibrium setting.
The other approach in comparing the systems deals with the over-
all functioning of the two systems. The two types of firms can
be subject to different working conditions. These conditions can
favour one enterprise organization, and they will typically
differ between economic systems. But then introduction of such
assumptions and restrictions may imply that one type of firms
will be superior to the other one when measured by efficiency.
On the one hand e.g. Vanek (1970), Ireland (1981) and Reich and
Devine (1981) compare PH- and LH-economies when conditions like
disuti1ity of work and need for supervision of workers differ.
As labour-management is supposed to have favourable effects on
such variables, an La-firm can obtain better results than PM-
firms. This is, however, contrasted by e.g. Alchian and Demsetz
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(1972), Furubotn (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1979) and William-
son (1980) who assert, for different reasons, that management is
better performed in hierarchical structures than egalitarian
ones. Because of property rights problems and the incentives of
the management and supervisors, the PM-firm will have the better
possibilities of obtaining finance and lowering costs, particu-
larly those related to supervision and monitoring, and thus
allocate resources better than LM-firms. These problems relating
to the Yugoslav LM-firm are discussed in Furubotn and Pejovich
(1970).
Of course, what kind of firms are really the best ones, is hard
to ascertain. It depends probably strongly on the environment in
which firms have to operate. This environment may involve imper-
fections which favour one type of firm. Thus, it is not unreas-
onable to assume that in an economic system where one way of
organizing firms is dominating, it will be problematic for other
types of firms to be accepted and function properly. There may
be several reasons for this. It can be considered a matter of
discrimination, see e.g. Lomme rud (1987) . Financiers,
raw-material suppliers and customers may be sceptical to
worker-managers. Of course, an LM-firm may employ a fully
professional management which is supposed to represent and
negotiate the firm' sinterests. This is compatible with our
definition of an LM-firm. But the workers may choose instead to
do the practical management themselves. This ~ create problems
if social and professional background differ from their
counterparts. Another problem which may arise, concerns the
optimal financial structure of the firm. It is advantageous for
an LM-firm with collectively owned capital to be 100% externally
financed (see e.g. Furubotn (1976», but credit suppliers may be
unwilling to contribute with 100% finance because of the risk
connected to it. This calls for special financial arrangements
which are hardly present in capitalist economies. As a result of
~his, the workers may be forced to choose a capitalist way of
organizing the firm.
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Stated more formally, the views of Ireland et. al. and
Williamson et al., can be interpreted as partial equilibrium
results in a context where a general equilibrium setting would
be appropriate. Dreze (1976) points out that choice of working
conditions is a problem involving nonconvexities because of its
public good aspect. Comparisons can be drawn to the choice .of
product quality, where the existence of nonconvexi ties makes
efficiency results only locally valid. Putterman (1984) and
Lommerud (1987) use the same approach when discussing works by
vlilliamson et al. They argue that the economic environment lays
down conditions which favour conventional forms of organization.
This means that the equilibrium studied is not a global one, as
there is no natural way of leaving one (local) equilibrium
position to attain another one. If this is so, arguments like
"social revealed preference" to explain existence of firms by a
revealed preference of workers as to choice of production.
organization, and "economic Darwinism" to explain existence of
firms by survival through efficiency, are not good explanatiåns
of why one firm structure dominates at a given point of time.
Instead, this structure is established as a result of a local
optimization, given an economic environment. Then this local
optimization argument is important both when explaining firm
structure and working conditions within firms to which workers
have to adjust.
Thus, although LM-firms are rare outside Yugoslavia, barring
cases like 1-1ondragon in Spain, plywood cooperatives in USA and
perhaps the kibbutz system in Israel, the relatively extensive
literature on labour-management during recent years should be
justifiable. vfuen situated in systems of overall "traditional"
profit-maximizing enterprises, conditions under which competi-
tion takes place are probably unfavourable to LM-firms. But
nevertheless it is important to explain how LM-firms behave
under perfect conditions. Knowing optimal reactions of agents to
changes in economic and other variables under first best condi-
tions are necessary both when systems are to be compared, and
when the effect of various imperfections are to be analyzed. But
first and foremost we need to know whether the system in ques-
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tion is such that the economy is pulled toward a position where
resources are r~tionally allocated. To be able to do so, we need
a general equilibrium framework.
The above analysis and discussion of partial equilibrium results
have indicated that obtaining an efficient resource allocation
may not be a trivial matter in an LM-economy. However, Dreze
(1974, 1985) shows that the set of Pareto-optimal allocations in
an LM-economy may be identical to those of a PM-economy with the
same restrictions on technology and resources, and assuming also
that the utility functions of the households are identical.
The derivation of the equivalence and efficency result rests
upon a proper definition of the economy. The special feature of
the labour-managed economy is that labour is a non-traded good,
and thereby it has no market price. However, skills and amount
of work done can be assessed in the same manner as in a tradi-
tional capitalist economy, and thereby enable the establishment
of weights for payment for different kinds of work in terms of
quantity as well as quality. Generally there will exist initial
assets also, to which the workers (the firms) will have access.
He have mentioned above the suboptimality that will result from
free access to a factor of production (Sen (1966». Dreze assum-
es that this problem is solved by charging rents for using these
assets. The ownership of the assets, and the distribution of the
rent, can be assumed given exogenously. What is important is
that the rent is levied in a way that enables no firm to obtain
a yield which is denied other groups of workers. Lastly, it is
crucial that potential firms rather than existing firms are
considered, i.e. the number of firms is endogenously determined,
so that the workers are free to costlessly set up new firms and
close down old ones as responses to changes in relative
profitability between lines of business. The importance of this
is seen easily by looking at partial equilibrium analyses of the
representative U1-firm. We showed above that in the short run
the Illyrian LM-firm will react "perversely" to price changes.
These wrong reactions to price signals may be present also in
the long run and for qui te sophisticated specifications of the
LM-firm's maximand. Changes in prices mean that production
should be changed. From PM-economies we know that this can
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happen either through establishing or closing down enterprises,
or by changes in level of production in existing firms. But in
an LM-economy the change in the level of production may go in
the wrong direction. Then we will have to rely on entry and exit
of firms and mobility of labour to attain a market equilibrium.
Unless this happens, income differentials will be present, i.e.
marginal products of Labov r will differ between lines of busi-
ness for workers of same ability. Then there is not equality
between demand and supply in the labour market. This disequi-
librium condition will, however, vanish through entry and exit
of firms, so that supply and demand are equalized to establish a
Halrasian equilibrium. In this equilibrium the market shadow
price of labour is equal to marginal productivity, and equalized
among firms and lines of business.
Ichiishi (1977) explains the formation of firms by looking at
the productivity of different coalitions. A firm in an LM-econo-
my is considered a coalition of the ultimate consumers, where
each coalition is assigned a production possibility set. As any
coalition being a subset of the set of all economic agents is
possible, including the single member coalition and the grand
coali tion of all agents, at each point of time a number of po-
tential firms exist. The firms in operation will be only those
producing at lowest costs, given the assumptions made on techno-
logy and preferences, which lead to the establishment of a com-
peti tive equilibrium price vector . Possibilities of different
sizes of firms are contained in this formulation by allowing for
segments of increasing and decreasing returns to coalitions.
A coalition production economy model is used by Greenberg (1979)
also. He shows that the efficiency results obtained by Dreze may
be sensitive to the definition of what kind of coalitions are
allowed in the economy. In particular, by assuming that workers
are not allowed to form subcoalitions within existing firms,
share the proceeds from the productive activity of the sub-
coalition among those who are members of it, and simultaneously
receive a share in the original firm, Greenberg finds that an
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equilibrium allocation exists. Not all equilibrium allocations
are Pareto-optimal, due to the restriction on the formation of
coalitions. But by defining an embracing technology, the resul-
ting equilibrium may be Pareto-optimal. This technology repre-
sents a weaker restriction on the formation of subcoalitions.
The workers are allowed to form subcoalitions and share the
proceeds from these subcoalitions among the members. Further-
more, in the replica economy there exists an efficient price
system supporting this equilibrium, coinciding with the equi-
librium in a PM-economy.
Greenwald (1979) argues that the comparison between the labour-
managed economy and the idealized capitalist economy may not be
the most relevant one. Instead the labour-managed firm should be
compared to a strongly unionized capitalist firm, defined as a
firm where the union is strong enough so as to capture the whole
of the economic rent (profit), i.e. the union is restricted by a
bankruptcy constraint only. In this case the responses to para-
meter changes are identical between a labour-managed firm and
the unionized firm. As the profit (economic rent) can be
considered the return to a scarce factor in free supply, the
solution to the problem of existence of an equilibrium will
depend on the ability of the economic system to establish an
equilibrium "rent" vector. Dreze (1974) assumed that these
"free" factors of production were owned by the households, and
that these ownership rights were given initially ("historical-
ly"). However, Greenwald argues that fixing the rents may create
problems, so that they may be fixed either too high or too low,
causing problems in defining an equilibrium allocation. This is
related to the problem of inducing worker-managers to reveal
their true productivity by means of incentive compatible mecha-
nisms, cf. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). It must be noted that
in Greenwald's scenario the workers have alternative employment
prospects in a self-employed sector, which may imply that for
some level of rent all workers will leave the cooperative sec-
tor, causing non-continuities in the supply functions. However,
if an equilibrium is defined, appropriate use of rent changes
when price parameter changes, will induce the labour-managed
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firm to undertake the same response as the idealized capitalist
firm, cf. the Slutsky-equation approach examined above, assuming
that the first-best solution can be implemented.
The assumptions made concerning entry and exit of firms may be
quite strong ones, even in the long run. There are probably
large costs involved in establishing and closing down enterpris-
es, both to entrepreneurs and society. Especially in å shorter
time perspective, these assumptions turn out to be quite
unrealistic. Then, if the possibility of attaining a competitive
equilibrium depends crucially on entry and exit of firms, we
must admit that obtaining efficiency in an LM-economy may create
problems. (Of course, entry and exit assumptions cause the same
problems in a PH-economy.)
However, suggestions have been made on how to cope with the
allocational problem, which in particular relate to the short-
run allocational decisions. Vanek, Pienkos and Steinherr (1977)
show that using price controls and lump-sum taxes as allocation-
al instruments removes the problem of a backward bending supply
curve, and the problem of a possible instability and wrong re-
actions to price signals also. Although their discussion refers
to imperfect competition, it has general interest as means of
~controlling and directing allocation of labour, and thereby
level of production. Another suggestion aimed at influencing the
incentives of the firms is put forward by Ireland and Law
(1978). They suggest the establishment of an Enterprise Incen-
tive Fund, whose objective is to tax and subsidize firms depend-
ing on their allocational decisions. The firms make payments,
respectively receive money transfers, depending on whether the
workers' dividend exceeds or falls short of a market shadow
wage. Then efficiency may be obtained through firms acting acc-
ording to their self interests.
A problem with these suggestions is that they require some know-
ledge of parameters which the governing body will have to obtain
from the firms involved. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) have ex-
amined the possibility of implementing incentive correcting
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mechanisms, and they show that the firms will have incentives to
reveal true values in special cases only. This will be further
discussed in a subsequent paper dealing with optimal taxation.
On the other hand, the allocational problems may diminish, or
even vanish, if the firm is allowed to deviate from the rela-
tively strict definition of the LM-firm as it is formulated by
wiard (1958). Some modifications are discussed above, and others
should be mentioned also, in particular as elements of these
ideas will play an important role in the papers on finance in-
corporated in this thesis. Thus, ~1eade (1972) suggests that
experimenting with the incentive structure may be useful for
reaching a better resource allocation than that of the Illyrian
firm. In particular this may be obtained through the inegalitar-
ian cooperative, which allows for members having unequal shares
in the firm's value added. These may be determined e.g. accord-
ing to seniority. A model for trade in membership rights is
discussed in Sertel (1982).
Furthermore, if the LH-firm is allowed to employ non-members on
short-term contracts, the firm's production decision may be
favourablyaffected, as shown by Domar (1966). However, then the
possible dilution of the firm as labour-managed becomes immedi-
ate, as it may be found advantageous by remaining workers always
to hire new workers instead of giving them full membership
rights. This is discussed by Miyazaki (1984). He argues that
this is an important explanation of the relatively rare success-
ful experiments with labour-management in capitalist economies.
In his model he assumes that the U1-firm is able to insure its
debt obligations by making them state contingent. In addition
there may exist self-insurance schemes so that temporarily fur-
loughed member will receive the same constant income stream as
the non-furloughed workers. Uncertainty is caused by a random
market price, and the workers, who maximize the expected income
from participation, are ~ssumed risk averse. The hired workers
• receive the market wage rate. If the workers outside the firm
cannot completely insure their wage, it may pay workers of a
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bankrupt Pt1-firm to transform the firm into an LM-firm, although
in some states they will receive a payment lower than the going
r market rate. However, if the constant income stream received by
all members exceeds the expected market wage, it will always pay
to substitut~ hired workers for leaving workers, and the firm
will turn into a capitalist firm. Only market conditions under
which the workers do not receive a payout above the market wage
rate are consistent with a pure Ll1-firm, although the size of
the optimal membership may be infinite. But if capital markets
are not perfect, an U'l-firm with a finite, unique membership
size may exist .
•
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
The results discussed so far refer mainly to LM-firms operating
under first-best market conditions. The only imperfection touch-
ed so far is the possibility of imperfect capital markets and
insurance arrangements under uncertainty. Although many other
imperfections could be considered, e.g. different kinds and
degrees of monopolization in the labour as well as product mark-
ets, I will in later chapters of this thesis concentrate on two
important problems which affect the possibility of reaching a
first-best optimum. One is the lack of a perfect credit market,
and the other is the existence of distributional goals which may
call for the introduction of efficiency disturbing tax func-
tions. The theory outlined above, combined with an overview of
the literature on the finance of U4-firms, is intended to serve
as a background for these analyses.
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FOOTNOTES
•
l) Illyria is an old Latin term for the Adriatic coast (Yugo-
slavia, Albania).
2) The properties are local only. The existence of non-con-
vexities of the cost-function may make the solution non-
unique, and the statement is not globally valid. See also
Ireland and Law (1985).
3) See Ireland and Law (1985) for a complete treatment.
4) The desire to reduce the level of employment is discussed
above, and it is explained slightly more formally in the
subsequent survey-article on the finance of LM-firms. The
individual over-supply of labour is shown formally in the
article on optimal taxation of LH-workers and -firms.
5) Meade (1972), p. 421 .
•
6) Steinherr and Thisse (1979) assume that dismissals are
carried through randomly. However, other principles of
membership reduction may change the result. Brewer and
Browning (1982) argue that a principle of last-in-first-out
may make membership reductions involving up to 50 % of the
work-force profitable.
7) Some algebra is needed to sh~i this formally, and this will
not be done here as the analysis is carried through by
Hiyazaki and Neary. A reasonable explanation can be given,
however, by arguing that a price increase will increase the
relative price of "staying at home", which is the alterna-
tive which faces the marginal worker.
8) Some of the comparisons between certainty and uncertainty
scenarios may change if, as pointed out by Hawawini (1984),
the certainty case is defined as the decision made after
•- 46 -
the price (or the productive environment) is revealed,
rather than the case where the firm faces the expected
price.
9) A complete treatment of certainty and uncertainty scenarios
is given in Hey (198la).
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THE FINANCE OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS
- A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
l. INTRODUCTION
The finance of the labour-managed firm has been a subject of
continuous interest. Several problems have been addressed,
ranging from appropriate formulation of the firm's maximand to
the optimality of different ways of obtaining finance. A
general concensus exists throughout the literature that in an
economy consisting of labour-managed firms the main problem is
the provision of internal finance. Therefore most interest has
been devoted to assess the profitability of internal versus
external finance, and to the establishment of proper financial
institutions. In this overview of the literature I will
examine the main contributions.
I will follow the literature in emphasizing the problems of
finance in a labour-managed firm with the property rights
structure which is found in the Yugoslav (Illyrian) firm. This
will be explained further in the next section, where I will
draw attention also to some alternative models. In Section 3 I
discuss the internal finance of a labour-managed firm with
collective ownership of capital, the Illyrian firm, while I
broaden the scope in Section 4 to allow for external finance at
a fixed rate of interest. Then in Section 5 some suggestions
are discussed, which are aimed at solving problems of external
finance under uncertainty. Lastly in Section 6 these sugges-
tions are considered within the wider context of an optimal
financial environment of a labour-managed firm.
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2. THE MODEL AND SOME BASIC PROBLEMS
I will define a labour-managed firm as a firm where the workers
own the means of production and make the decisions regarding
production, employment and investment. The firm will maximize
the utility of the workers or of a dominating coalition of
workers, see Furubotn (1976). A utility index can be estab-
lished, where present as well as future consumption and non-
pecuniary benefits are arguments. It is, however, common to
assume that the objection of the firm is per period wage maxi-
mization, or the maximization of sales minus non-labour costs
per worker (dividend), due to Ward (1958). The model is
intended to represent the Yugoslav (Illyrian) firm. In the
discussion we will concentrate on this variant of a labour-
managed firm, with a proper modification to allow for inter-
temporal optimization.
The importance of this modification is pointed out by Furubotn
and Pejovich (1970) and Furubotn (1971). They argue that the
maximization of per period dividend will result in no inter-
nally financed investment being undertaken. However, the
Yugoslav firm is by no ,means completely externally financed.
Indeed, in each period the workers decide on the allocation of
a gross surplus, "profit" aftet:_,payment of non-labour costs and
taxes, "to a wage fund and to an investment fund. According to
the Hard hypothesis, the latter should be zero, which corre-
sponds to his assumption that the firm is entirely externally
financed. On the other hand, it is not difficult to find
reasons'why the allocation to investment should be non-zero.
The government may require it as a condition for being willing
to supply credit. If there is a professional management of the
firm, its utility may be increasing in their ability tp
generate internal finance, as this may influence their future
job prospects. But it may also be rational from the workers'
point of view not to maximize wage payment per period. If they
are concerned with present and future wealth, they will maxi-
mize an intertemporal utility function. The cost of sacri-
ficing consumption today will be mitigated by the enhanced
- 3 -
future consumption prospects. Thus, if the representative
worker expects to remain with the firm for T periods, the
proper maximand, see Furubotn and Pejovich (1970), is
(l) Max u (C l' C2' ..., CT )
where Ct' t = 1,..., T, is consumption in period t. Then the
comparison of the marginal rate of substitution between present
and future consumption to the yield of investment in capital
equipment will give the optimal consumption pattern over
. l) If" h ... .t1me. An examp e o a s1tuat10n were pos1t1ve 1nvestment 1S
optimal is shown in figure l below:
Figure l: Optimal consumption and investment over time. Two
periods. wt' t = 1,2, is maximum income in the twoperiods when investment is zero. (See Furubotn
(1971».
In figure '1 the workers can choose between consumption today
(Cl) and consumption in the future (C2). wl is maximum income
in period l, resulting if total income is consumed. Then w2
will be the period 2 income. However, part of wl' say
*(wI - Cl) may be withheld for investment, and thereby increase
income and consumption in period 2. \fuen investment is zero,
income and consumption in period 2 is w2. Investment (saving)
*may however increase consumption to a point like C2. The
curvature AB reflects the yield of the investment, which
together with the intertemporai utility function u(Cl, C2) will
give an optimal level of investment and consumption over time.
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Now, to proceed from here, we must explain the property rights
structure under which the firm is assumed to produce. The main
feature of the Illyrian firm is that the workers have no
individual claims on the receipts of an investment. Those will
reap the benefits who are employed at the ti~e an investment
pays off. This causes two main problems that the workers will
consider before voting for an investment project to be under-
taken, viz. the horizon problem and the common property prob-
lem, cf. Jensen and Meckling (1979). The first problem relates
to the tenure period of the initial workers compared to the
life-time of an investment project, which may for long-lived
projects result in truncated flows as a leaving member of the
collective will have no right to share in the income after his
departure. The latter problem points to the fact that poten-
tial new workers will share in the proceeds of an investment on
equal terms with those workers who made the sacrifice by under-
taking the investment. Both aspects will affect the profit-
ability of an internally financed investment, although I will
in the discussion to follow concentrate on the horizon prob-
lem.
It should be noted, however, that the property rights structure
of the Illyrian firm is not the only conceivable one. A
possible way out of the problem is to follow Ward (1958) and
Vanek (1970) and assume external finance only. But as remarked
by Jensen and Meckling (1979), a pure rental firm, i.e. a firm
financed 100% externally at a fixed capital cost (interest
rate), is impossible, mainly because of the need to make
investments in intangibles. This is recognized by Vanek
(1977c) and McCain (1977), who suggest the introduc~ion of
different varieties of variable-income bond finance without
voting rights to bond holders. Sertel (1982) proposes on the
other hand that membership rights should be traded, which would
be a substitute for the poor functioning capital market.
Lastly, as pointed out by Gui (1984), the "Basque" labour-
managed firm - the firms in the Mondragon cooperative system in
the Basque provinces of Spain - may represent a more efficient
solution to the property rights problem, compared to the
'.
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Illyrian model. Here membership rights cannot be traded. But
each worker possesses a personal account to which he has to
allocate funds when joining a firm. As a member the worker
receives work payment as well as interest on his privately
provided capital, and he is allowed to withdraw his funds when
retiring. T~e problems discussed in this article refer to the
labour-managed firm with collectively owned capital, as this is
the model most widely analysed in the literature.
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3 • INTERNAL FINANCE
Let us assume that the labour-managed firm consists of N
workers, and that this level of membership is constant over the
time horizon we consider. This means that we consider the
yields due to the initial worker-members. Excluding the common
property problem - new workers share in the proceeds on equal
terms with old workers - is not necessarily an unreasonable
simplification, as the initial workers have the possibility to
refuse membership to new workers.
Firstly we have to establish the planning horizon T of the
initial workers. According to Furubotn (1979) it does not need
to be lengthy. At any cross section of time t, it is given by
the formula Tt = To t, t = l,2, ...,To' where Tt is the
planning horizon and T is the total tenure period. Furubotn
o
discusses how the horizon will depend on the political process
of decision making within the firm, notably the formation of a
dominating coalition. If such a coalition is stable and holds
the power over time, the horizon of the decision making
majority will continuously diminish. On the other hand, we may
as well assume that there is a median worker who holds the
balance of power, and whose remaining tenure period is an
average of that of the total workforce. Alternatively we may
consider the problem as a bargaining problem, in which case the
horizon will be some weighted average of the horizon of all
workers.
Now, as there exist no tradable claims on the residual of the
firm, and we have also to take into consideration that all
workers have the same claim on the yield from an investment
project, independent on past effort and on how long they have
stayed with the firm, each worker voting for an investment to
be undertaken will be sure to have his part of the investment
expense recuperated during his tenure period with the firm.
I.e. the yield from the project must repay the principal ~
secure an increase in future income above the best alternative
available, which we assume is a deposit in a privately owned
bank account.
- 7 -
Thus, if the yearly return on an investment is r, we must have
for a marginal project worth $1 to be undertaken, that
(2 )
T
E r = l,
t=l (l+i)t
where i may be interpreted as the rate of time preference or
the opportunity cost of financial capital in the economy, i.e.
the interest rate on savings accounts. \le can solve for r to
get
(3 ) * ·(l+·)Tr = ~ ~
(l+i)T_l
which is obviously higher than i for a finite T. We can
calculate r for different time horizons, T, and opportunity
costs, i, to obtain the required rate of return. He see that r
is decreasing in T, and it will be high for short horizons.
Now, as pointed out by Zafiris (1982), this formula is in
itself not special for a labour-managed firm, as a capitalist
firm will also require the principal recuperated. The
difference arises only when the lifetime of the investment
project exceeds the horizon of the workers. The residual
claimant in a capitalist firm will simply cash in his expected
future claims by selling his shares, while a worker-member of a
cooperative looses all claims when retiring. This effect, that
the capital costs will increase if the lifetime of the capital
equipment exceeds the tenure period of the representative
worker, is termed the Furubotn-Pe jovich effect 01cCain
(1977» .
This is however not the only explanation of the alleged
increase in capital costs of labour-managed firms. A labour-
managed firm will often be subject to what Bonin (1985) refers
to as a strong capital maintenance rule. Such a rule is in
operation in Yugoslavia (Furubotn and Pejovich (1970».
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According to this rule, the book value of the stock of capital
has to be kept intact in perpetuity, i.e. disinvestment cannot
take place. There may be economic efficiency reasons (see
below) as well as social reasons for having this rule. An
important social consideration is the desire to prevent capital
from being converted into individualized consumption. However,
its effect is to increase capital costs compared to the
capitalist firm, and Zafiris (1982) argues that the capital
maintenance rule is the main explanation of the high capital
costs. ~lhile the repayment of the principal should be compared
to the depreciation of the capital equipment in capitalist
firms, and thereby results in the same capital cost in the two
firms if the horizon of investments and owners are the same,
the capital maintenance rule is unique and \vill call for a
double counting. Hathematically we can still use (3) to
represent the required rate of return. But it should be noted
that r is now the required return after allowance has been made
for depreciation. Therefore in (3) r* represents a gross hurdle
rate without the capital maintenance rule, while it is a net
rate when this rule is in operation, i.e. calculated after
*depreciation has been made. In both cases r is the required
rate of return.
As mentioned above, there may be efficiency reasons for having
'"a capital maintenance rule, in "addition to the social one
mentioned. Vanek (1977a) showed that there are underlying
economic forces which tend to reduce the size of the firm over
time, by Vanek termed the self-extinction forces. How strongly
these forces work, depends on the technology of the firm.
Firstly, if there are globally decreasing returns to scale, it
will always pay to reduce the size of the firm, and an equilib-
rium can be reached only with a one-man firm. But even con-
stant returns cause problems. This can be explained, following
Vanek (1977a), by assuming that the firm is initially in a
position where the value marginal product of capital equals the
time preferance. 2) ~vrite the production function as
x = N •
- 9 -
where X is production, K is capital and N is labour (employment
level). f(~) is increasing in ~ at a decreasing rate, and f(O)
= O. All investments are internally financed. The workers
will maximize payment by maximizing production per worker, e.g.
by not replacing members who retire, and thereby increase the
KIN-ratio. However, assuming technical complementarity, the
reduction in the labour force reduces value marginal product of
capital below the equilibrium level giving equality between the
marginal productivity of capital and the time preferance. Then
disinvestment takes place until the firm eventually turns into
a one-man firm. The reason for this is the workers' strive to
capture the yield due to capital. If the workers have to pay
fixed costs, e.g. to the government, there will be a minimum
size of the firm which will turn out to be the unique equilibr-
ium size, see figure 2 below:
X
N
fixed
costs
per
worker
f (!) ~N .fixed costs = O
f (~)l
N fixed costs positive
rA, *
\ tf} ..
K
N
Figure 2'. Optimum firm size under constant returns to scale and
social ownership of capital, with and without fixed
costs
*In figure 2, equilibrium positions are o and (KIN) respec-
tively, where there is equality between the marginal efficiency
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Kof capital, the slope of the f(N)-curve, and the cost per unit
of capital. This condition is found from the maximization of [~-iJ with respect to N, where F is fixed costs and X = N •
f(N'}.
If the firm has a technology with increasing returns to scale
at low production levels, and then decreasing returns, see e.g.
Vanek (1970, 1977a) and Ireland and Law (1984), an equilibrium
is reached where N > l because of the diseconomies of too low a
production. But if the firm is internally financed with a
hurdle rate rI > i, production is lower than in the pure rental
firm, or the profit-maximizing firm, see figure 3 and Vanek
(1977a) .
K
X*
-X
K
= - Lr*
K*
._------~~-----------------~NN* N
Figure 3. Production and capital-labour ratio in an internally
financed labour-managed firm.
In figure 3, at point (N, K), there are locally constant
returns to scale. In this position capital and labour are paid
the market remunerations i and w respectively. However, in the
self-financed labour-managed firm self extinction forces are
under operation, reducing Nand K, until payout per worker is
- Il -
. . d (* *) h * d K* K Th" tImax~m~ze at N, K were X < X an -- < ~s ~s exac y
N* N
what was shown in the preceding figure also. But now an
internal solution is secured by inefficiency of a too low scale
of production.
The effect discussed above is termed the Hard-Vanek effect
(HcCain (1977».
On the background of the setting outlined above, Furubotn
(1976) discusses the long run efficiency of the self-financed
labour-managed firm. He lays down a number of restrictions
within which the firm has to operate, and he assumes that the
firm maximizes a utility function defined over consumption and
several non-pecuniary environmental factors. The solution to
the constrained maximization problem shows how the firm chooses
between consumption now and in the future, i.e.·between payout
and investment in productive assets. -Now, assume that the
workers have the opportunity to choose between investment in
individually owned savings accounts or in non-owned (collec-
tively owned) capital equipment. The rate of return has to be
corrected for the property rights so as to be able to compare
the yield from an investment in non-owned assets to the yield
from individual savings. By this correction we require that
the return from investment in the firm, reI), repays the
workers the principal and an annual compensation equal to the
bank rate of interest, after allowances for depreciation. If
the marginal productivity of capital is falling, given
employment, the marginal yield of an investment is
(4 ) ar* (I) •I * ar*al = r + ~ I,
where I is investment spending, and r* is the (property-rights
corrected) return per period, and ~I*< O. An investment will
be undertaken if
- 12 -
*
(5 ) * or i,r + ar >
where i is the return on owned deposits
Now, we know that the corrected rate of
in savings accounts.
return is lower than
the uncorrected return, r, which includes allowances for
depreciation, so that
(6 ) r* or*+ ar < r
Pareto-optimality requires investments to be carried through
until there is equality between the· uncorrected rate of return,
r, and the market opportunity cost of capital i. But it is
obvious from (5) and (6) that the firm's investment decision
will exclude socially profitable projects, and a socially opti-
mal investment level cannot be obtained, unless, as pointed out
by Furubotn, the savings rate is fixed below the opportunity
cost of capital.
It must be noted that Furubotn's analysis refers to the
Yugoslav labour-managed firm. However, as pointed out by
others, see e.g. Bonin (1985), a strong capital maintenance
rule will increase capital costs in addition to the increase in
costs caused by the horizon and common property problems.
Berman and Berman (1978), on the other hand, argue that the
assumptions taken by Furubotn are the sole explanations of the
inefficiency of his labour-managed firm. In particular they
find the capital maintenance rule inappropriate in a long term
perspective, as it will preclude the liquidation of non-
profitable investments. Furthermore, they find the reliance on
self-finance unrealistic, and they see no reason why the
workers should not be allowed to allocate their savings to the
firm by means of owned investments. Furubotn also assumes that
the employment level cannot shrink over time, and at the same
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time that hours of work per worker is fixed. According to
Berman and Berman, also a profit-maximizing firm facing such
restrictions would fail to allocate its resources efficiently.
Other aspects pointed out by Berman and Berman are the lack of
a capital market and no entry and exit of firms in Furubotn's
model. These will strongly influence the allocation in the
economy. In addition we could argue that as there exist
individual savings deposits with the banks, there should be no
reason why the banks should not lend funds to the firms, in
particular when taking into consideration the high rate of
return on the marginal project when internal finance is the
alternative source of finance.
Furubotn (1978) argues that entry of firms will probably be
low in the labour-managed economy, due to the lack of incen-
tives to entrepreneurship. Thereby this will not be a means
by which resources are moved to more productive uses. Hiring
capital equipment is often held to be an alternative· to
internal investment. This will, however, according to Furubotn
give reduced incentives to household the capital stock prop-
erly. This increases agency costs, see Jensen and Heckling
(1976, 1979), and it will make investments in hired capital
more expensive than investments in owned resources. However,
Furubotn does not consider this in a general equilibrium
context, where incentives may exist to household the hired
capital equipment properly. In particular we should expect to
find that the owner of the equipment would demand a rental
reflecting the real costs, which would directly depend on the
way the equipment is being used.
On the other hand, there are assets which it is hard to imagine
can be hired, and both Furubotn (1978) and Jensen and Heckling
(1979) point to the need for investments in intangibles like
education and organisational development. It may also be
difficult to obtain bank loans for such projects. This calls
for at least some internal investment, and the problems raised
by Furubotn and Jensen and Heckling may exist. Simultaneously,
however, in such cases there will be strong personal interests
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which will affect the decisions. It may e.g. be the case that
"intangible projects" are less price elastic than investments
in capital equipment. In addition, as these projects may be
considered public goods, there may be scope for an efficiency-
improving governmental intervention (subsidised loans).
We can, however, conclude that self-finance of collectively
owned capital reduces the level of investment. Let us
demonstrate the result in a diagram. If SS is the
savings-schedule for owned assets and II the marginal
efficiency of investment, after allowances for depreciation if
the capital maintenance rule is in operation, the effect of the
Yugoslav property rights structure can be shown as in figure 4;
adapted from Furubotn (1974).
i,r
S
I,S
Figure 4. Level of investment in the labour-managed firm with
the Yugoslav property rights structure.
r* is the minimum acceptable return on investments (cf. (3»,
and the property-rights corrected savings-schedule will be
r~S'S'. The vertical distance between SS and S'S' reflects the
increase in return required when going from owned (SS) to
non-owned (S'S') assets. We may think of SS as the supply of
funds to savings accounts, or to individually owned shares.
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\Vi th investment in non-owned assets, the level of investment is
reduced to I2, from the level II when investment takes place in
owned assets.
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4. FIXED INTEREST RATE BANK FINANCE
Up till now we have restricted attention to the internally
financed labour-managed firm. But as pointed out at the end of
the preceding section, and argued by Berman and Berman (1978),
the assumption is unreasonable that the firm does not use any
external sources to finance its activity. E.g. Vanek argues
that internal finance, apart from being inefficient, is also
ideologically unacceptabie.3)
Nevertheless, the optimal way to finance an investment in
labour-managed firms has been a subject of fierce discussion in
a lot of articles. On the one side Vanek (1970, 1977a-d) and
Furubotn and Pejovich, see e.g. Furubotn and Pejovich (1970),
Furubotn (1971, 1974, 1976, 1980a,b) and Pejovich (1976), have
argued that self-finance is always inefficient. The labour-
managed firm should be completely externally financed as long
as it has to operate within the property rights structure of
the Yugoslav firm, or a firm with a capital maintenance rule.
This is mainly the view taken by Gui (1981) also, although he
concentrates on establishing the conditions under which an
investment project is more profitable in a capitalist firm than
in a labour-managed firm, given some degree of external
finance.
On the other side, Stephen (1978, 1979, 1980), Stephen and
Smith (1975), Zafiris (1982) and Bonin (1985) argue that some
degree of self-finance will normally be optimal, and that in
some cases 100% internal finance may be the optimal policy.
The crucial factors in determining the financial structure are
the remaining tenure period with the firm of the initial
workers, the lifetime of the assets in question, the period of
a possible loan, and the interest rates of deposits with the
banks and borrowings from the banks.
The factors mentioned above will determine the hurdle rate of
profitable investments financed by borrowings or by internally
provided funds. The centrepiece of the discussion is whether
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the critical rate of internally financed investments will
exceed or fall short of the critical rate of externally
financed projects. The authors seem to disagree on this accor-
ding to the line indicated above. In addition there seems to
be some disagreement as to the application of the capital main-
tenance rule on externally financed investments. In earlier
papers, e.g. Furubotn (1974), the author assumes that loans
can be repaid from the depreciation funds, so that no capital
maintenance has to be carried through during the repayment
period of the loan. Stephen (1979) argues that this implies
treating assets differently depending on their source of fin-
ance, which will of course affect the relative profitability of
internal and external finance. However, in a later paper, when
discussing the optimality of external finance, Furubotn assumes
explicitly that the capital maintenance rule applies for bank
financed investments also (Furubotn (1980b)). This, in turn,.
according to Furubotn, will imply that also the externally .
financed labour-managed firm will operate with a capital level
lower than the socially optimal level indicated by equality
between the opportunity cost of capital (deposit rate) and the
marginal rate of return on capital (cf. (5) and (6».
Now, assume that the capital maintenance rule is in operation.
Then (3) gives the hurdle rate for an externally financed
project with a finite loan period also. Note that also this
*hurdle rate is calculated net of depreciation allowances. r
is obviously decreasing in T. If the repayment period can be
extended beyond the horizon of the initial work-force, the
hurdle rate of external finance is lower than that of internal
finance since not all of the principal need to be repaid, while
the opposite is the case when the repayment period is shorter
than the horizon of the work-force. Using this, Bonin (1985)
shows, when the bank lending rate equals the deposit rate of
interest, that external finance will be used exclusively if and
only if the repayment period exceeds the horizon of the
(initial) workforce.4) In other instances there will generally
be a mixture of internal and external finance, and the gap
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between the bank deposit rate and the lending rate is crucial.
Furubotn (e.g. 1980a) tends to argue that this gap will be
small, favouring external finance, while Stephen (1979) tends
to argue that it may be large because the capital maintenance
rule affects the effective lending rate in the same manner as
the required return on internally financed investments is
affacted. This may favour a segment of internal finance before
the firm starts borrowing.
Let us illustrate this in a diagram similar to figure 4, a
procedure followed by Furubotn as well as Stephen:
r*I------
I
o A
Figure 5. Level of investment under internal and external
finance.
Still II represents the marginal efficiency of investment, and
can be considered the demand for investment projects. SS is
the supply of funds to owned assets, and r*S'S' represents the
supply of funds to non-owned assets. Let i be the banko
deposit interest rate, and let il be the lending rate. It is
reasonable to assume, as does Furubotn, that this rate is below
the hurdle rate of internal investments. If the loans have
infinite maturity, i.e. the principal need never be repaid as
long as the book value of the assets are kept intact, il will
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be the cost of borrowing, and the projects will be 100% exter-
nally financed. However, as the repayment period becomes
finite, the critical rate for accepting borrowing will increase
because of the capital maintenance rule (the required return
according to (3) will increase). Thus, at some stage, depending
on the repayment period, the critical lending rate may exceed
r*. Then, as argued by Stephen, the application of the
cheapest-source-first ruleS) will imply some internal and some
external finance. An example of this situation is given by the
"effective" lending rate i2 in figure 5. Total investment is
OB, of which OA is internally financed and AB is borrowed at
the constant "effective" (critical) rate i2. It should be
noted that investment is reduced compared to the level QC when
the "effective" rate stayed below r* .
Gui (1981) is concerned with the comparison of investment
decisions between labour-managed firms and capitalist firms.
While increased external finance will make the capitalist
better off only if the bank lending rate is below the owner1s
discount rate (time preference), the same will hold for the
labour-managed firm provided the lending rate is not too much
higher than the time preference. When comparing investment
projects with a given level of external finance the capitalist
firm is generally better off. Exceptions arise if membership
is allowed to be reduced over time in the labour-managed firm,
and if the unit labour costs are higher in the capitalist firm.
Gui shows also that different forms of governmental subsidy
will increase the relative profitabilty of investing in the
labour-managed firm, which is justified on the grounds of the
special property rights structure, and that governments often
intervene with capital contributions to bankruptcy threatened
capitalist firms.
The discussion above indicates clearly that the propety rights
structure and the capital maintenance rule result in a reduced
investment level compared to that of the capitalist firm, or a
labour-managed firm with individually owned capital. Although
self-finance may take place, from other reasons than being
forced upon the firm because of credit rationing, see Stephen
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(1978), or resulting from the utility function of the
management that may have special interests in arguing in favour
of self finance, see Furubotn and Pejovich (1970), it is clear
that self-finance is less attractive under labour-management
with social ownership of capital than under regimes where
ownership is individualised. This will tend to increase the
demand for credit if a system of labour-management is to reach
the same set of Pareto optimal allocations as an economy
consisting of profit-maximizing firms. Indeed, if this is to
occur, see Dreze (1976), the firm has to be able to obtain
loans with infinite roll-over, or by other means be able to
obtain 100% external finance at a market clearing rate. This
is the assumption taken by V/ard (1958) and Vanek (1970) also.
Vanek (1977a) puts it this way:
"It has always puzzled me how it could have been
possible that a productive organisation based on co-
operation, harmony of interests and the brotherhood of
men, so appealing and desirable on moral and philosophi-
cal grounds, could have done so poorly when subject to a
practical test. It seems to me that we now have both an
explanation and a way of remedy".6}
The explanation is the inefficiency of internal finance. The
remedy is introducing effective ways of obtaining external
finance. This can be done by a system of large-scale renting
of capital assets (hired capital equipment as mentioned above),
e.g. organised by the government or some other formal
institution (Vanek (1977b)). This has to be accompanied by
formal legislation favouring the idea of self- management.
Although fascinating, the idea unfortunately creates problems.
Firstly there is the problem connected with investment in
intangibles and problems of control, cf. Jensen and Heckling
(1979). Secondly there are political problems of introducing
the system in economies where other types of firms dominate.
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Vanek seems to argue that such problems can be solved in a
fully decentralized labour-managed economy by founding a
"National Labor Hanagement Agency". This body is assumed to
supply funds as well as give advice in planning etc. In
particular in a world of uncertainty its role may be crucial,
as will become clear from the analysis to follow. That subject
has so far not been mentioned. But it should not come as a
surprise that the introduction of uncertainty creates new
problems, which will strongly affect the optimal financial
structure of a labour-managed firm.
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5. UNCERTAINTY
Harket and production uncertainty will affect the optimal way
of financing the firm. Two interesting approaches to the
problem can be considered, due to Vanek (1977c) and r1cCain
(1977). Both authors take as their departure the idea that
income uncertainty calls for the introduction of
variable-income finance, or more precisely a financial
instrument whose remuneration is dependent on how well the firm
is doing. Simultaneously they try to find solutions which
maintain self management of the firm and voting rights vested.
with the workers. The suggestions are intended to represent
realistic ways of organising a financial environment. In a
later chapter of this thesis I will question the possibility of
combining such variable-income finance with complete self
management ~ an egalitarian power structure within the firm.
The two suggestions differ in their practical formulations,
and in what issues they aim at solving. It is taken for granted
that internal finance is not profitable because of the
Furubotn-Pejovich effect. Exclusive fixed interest rate
external finance may however be undesirable from the workers'
point of view. Vanek is concerned with finding a financial
structure which results in an optimal risk-taking by the
workers, while HcCain argues that bankruptcy risk may make
external finance at a high gearing ratio inordinately
expensive. Both approaches call for supply of risk taking
capital.
Vanek (1977c) introduces a system of share-cropping which
implies that the financiers participate in risk taking by
receiving a part of the firm's income. If both fixed-income
debentures (risk free bonds) and variable-income debentures
(risk participating bonds) are available, the firm should be
able to choose the best combination of these bonds. The intro-
duction of variable-income debentures will reduce the risk held
by the workers by reducing the variance in income. But the
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bond suppliers will demand an expected return above the
interest rate on fixed-income debentures as a compensation for
the risk they are supposed to share.
Now, assume t~at the firm can choose among different portfolios
consisting of fixed- as well as variable-income debentures. The
workers' utility is assumed increasing in income and decreasing
in the variance of 'income (risk aversion). Increased
variable-income finance can be obtained at an increasing cost
only. Given an investment expense, there exists a most
preferred portfolio mixture, as shown in figure 6.7)
y,Y= E(y)
-y
y* ,,,,
t
Y . ,rn~ t,
t
Var (y)O A B
u
Figure 6. Optimal level of risk held by workers of a labour-
managed firm.
Variable-income debentures share in risk. Therefore the
bond-holders will demand an expected return which is at least
as high as the return on risk free bonds. This will affect the
income to be shared among the workers. Let E(y) be expected
dividend per worker (or increase in expected dividend by
undertaking an investment project), and var (y) its variance.
y is income net of costs of finance (interest paid on bonds).
The highest expected income obtainable is Y when all finance
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is provided by means of fixed interest rate bonds. The workers
will have to carry all risk, so that variance is represented by
maximum variance B. The workers can reduce their risk by
choosing portfolios consisting of variable-income debentures.
At its most extreme we may imagine that all risk is shifted to
bondholders, and the workers are receiving a risk free wage.
This situation is represented by Y . . It is reasonable tom~n
assume that the financiers will demand an increasingly larger
compensation as their part in risk taking increases. \'/e must
remember that bonds carry no voting rights. E.g. in (O, Y . )m~n
the workers have the exclusive voting rights, while bond-
holders carry all risk. This solution will induce high agency
costs (see Jensen and t1eckling (1976) and the discussion in
part 6 of this paper relating to their article). Using this, we
can draw a concave curve e between the two extrema, (B, 1) and
(O, y . ), which may be interpreted as the boundary of thenu.n
opportunity set giving portfolios of different combinations of
riSk-taking by outsiders. In the same figure we have drawn an
indifference curve u reflecting the workers risk aversion. Then
the optimal 'risk taking by the workers is found in (A, y*). The
workers may buy some of the variable-income debentures
themselves. This will not reduce the total risk taken by the
workers. But it may improve efficiency compared to exclusive
fixed interest rate finance if the workforce is heterogeneous
in terms of attitude to risk.
McCain (1977) investigates the optimal financial environment of
a collecti've which has the option of issuing ordinary bonds,
participation bonds or rely on self finance.8) Due to the "law
of increasing risk" (bankruptcy risk), Kalecki (1937), the
interest rate on ordinary bonds will increase in the gearing
ratio when uncertainty prevails. This means that fixed interest
rate finance will not be possible under uncertainty.
The participation bonds may represent an optimal way of
reducing capital costs. The bonds carry no voting rights. But
they are assumed to share in risk. This, HcCain argues, will
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create problems if the suppliers of bonds do not have any
guarantee that the workers' and the financiers,' interests are
the same. Instead of Vanek's share-cropping I1cCain therefore
formulates a rule for income sharing which ties payout to
holders of risk participating bonds to wage-dividend to the
workers. vfuen the firm maximizes payout per worker, it also
maximizes the return to bonds.
McCain's argument is quite simple. Assume firstly no
uncertainty. Then the interest rate on ordinary bonds is fixed
as there is no bankruptcy risk, and the market rate of return
on participation bonds will in equilibrium equal the risk free
rate. The workers are therefore indifferent to mode of finance.
Self-finance, however, will be ruled out because of the
Furubotn-Pejovich effect (see above). Introducing uncertainty
changes the investment decision, and possibly the financial
structure, as capital costs increase. The return to ordinary
bonds, r, is determined endogenously in each firm's
optimization problem as
(8 )
where B is ordinary bond finance and K is total capital in the
firm. The expected return to participation bonds, r**, is
determined in the market, and it is thereby exogenous to the
firm. Assume that the bond-holders value expected returns. To
be able to obtain risk participating finance, the workers must
determine a parameter, z such that
( 9 ) x" * = z • E (y) ,
where E(y) is expected dividend to the workers. The equilibrium
financial structure of the firm is found where the marginal
costs of the three modes of finance (self finance included) are
equal. Self finance will, however, not be used according to
McCain. But the sustainability of this result hinges on some
. l . 9)spec~a assumpt~ons made .
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If internal finance is zero, the required return to internally
financed investments does not affect the optimal solution, and
the Furubotn-Pejovich affect does not play any role. Then,
McCain argues, the labour-managed firm financed by risk parti-
cipation bonds cannot do worse than the capitalist corporation
financed by means of shares. Indeed, in some cases the
labour-managed firm will even do better. This may occur when
the capitalist corporation is partly self-financed and the
capital markets are not perfect. Then there may be a
divergence between the corporation's internal opportunity cost
(time preferance) and the market rate of return, as the
capitalist corporation will typically make use of internal
finance.
On the other hand, if participation bonds are not available,
the labour-managed firm may rely on internal finance also. As
pointed out by HcCain, the Furubotn-Pejovich effect and the
Hard-Vanek effect will be mitigated by the increasing cost of
external finance, and conditlons may be met for the firm to
undertake internally financed investments.
The analysis by HcCain is interesting in the sense that it
broadens the set of financial instruments available to the firm
beyond those considered by e.g. Furubotn, Pejovich and Stephen.
vle can illustrate HcCain' s results within the framework used by
Furubotn et al. By referring to figure 5, certainty represents
the case where the lending rate is il' and no internal finance
is undertaken. Introducing uncertainty means that the cost of
borrowing increases due to the "law of increasing risk", and il
*will approach r. If participation bonds are not available,
the cost of borrowing will eventually supercede r*, and some
internal finance is profitable. However, the introduction of
participation bonds may lower the capital costs, and il will
again fall below r*.
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A problem in interpreting McCain's results is the use of quite
special assumptions. In particular this affects his conclusion
that internal finance will be ruled out when participation
bonds are available. On the other hand, the financiers'
interests should be better taken care of than in Vanek's
share-cropping system, as their return is tied to the workers'
return. However, considerable control problems remain. The
workers' utility may depend on more than income. Work-place
consumption, which it is hard to measure, may be a good
substitute for a high take-home wage. Then agency costs will be.
high. Alternatively there may be negotiations between workers
and financiers in determining rules for payout. But then
self-management, contrary to assumption, is no longer total.
The solution may be either to accept outsiders' voting rights,
and/or abolish collective ownership of capital and allow for
the introduction of possibly vote-carrying share finance. vle
will return to the subject in section 6, and in a later chapter
of this thesis.
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6. THE OPTIMAL FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT?
In the literature reviewed so far, there is a consensus of
opinion that the finance of labour-managed firms is a subject
pointing to a potentially serious problem for the system of
labour-management. Although the labour-managed firm can be
given a property rights structure different from the Illyrian
firm's collective ownership of capital, see Gui (1984), the
"socialist" structure represents properties many proponents of
labour-management will find desirable.
Theoretically the problems involved can be solved internally by
different systems of tradeable claims. Tradeable job rights,
suggested by e.g. Sertel (1982), would be the precise analogue
of shares in a capitalist economy, and common property problems
and horizon problems should disappear as the wealth of the firm
is capitalized in the claims. On the other hand, there is not
a stock exchange continuously evaluating these claims, and
correspondingly transaction costs and miscalculations will be
larger than in a capitalist environment (Furubotn (1980c».
Schlicht and von Weizsacker (1977) find the system not feasib-
le, apart from practible problems, mainly due to the incomplete
separability of person and property right. They point, howev-
er, to another underlying feature which may affect the possi-
bility of obtaining debt.
After having considered different modes of finance: internal
finance, fixed interest external finance, variable-income fi-
nance (non-voting shares) and leasing, they argue that the main
problem in financing labour-managed firms is the commitment
problem. Outsiders will contribute with finance only if they
believe that the decision-makers make "good" decisions. A good
decision from a financier's point of view is one that maximizes
the long-term wealth of the firm. Schlicht and von Weizsacker
argue that the degree to which the workers commit themselves to
the firm will be an indication of the quality of the decisions
made. A solution to the commitment problem is having a low
mobility of labour between firms, which can be obtained through
unemployment or other mechanisms which increase the mobility
costs. Furubotn (1979) argues on the other hand that a low
turnover of labour is not necessarily an indication of a
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long planning horizon. Decisions may be taken by a dominating
coalition, whose remaining tenure period may be short.
But whatever the solution is to the commitment problem, proper
financial institutions will have to be established. Thus,
Nutzinger (1975) discusses in a more general context different
procedures which can be followed in financing labour-managed
firms. He argues that capital can be supplied by means of
shares held by the workers (owners), by the state or by any
economic agent in cooperation with the workers. Unless shares
are supplied by the workers only, the shares should bear no
voting right. Nutzinger indicates toward the end of his paper
that control problems may arise because of outside finance,
which are probably hard to solve. He does not give any
solution to the problems. But he argues that experimenting
with different forms of finance may give interesting results of
importance to the system of labour-management. Although
labour-management may be favourable to working conditions and
effort (see e.g. Vanek (1970) and McCain (1977, Section V»,
the problem of finance has turned out difficult to handle. The
suggestions put forward by Vanek and HcCain represent possible
paths to follow.
However, the propositions are, as indicated previously, not
without problems. Dreze (1976) and Jensen and Heckling (1979)
comment upon the suggestion put forward by Vanek (1977c). If
both workers and outsiders hold shares, and the shares held by
the workers are identical to those held by outsiders, the
workers can always do better by issuing all shares in the
market than by keeping a fraction of them th~mselves. But if
risk is taken by outsiders and voting control remain with the
workers, the solution will generally not be efficient as the
workers are receiving a risk free wage giving no incentive to
allocate the resources according to the preferences of the
residual claimants. Thus, probably no-one will be willing to
buy risk-sharing bonds without compensation through payment
and/or voting control. The same applies when inside held
shares/bonds carry voting right whereas the outside held shares
do not. In addition that scenario implies an increase in the
number of restrictions. On the other hand, as argued by
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HcCain, the restrictions result from the credit market, in
reality facing all types of firms. Furthermore he argues that
the non-voting bondholders are comparable to the minority
shareholders in ordinary stock companies. To them the voting
rights are generally of less importance, as long as they can be
assur~d that the firm's maxirnand corresponds to theirs.
Jensen and Heckling (1976) consider the relation between the
firm and its financiers in terms of agency costs. These inclu-
de the control costs indicated above. They argue that the
capitalist joint-stock firm does not eliminate agency costs,
but that these are minimized by that property rights structure.
Thus, in order to minimize agency costs, the labour-managed
firm must convince the capital suppliers (outsiders) that they
have common interests with the workers. Probably this is not
as easy as convincing minority share-owners in stock companies,
unless there exist institutions like the one suggested by Vanek.
(1977b, 1970, ch. 15).
Following these lines of reasoning, one might be tempted to
believe that the cost of capital is minimized in the joint
stock firm (Heade (1972» maximizing payout per capital unit.
Then all capital suppliers take part in risk and decisions
(although the workers have no formal say, which may influence
their productivity). But as attitude to risk differs among
capital suppliers as well, different financial instruments
should exist, including the possibility of obtaining fixed
returns. A compromise may be the codetermined firm, wh i.chmaxi-
mizes (a utility function of) payout to capital suppliers and
workers. The bargaining power of the different parties plays a
crucial role in determining the relative shares in the return.
The importance of this approach is that it throws light on the
performance of workers as well as capital suppliers of a firm.
Thus, as pointed out by ricCain (1982, p. 41), the inefficiency
of labour-owned firms resulting from reduced portfolio diversi-
fication and ownership by risk averse workers, may be a source
of increased monitoring and better performance in terms of X-
efficiency. This indicates that there may be an optimal way of
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organising the firm which gives some control to workers and
some control to capital suppliers. (For an overview, see
HcCain (1982)). Or, as it is formuated by Dreze:
"Tentative as this conclusion may still be, I regard it
as providing theoretical justification for the partici-
pation of both labor and capital - whether it be pub-
licly or privately owned - in decisions affecting the
future of the firm and hence of its workers and capital
owners.,,10)
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FOOTNOTES
l) For the time being we are excluding alternative investments
in financial assets.
2) The time preference should be corrected for the property
rights structure, resulting in a higher hurdle rate if the
life of the capital equipment exceeds the remaining tenure
period of the workers.
3) See Vanek (1970), ch. 14.9 and Vanek (1977d).
4) Bonin (1985), proposition 5, p. 64.
5) Stephen (1979, 1980) argues that Furubotn is led into his
error of recommending external supply only because of his
concern with maximizing the level of investment, see p. 154
and p. 798 respectively.
6) Vanek (1977a), p. 187.
7) See Vanek (1977c), figure 11.4, p. 225.
8) Ordinary bonds and participatidn bonds should be comparable
tø Vanek's fixed-income debentures and variable-income
debentures respectively.
9) Specifically these assumptions are: The minimal rate of
return on internal finance is at least twice as high as
r**- the market rate of return on participation bonds, and
that the workers are not allowed to reduce the level of the
workforce below half the initial level.
10) Dreze (1976), p. 1137.
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ON THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM Of LABOUR-MANAGED fIRMS,
AND THE APPLICATION Of INDIRECT OBJECTIVE fUNCTIONS TO
REPRESENT THE EQUILIBRIUM
by
lJan Erik Askildsen
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will use indirect objective functions to repre-
sent the optimal choice of labour and other factors of produc-
tion in a labour-managed firm. It will be shown that comparative
static results are easily derived by using a dual approach, both
when the firm's and its workers' individual optimization prob-
lems are considered~ As will be shown, the results are valid for
quite general formulations of the firm's objective function
(maximand).
A labour-managed firm (LM-firm) is defined as a firm where the
workers own and control the firm in which they work. All im-
portant decisions concerning production, investment and employ-
ment are made collectively or by an elected management express-
ing the interests of the workers. The objective of the firm is
to produce quantities of one or more products in such a way that
dividend (wage, payment) to the workers is maximized.
Characterization of the optimal decisions of the LM-firm con-
cerning employment, use of capital and level of production is
well known from the literature. Most theory refers to the 111-
yrian (Yugoslav) LM-firm (Ward (1958)). But an important exten-
sion of the theory has received much attention. Ireland and Law
(1982) argue that the utility of the workers is the prime con-
cern of worker-cooperatives. This implies that individual labour
supply decisions have to be taken into consideration.
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I find it valuable to summarize some existing results on the
optimal allocation of labour and non-labour factors, and choice
of production, by means of indirect objective functions. But
simultaneously I want to stress the importance of viewing the
firm's optimization programme in two stages: the firm's collec-
tive decisions and the individual workers' individual optimiza-
tion. All relevant information about the firm's equilibrium
choice of factor and production combinations is contained in the
LM-firm's dividend function, and each worker's indirect utility
function, or its dual the expenditure function, represents the
household's equil~brium labour supply decisions.
A dividend function is used by Ireland and Law (1982), ch. 2.10,
and Brewer and Browning (1982) introduce a maximum revenue func-
tion to analyse the optimal emloyment of the LM-firm. In this
paper I will use this approach when discussing the firm's long-
run optimization problem. But since its dual, the cost function,
has been used in some contexts, I shall give a brief outline of
the firm's cost minimization problem.
It has been shown by Hey (1981) and Ireland and Law (1985) that
the LM-firm's optimal production and factor employment decisions
can be conveniently expressed by cost functions. In the general
problem, where all factors of production are assumed variable, a
proper definition of the firm's technology is required. Speci-
fically, so as to be able to find a unique equilibrium, the
technology must exhibit first increasing and then decreasing
returns to scale. In that scenario the LM-firm's optimal pro-
duction level is found where average costs are at their minimum,
implying the existence of a U-shaped average cost curve. By
choosing this cost-minimizing production level, the payout to
the workers is maximized, assuming that prices of output and
non-labour factors of production are given. Then there exists a
minimum cost function in the parametric prices and the maximum
attainable dividend, whose properties are equivalent to those of
the non-restricted cost function representing the equilibrium of
profit-maximizing firms (PM-firms), see e.g. Varian (1978).
Ireland and Law (1985) use this cost function to do comparative
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statics on the firm's equilibrium when prices of products and
non-labour factors of production change.
Now, whereas this minimum unit cost function is defined when all
factors of production are variable only, Hey (1981) shows that
the cost-function approach is more generally applicable by de-
fining a cost function over non-labour costs. For every level of
production, the firm will always choose factor combinations so
that the burden per worker of non-labour costs is minimized.
Then a minimum cost function exists, which is equivalent to the
PM-firm's cost function, and it can be defined with or without
restrictions on the variability of some factors of production.
But to be able to obtain this equivalence, the cost function
must be defined in terms of production, factor use and costs per
worker. But then the cost function can be used to study long-run
as well as short-run changes when price parameter changes. On
the other hand, we will not necessarily be able to tell how
absolute levels of the variables change.
I shall consider a model which stresses the importance of con-
sidering the long-run and short-run optimization problems sepa-
rately, which will be defined as the firm's and the household's
problems respectively. A similar approach is taken by Ireland
and Law (1981), and I find it useful to show that the main re-
sults can be confirmed by this dual exposition ~f the problem.
The long run problem is, as seen from the point of view of the
members of the LM-firm, mainly a problem of finding relative
factor combinations that maximize the utility from partici-
pation. This justifies the use of dividend functions that define
relative production and factor levels. In the short run, how-
ever, employment level as well as the use of non-labour factors
should be considered constant, see e.g. Berman (1977) and
Steinherr and Thisse (1979). Then the workers' problem becomes
closer to the leisure-work decisions of workers in PM-firms, and
a programme characterizing their labour supply decisions is of
interest. The indirect utility function and the expenditure
function offer an informative characterization of this short-run
equilibrium.
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The model is outlined in the next section. The management's
problem, i.e. the long run problem, is discussed, and a divi-
dend function·is used to derive responses to price changes. Then
the workers' optimal choice of labour supply, i.e. the short run
problem, is characterized. In Section 3 I use indirect utility
functions and expenditure functions to analyse the equilibrium
of the households (the individual workers). Comparative static
results are derived in S~ction 4, using the expenditure function
to derive Slutsky-equations. The importance of how income is
distributed among the workers is stressed, and the influence of
this on the comparative statics is examined. In Section 5 I
briefly discuss the optimization in a medium-term time perspec-
tive, and discuss some results relating to the comparative sta-
tics of a multiproduct firm. Some concluding remarks are given
in a final section.
2. CHARACTERIZATION or OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION
DECISIONS
Model
It may be natural to consider the optimization of the LM-firms
and their workers in two steps. In the long run all input fac~
tors, including labour, are considerea variable. Level of em-
ployment, total number of hours to be worked and use of non-
labour factors are freely chosen according to the behaviour
rule, which is maximum dividend per unit worked. Let us assume
that the firm's decisions are made by a democratically elected
management, which expresses the interests of the workers. In
the short run, however, the number of workers is fixed as it
seems unrealistic that anyone can be forced to leave the coop-
erative, cf. Berman (1977) and Steinherr and Thisse (1979).
Hours of work can on the other hand be varied, and each worker
decides himself on how many hours to work. This decision can be
made by collusion or under the assumption that each worker takes
the labour supply of other workers as given (Nash-Cournot).
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These two steps, short and long run, can be analysed separately.
When management makes its decisions on long-run factor alloca-
tion and production, the labour supply of the individual workers
is taken as given. Total number of hours to be worked, and
thereby total number of workers, are to be determined. We assume
that the decision is made according to the preferences of the
workers. When the workers decide on their labour supply, the
number of workers in the cooperative as well as the level of
non-labour factors of production are taken as- given exogenous-
ly.
We shall analyse a representative LM-firm producing one or more
products, denoted by a vector X (vector of Q elements). Products
are sold at market price P, where P is a vector of Q elements
also. The number of workers in a firm is denoted by N., and each
. J
worker supplies l~, i=1 ••• ,N, j=1 ••• ,J, units (hours) of work to
J N
firm j. The total number of working hours in a firm is L. = I
. J Le l
l~. The enterprise makes use of non-labour factors also, denoted
Jby a vector of 5 elements, K .• An S-element vector r denotes the
• Juser price of non-labour factors. In the short run all elements
of K. are fixed, and non-labour costs are then for notational
J 5
convenience denoted by F. = I rJ.sKJ.s• Furthermore we assumeJ s=1
that there are J firms. In much of the analysis to be made this
is of little importance, so that notation indicating which firm
we analyse, will be omitted when it is clear that we are referr-
ing to the representative firm j.
tong-term-optimization-=--fhe-managenrent~s-problem
The management chooses the levels of non-labour factors, employ-
ment and production in such a way that dividend per labour unit
is maximized.
The unit of labour is to be interpreted as a worker, an hour of
work or·a standard efficiency unit. In this representation
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tation we will use hours of work as the standard unit since it
is general enough to be interpreted as any other unit, and at
the same time it is a unit which is practically measurable.
Of course, the choice of unit will not be made arbitrarily, in
particular as it affects the way surplus is distributed among
the workers. Some aspects of this will be discussed in several
contexts below, with special mention of how they relate to the
allocation of labour and production. Here I will comment briefly
on two general points. Firstly, I find the optimization problem
of the Illyrian firm (Ward (1958)) inappropriate in several
circumstances. The maximization of dividend per worker will
probably be considered unfair in cases other than those where
all workers have-to work the same number of hours. Although this
may sometimes be the case, it is certainly not a generally acc-
epted assumption in the theory on labour supply, and the behavi-
our rule should take into consideration the incentives directing
labour supply decisions. Secondly, we need a programme which is
so formulated that its elements can be measured. This may be
problematic if efficiency units are other than hours of work. Of
course, some elements of productivity are easily measured, like
e.g. special qualifying education. But measuring e.g. speed of
work will require quite comprehensive supervision activity, and
measuring quality of work may prove prohibitively costly. On the
other hand, the variables indicated are not necessarily correla-
ted with hours of work, although they are important in obtaining
economic results. Thus, maximizing with respect to number of
hours to be worked, does not necessarily yield the best result.
If extensive cooperation between workers or strong solidarity
between them were existent, choice of behaviour rule would prob-
ably be a minor problem. Then even maximization of dividend per
worker might prove satisfactory. 'But it seems not realistic to
start out with such an assumption, although it may well be an
interesting special case.
There is another_justif~cation for using hours of work as a
representative unit in the maximization problem. Other aspects
which exert influence on quality of work, intensity of work
etc., can be considered a social good, see Dreze (1976). Then we
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have to draw attention to free-rider problems, and that the
workers have incentives not to reveal their true productivity.
But this may imply that these variables (quality, intensity)
vary more among groups of workers (departments) than among indi-
vidual workers. Therefore it may prove easier to find a distri-
bution rule which takes into account group qifferences without
affecting the firm's optimization problem as such, by varying
payment among groups of workers.
Of course, this is not a perfect solution to the free-rider
problem. But it represents a formulation which is comparable to
the one used when PM-firms are studied. Furthermore, on an ab-
stract level, it is easily generalized to allow for compensation
according to any productivity measure. This is further discussed
later in this section, and in footnote 5 where we show how
dividend may be varied among groups of workers as well as among
workers. As presented here, hours worked is assumed to be a good
proxy for amount of work done, obtained by a ~inimum of informa-
tion and cost.
Dividend, y, is defined as
( 1 ) y = PX-rKL
Maximum production associated with input levels L and K is given
by a twice differentiable production function. As there may be
more than one product, the efficient production plans are denot-
ed by
(2) f(X,L,K) = O.
The usual properties involving positive and decreasing marginal
productivities are assumed.
Now, an LM-firm can produce one or more products, as indicated
by the production function above. Here we are not primarily
concerned with the choice of products to produce, so that it is
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sufficient to assume that production facilities are optimally
allocated between different activities. This does not mean that
we disregard effects of joint-production, which may be of im-
portance when studying LM-firms1). It is rather a result of our
intention to concentrate on the allocation of input factors.
Therefore it is convenient to assume that the various products
are easily singled out as functions of input factors, Le. for
each product 9 we assume CK may still be interpreted as a vec-
tor) that
C 2 ' ) x = gel ,K ),
999
q = 1, ••• ,Q.
a (p X )
Thus, the derivatives at q
q
to the g- function in (2'), and the same
aC P X )
q 9 > O below relateoK
9
will apply to the second
> O and
order derivatives, i.e. the assumption
2
ties are decreasing means that o g 2<
a( L )
9
one-product case, the e9uivalence between
obvious as we have then that X-g(L,K) = O.
that marginal productivi-
2
O and ~ 2< O. In the
o( K )
9
(2) and (2') is
Now we can write the management's optimization problem as
C 3 ) Max
L,K
y = PX-rKL
s.t. fCX,L,K) = O.
According to (3), all workers share on e9ual terms in income
from all production activities. First order conditions defining
optimal factor combinations and production are, when marginal
productivities relate to the g-function in (2') and we note that
aLar- = 1:
9
(4a)
oCP X )9 9ol
9
=
PX-rK
L 9 = 1, ••••• , Q
(4b)
o( P X )
_..,..,..,.9 9 =
oK
9
r, 9 = 1, ••.•• , Q.
o~rX) is the value marginal product of labour, which will be
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2)denoted VMPL• We see that the value marginal products will be
equalized over the production activities.
There may be different types of labour that are to be compen-
sated at different rates. This will not alter the optimal solu-
tion as L may be viewed as a common efficiency unit. When divi-
dend is paid according to type of work, productivity or hours of
work, the individual payment is given as some ratio to this
unit. Then the management's task is to maximize dividend per
unit irrespective of its interpretation. See also footnote 5,
and the discussion above.
Thus, X, Nand K are chosen according to (4) to give the optimal
position of the firm'given P, r and the workers' individual
labour supply. When the variables are at their optimal levels,
the equilibrium may be characterized by a dividend function,
Y' .3) This maximum value function expresses maximum dividend
worker as a function of the price parameters P and r. When Z is
per
the production possibilities set, we write the dividend function
as
(5) Y' = Max y
s , t. L, K, X e Z ~ R1+S+Q •
Y' is convex (not strict convexity) in P and -r, and the divi-
de~d function will be used to stu~y effects on the endogenous
variables L and K of shifts in price parameters. As the deriva-
X K
tives of y' at prices P~ and r~ are respectively ~ and ~,
q=1, ••• ,Q, s=1, ••• ,S, when conditions (4) are fulfilled, we can
X K
immediately find the changes in Lq and ~ resulting from para-
meter shifts. By using the convexity of Y', which implies posi-
tive second order derivatives, we have
(6 a)
X
o~
ar-f 0,
q
q=1, ••• ,Q,
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(6b)
K
a sL- < o,or =s s=1, ••• ,S.
Generally it is hard to determine the total effects on produc-
tion and employment, as this is influenced by several cross
effects, whose signs depend on technical relations in produc-
tion. Substitution possibilities between factors as well as
products matter. In the short run these may be quite small, but
they are probably of more significance in a longer time perspec-
tive. As the discussion relates here to long-run decisions, we
must take substitution possibilities into account. Then, from
(6a) we find, if the relative price of product q increases, that
the optimal production per worker of product q increases. But
this also affects the production of oth~r products through in-
ternal factor and product adjustments, provided substitution
possibilities exist. I.e., if possible, production facilities
will be transferred so as to increase production of product q.
But this means that the production of product q can be increased
without increasing employment.
Let us examine this adjustment process somewhat more closely. If
the production functions (g-functions) are homogenous, equally
proportionate changes in all factors do not affect relative
marginal productivities. But dividend, y, changes when P does,
q
implying that labour becomes relatively more expensive if P q
rises. This causes a shift in factor combinations towards non-
labour inputs, which affects labour productivity positively or
negatively depending on technical relations. Thus, the effect on
employment (or more precisely, total number of hours to be work-
ed) is ambiguous when the relative price of one product increa-
ses when the production function is homogenous, and the 'total
effect on scale of production is ambiguous as well.
The above discussion relates to the general case with more than
one factor of production. In the two-factor case it is possible
to establish the results more precisely. When there are constant
returns to scale, technical complementarity between
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the factors of production follows,
2o g(K,L) >
et, oK
effects
i. e •
2in (2') o g(K,L) =, oK ol
o. Furthermore, in the two-factor case the cross-
have to be opposite to the direct ones. Then we have:
(6c)
x
o ~
ar < O,
o ~
L f O.
~
(6d)
From (6d) we see that the ~ratio is non-decreasing. As tech-
nical complementarity means that labour productivity is increas~
ing in the other factor of prnduction (capital), we see that
(6a) can be satisfied through either a reduction in employment
or an increase in the use of capital. (Of course, if there is
technical complementarity between all factors, the last point is
generally valid. But to establish technical complementarity in
the general case, further assumptions are required.)
Now, in the two-factor case, according to (6a) and (6d) the
effects on total employment and production are ambiguous. The
effects on L,K and X must be found by doing comparative statics
on the first order conditions. When the production function is
homogenous of the first degree, this yields the result that:
dl
dP
dK dX
dP = O,= =dP
assuming an equilibrium can be found. Furthermore, also
dl
=dr
dK
dr =ardX = o.
The LM-firm cannot do better by. changing factor mix when its
production function is homogenous of degree one. This implies
that the firm's dividend-function is linear in P and r.4) How-
ever, we have problems in defining maximum when constant returns
to scale prevail over some range. To define a unique equili-
brium, the average cost curve should be u-shaped. But then the
a-responsiveness and linearity indicated above will generally
not hold.
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In the general case the effects are harder to trace out, par-
ticularly when input-output relations differ between lines of
production depending on scale advantages. Net effects on employ-
ment, use of non-labour factors and production will depend on
technical relations and transfer possibilities. To state ulti-
mate results, we would need knowledge of these technical rela-
tions.
If all prices change with the same percentage, and scale advant-
ages do not differ among lines of production, there is no reason
to adjust product mix. Total effects on employment and produc-
tion levels will depend on technical relations as optimal factor
mix will change. The same occurs if prices of non-labour factors
change. This may influence product mix also, as factor intensi-
ties may vary between lines of production, and thus affect the
relative profitability of the products.
If there is no possibility of changing the product combination,
the effect of a single price changing is identical to an equally
proportionate change in all prices. On the other hand, if the
scale of production of the product in question can be changed,
and held fixed for other products, the result will be as in the
one product case. These cases are, however, probably of little
empirical interest, as some substitution possibilities will
exist in the long run. In the short run, they might prove more
interesting.
Some of the aspects mentioned above will be discussed also at
the end of next section, although from a somewhat different
viewpoint.
Short-term-optimization"--the"households~"problem.
i .Each worker chooses lab-our (hours of work) (l) and c on sump t t on
(ei) so as to maximize a utility function given the number of
workers in the LM-firm(s):
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( 7 ) i=1, ••• ,N.
ui(Ci,li) is individual ils quasi-concave utility function,
i ou i i ou iwhere uc = -..- > O and ul = -.- < O. The household's budget isoC l 011
restricted by dividend (income) from work in the LM- firm( s) .
Income per unit worked is not constant, as the worker can him-
self/herself decide upon how many hours to work, which will
affect the dividend. Furthermore, dividend may be distributed
according to differen~ rules, e.g. proportional to hours worked
or on a per capita basis independent of hours worked by each
worker. Whether all workers receive the same payment for a la-
bour unit (hour, year etc.), plays a minor role in this context.
The workers may belong to different pay categories also, charac-
terized by productivity or type of work, which may affect the
dividend received. Although these qualifications are not taken
explicitly into consideration in all"results to be developed,
this is easily done without changing the way in which the analy-
.. . d th h 5),6)SlS lS carrle roug.
Sen (1966) specifies an income distribution rule which contains
both payment according to "work" (proportional to hours worked)
and payment according to "needs" (equal amount per worker). He
shows that some combination of payment according to "work" and
payment according to "needs" can be found which secures a Pare-
t o-eopt Lma I supply of labour, irrespective of collusion or "so-
cial consciousness" among the workers. Such a rule is easily
incorporated into a general dividend formula, as it will be
shown below.
Here we will as a starting point use a quite general dividend
formula, allowing for payment according to work done, according
to "needs" (Sen (1966)), and also distribution of dividend acc-
ording to other productivity measures or type of work (task in
iproduction). Denote share of dividend due to worker i by Dj'
i=1, ••• ,N, j=1 ,••• J. As the share will vary among the workers,
we use superscript i to indicate the different workers. A pro-
-.
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portion of dividend, y, may be paid according to work done, and
< <(1-y) according to "needs", where O = y = 1. Then the reason
for different payment to workers in the same firm is due either
ito variation in individual hours of work (l ), or different
productivity or type of work. Payment according to type of work
or productivity is in the general formula taken care of by the
parameters o; and o~. The dividend sharing rule of firm j is: 7)
(8) D~ oi
l~ oi 1J (1-y.) i=1, ••• ,N.- Yj L. + 1\I ,J 1 2 JJ
According to (8) dividend is composed of two elements. Both of
these elements may be affected in different ways by the factors
mentioned above which will influence payout (productivity, ac-
tivity, etc). Therefore the two parts of D~ is assigned o; and
o~ respectively, and one of them may well ~e equal to unity
while the other is not. Thus, we may also interpret (8) as a
linear approximation of a non-linear dividend distribution
(wage) system~ Also, as the economy consists of several firms,
dividend is only paid to workers who are working in ("member
of") firm j, Le. D~ = O for non-members.
Now, assume that the actual dividend distribution is given by
some specification of (8). We are interested in finding the
optimal labour supply of a representative worker. In most cases
there will be need to distinguish between work in different
firms. Although relative price changes leading to shifts in
relative dividend among firms may lead to shifts of occupation
or hours worked in each firm, we will concentrate on studying
the actions of a representative worker employed in only one
representative firm. In our analyses here, nothing is lost in
terms of generality by assuming membership in one firm. When
studying LM-firms this should not be considered a strong
assumption as workers will, because of the firm's structure of
codetermination, probably have loyalty and interests towards the
firm beyond the pure economic ones. Thus, we will omit the
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subscript j, and concentrate on a worker working in a represen-
tative firm.
The representative worker's optimization problem can be written
as in (9) below. In this partial equilibrium analysis we have
also omitted the superscript i, as the worker may be any employ-
ed in an LM-firm. This is however a notational simplification
only, and not an assumption that all workers are identical.
Superscript i will be used when it is needed in interpreting
results. Thus, we write
(9) Max u(C,l)
s.t. pC = (PX-F) • D
C and p may be interpreted as vectors of consumption gaods and
prices of consumption goods respectively. First order conditions
are:
(10a) uC - A.p = O
(10b) u , + A. [o(PX) ~ • D
Å 5C OJ. oD ]+ (PX-F) ~ = O
(10c) (PX-F) • D = pC
A.is a Lagrange multiplier. We assume an interior solution and'
monotonicity so that A.> O. In order to have efficiency in Pare-
to sense, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and work must equal the value marginal product of work. As it is
seen from (10a) and (10b), this condition will be fulfilled only
in certain circumstances. Degree of collusion and social consci-
ousness and formulation of the dividend distribution rule are
decisive in this context. This is discussed in several other
articles as well, see e.g. Sen (1966), Bonin (1977), Berman
(1977) and for a summary Ireland and Law (1981).
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A few comments on the marginal rate of substitution, MRS, is
appropriate. The MRS is, for some representative worker i, de-
fined by using (10a) and (10b) as
(11 )
ui 1l- -- =Ul. P
C
• Di + (PX-F)
It is of interest using a somewhat more general formulation of
(11). As indicated in (8), payment can be made according to
various units. In footnote 5 we showed that the production func-
tion can be written in terms of efficiency units, and that diff-
erent work categories are easily taken into consideration. Then,
instead of using L as input factor, let us use LE' where LE is
number of efficiency units supplied to the LM-firm, given em-
ployment level. As. a special case, LE is number of hours worked.
Furthermore, let al. be a parameter transforming worker i's la-
bour supply into efficiency units. Then ai reflects the produc-
tiv~t~ of w~rker i. Worker i's ~upply of efficiency units is. l~
= al.Il.• Of course, if LE (and l~) is number of hours, then al.=
1. Since it should not matter in this context to which work
category worker i belongs, i.e. we do not analyse choice of
occupation, we do not take into account that payment may differ
a~ong groups of workers (~b' defined in foot~ote 5, is 1). Divi-
i . i i al.~dend to worker i will be, when 61= 62= 6 = ~ (see also foot-raj
j
note 5):
(8 I )
i
a·+ (1-y) _
o o \' ol.:
00 La
i
Furthermore, we have that
o(PX) o(PX) oLE olE i oCPX) oLE= oLE --.,. - = a oLE . ____,.. .oll. oIl. oll. oll.E E
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oLE li iLetting E ( 11) can be written:ol~ tE = 'Tl = 'TlE
(11 ' )
ul 1 i { [o(PX) PX-F (1-'Tl)]= • a y oL • 'Tl + LEUc P E
o(PX) oL - -L}(1- y) E+ olE • °l~ Ia~E i
'Tl is the elasticity of total number of efficiency units in the
individual worker's supply of efficiency units. The interpreta-
tion of the r.h.s. of (11') is independent on what kind of units
'Tl measures. When it is not ordinary hours, ai transforms the
ulterms in bracket to the same units as - Conditions for Pare-uc·
to-optimality, and comparative statics, can therefore be analys-
ed irrespective of what kind of labour units which enter into
the production function and the dividend sharing rule (cf. Vanek
(1970), ch. 12). Particularly, when a1 = 1, Le. efficiency
oL lunits are number of hours worked, then 'Tl = 6T L' and the inter-
pretation of (11 ') is straightforward.
As to 'Tl, it lies in the interval ~ ~ 'Tl ~ 1 if l~ = lE for all i
initial~. In our comparative static analysis, we will assume
'Tl .~, i.e. a Nash-Cournot assumption for individual labour
supply reactions. Then we know that labour allocation is Pare-
to-optimal when "social consciousness" is perfect or when some
optimal value of y is chosen (Sen (1966)). When y = 1, the allo-
cation is Pareto-optimal when the firms are in long run equilib-
o( PX)rium, Le. ol = YE' see (1) and (4a).
E
iHowever, in the analysis to follow, we assume a = 1 for all i
belonging to firm j. Furthermore, the analysis is independent
of the work category to which the worker belongs, so that also
~i = 1 (see footnote 5). As we have argued above, this simpli-
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fication does not seriously affect the generality of the re-
sults.
3. INDIRECT OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS TO REPRESENT HOUSEHOLD
EQUILIBRIUM.
We will now se how the individual workers' optimal choice of
labor supply and consumption can be represented by indirect
objective functions. These may be useful in other contexts also.
Particularly when taxes are introduced, indirect objective func-
tions have analytical advantages, partly because of the formula-
tion's lucidity, and partly because the problem is formulated in
terms of prices and income. Some effects of taxation will be
examined in a subsequent paper.
Assume that the worker has chosen the optimal leisure and con-
sumption levels according to (10). Then worker ils indirect
utility function can be written as:
(12 )
h :I:iv(p,P,F,l ,N,y,m) = max u(C,l)
s.t. pC - (PX-F) • D < m.
Here lh*i is a vector of labour supply from workers other than i
working in the same firm, and m is minimum lump-sum income ne-
cessary to reach a given utility level. This indirect utility
function, or its dual the expenditure function, is useful when
deriving labour supply functions and studying the effect of
price changes. The expenditure function is:
(13) h*i [ PX-Fe(p,P,F,l ,N,y,Uo) = min pC - y -r- • l
+ (1- y) P~-F ]
s. t. u(C,l) > uo
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The expenditure function is to be interpreted as minimum lump-
sum income, m, necessary to reach a given utility level, u • Weo
will make use of this function when doing comparative statics.
By using Roy's identity, the indirect utility function could be
used instead. Some remarks regarding information contained in
the indirect utility function (and in the expenditure function
as well) should however be made. We will show how the individual
members of a producer colle~tive like an LM-firm are affected by
the labour supply decisions of other workers and the level of
employment (membership) of the firm.
Let us investigate first how a representative worker's maximum
attainable utility is influenced by the level of employment.
This reflects the employment policy each member wants the mana-
gement to follow, and the management is supposed to act in ac-
cordance with the workers' preferences.B) In the long run we
assume that each worker's labour supply is fixed and on average
1 li.e. D = ~ or D = C'
o ld o 1Yle s, assumlng N =
equal to 1. If Y is either 1 or O,
entiation of (12) with respect to N
di ffer-
lr:
( 14 ) ov ( .)oN .1 _ P~-F).
(Far simplicity, the indirect utility function is denoted by
v(.». A is interpreted as marginal utility of money (income),
and A > O. Thus, the sign of the effect on worker ils maximum
utility by changing the level of employment is dependent on how
the firm has allocated its resources. In long term equilibrium,
o(PX) -l PX-F d th k o o dOff t b t ool • = ~ = y an e war er lS ln l eren e ween ln-
creasing or reducing employment. However, if o~~X) = VMPL < I,I
which will be the immediate effect of a price increase, we see
that utility is decreasing in the number of workers. Thus, each
worker for whom A>O will find it profitable to reduce the em-
ploymerit level, and accordingly vote for this to occur. Of cour-
se, all workers could agree instead upon a reduction in individ-
ual labour supply, thereby reducing the need for membership
reduction. But as membership reduction can be carried through by
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natural retirement etc., there should be no need to dismiss
workers who do not want to leave. Then reduction in individual
labour supply will take place only if the workers find it opti-
mal to do so according to their individual leisure-work dec i-
sian.
However, in the long run the firm may change the level of non-
labour factors also, and K will be affected by changes in L(N).
We can write the effect on maximum utility from a marginal chan-
ge in N, when non-labour factors are affected as well, as:
(14 I ) av ( .)aN = Å. • I [(o(PX)r sr . I PX-rK)- N
aK
+ I~ I(o(PX) - r )],
s OL aK s s
haL -l A ' , " th t thw ere ~ = • galn, assumlng a prlce lncrease, we see a e
effect on maximum utility of changing membership is no longer
unambiguous when the firm is not in a long run equilibrium. If
oK
there is technical complementarity in production, i.e. ~ > O,
and l'f a(px) > 1 S 't b t' lt'aK s rs' s= ,••• , , l may e ap rm a o i nc rease mem-
bership as the change in use of non labour factors offsets the
effect discussed above. With technical substitutability, howev-
er, there will definitely be a reduction in membership. But an
overall complementarity seems most realistic, and in the case
with two factors of production and constant returns to scale,
this is always the case. See also discussion in Section 2, under
the heading "Long-term optimization".
In a shorter time perspective individual hours of work can be
varied. Expelling members, and for the same reason engaging new
members, is considered to be an unrealistic assumption in the
short run, cf. the presentation of the model in Section 2 above.
But the utility of worker i will be affected if the other work-
ers change their individual labour supply. Suppose worker h, h*i
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and heN, changes his labour supply
vidual i's utility is, assuming Di
hl • Then
l i 9)
= r:
the effect on indi-
(15)
iov (.)
olh
= Ai [( o(PX) _ PX-F) oL l i PX-F oli ]
sr ~ hlf1 r + -C- ~
Furthermore, the value this derivative takes,
oL
ol h = 1.
ol iOn the other hand, :7h
ol
oL olifor the value of:7n. If ~ =
ei ol
1 . Li oL= lmp les :7n =
ol
O, thenhas implications
two arbitrarily chosen workers
1 . ol iN' we find that assumlng ~ =
ol
are being studied.
N, assuming
liThen, if L os
1 will yield
(15 a)
iov (.)
olh
o(PX)oL
while the effect on maximum ei iutility when --- = O isolh
(15b)
Thus, the assumptions made concerning individual labour supply
reactions are decisive for the outcome. When all workers change
individual labour supply simultaneously, (15a), worker i's indi-
rect utility is always increasing in the labour supply of other
workers. The reason is that the worker's marginal utility of
income is positive, and a unamimous increase in labour supply
will definitely increase the income of each worker. But assuming
that worker i does not respond to the change in labour supply by
worker h yields a result similar to the one discussed in (14),
i.e., the effect on indirect utility is dependent on whether the
firm is in long run equilibrium, when the effect is zero, or
whether VMPL ~ y. Particularly, when prices increase, and we
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find that VMPL < y, the increased labour supply from worker h
will have negative influence on the maximum utility of worker i.
This is so because worker h increases his share in total income,
hf-' at the expense of the other workers, which means, given the
new price level, a reduced income to worker i unless he
retaliates by increasing his labour supply.
We can also find the relative strength of this effect between
two workers by taking the same derivative of h's maximum utili-
ty, vh(.), with respect to labour supply of worker i, Ii. Now,
i h aL et, al i alhsuppose l - l - and - initially. Then- 'hlf1- all' hl'1- all
av i( .)
(15 c) al h A.ih =
~av (.)
ali
Thus, differences in the effect of labour supply changes on
maximum utility of workers in the same firm is due to differ-
ences in marginal utility of income. Allowing for interpersonal
comparisons, i.e. assuming strict concavity, this can be inter-
preted as saying that the richest workers will care less than
the poorer workers when someone changes his labour supply. With
the, assumption that. the workers wi thin a firm are identical,
this indicates that the effect on maximum utility of labour
supply changes may vary among firms if the overall prosperity of
the workers differs. But then it is probably the case that the
willingness to collude in fixing individual labour supply diff-
er s am ang fir ms also, ins uchaw ay that, cete ris parib us, the
aL l al ipoorest firms will have the largest value of n = ~ L (or ~).
al
The terms "rich" and "poor" need to be commented upon. As used
here, we think of "rich" and "poor" in terms of income differ-
entials. This may however be of little interest without further
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spesification of reasons for the inequality in income. It may be
due to differences in external income (wealth) sources or to
unequal payment for the same number of hours of work, and the
comparison above will be valid. But if consumption of leisure
differs, i.e. the workers supply an unequal number of hours,
differences in preferences can be the sole explanation of income
differentials. Then there is no reason to assume systematic
differences in marginal utility of income. We see from (15) that
the variables within the bracket will differ among the workers,
so that the explanations of why the effects on maximum utility
differ when someone changes hours of work, are much more compli-
cated. Therefore, "rich" and "poor", as they are used above,
refer to total income of workers when their hours of work and
preferences do not differ significantly.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
We have indicated above that the indirect utility function (12)
as well as the expenditure function (13) are useful when doing
comparative statics and deriving Slutsky equations. Here I will
use the expenditure function. For notational convenience, let it
be denoted e(·).
<,
Since the specification of D, and in particular the value of y,
is important when analysing the effect of parameter changes, it
is of interest allowing for payment according to Sen's (1966)
rule. Compensation is therefore conveniently divided into a
fixed par,t, yf, and a variable part, yV, where
f
Y
v
Y
( PX-F= 1-y)-
PX-F N= y -y:--
But then we can rewrite (13) as
v f . [ v f](13 ') e(p, y , y , Uo) = ml n pC - y l + Y s •t. u(C, l) f Uo
When the agent has made the optimal choices of labour supply and
other endogenous variables, given the values of the parameters
of the model, we know that other effects than those of first
order may be disregarded when these parameters change, cf. Dixit
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(1976). If e.g. prices change marginally, the existing number of
hours worked continue to be an optimal choice. This means that
we can find compensated (Hicksian) supply (and demand) functions
directly from the expenditure function. Let us assume that the
v
firm is in short run equilibrium so that ~r = O. Then by differ-
entiating eCe) in (13') with respect to y and noting that y = yf+
yV, we get (cf. Shephard's lemma):
(16 ) eeC .)
ay
__ ee( e) (~+ _ey ) __ ( )
_ I - 1+1.ey ey eyv
This is the compensated labour supplyfunction lk(p, yV, yf, u )=o
lk(p,P,N,lh*i,F,y,u ), which for notational convenience is
o
written lk( e).
We see that it is composed of a constant and a variable element,
which is due to the possible existence of a fixed as well as a
variable work payment element (yf and yV respectively). If all
payment is made according to work done (y=1), (16) will become
(16a) = - l,
and if Y = O, that is all payment is fixed irrespective of work
done, then
(16b) = - 1.
Now, it seems most reasonable to assume that payment is made in
the short run according to work done, Le. (16a) holds. The com-
parative statics will be done under this assumption, although we
will also discuss solutions for cases where O ~ y < 1.
We know that the compensated and uncompensated labour supply
will be identical in equilibrium. Let lU(p,P,F,lh*i,N,y,m) =
lU(e) denote the uncompensated labour supply. Then we can write:
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ul (.).
As e C> ] is concave in y (or p and -F), we know that
(17 )
This is the substitution term in the labour supply S,lutsky equa-.
tion, and we see that it is positive in P as
%,f = ~ > O.
The complete Slutsky equation is found by differentiating the
identity lk(.) ::lu(.) with respect to y. This yields:
= am• ry'
Then, using the equilibrium identity m ::e(·) and the fact that
~; = - l, cf. (16a), this can be written as
The effect on the labour supply of p~ice changes is found by
differentiating y with respect to P to get the Slutsky equa-
tion:
(18 a)
k= X (ol (.)
L oy
• u
+ l • al 5~ .) ).
u
We assume that leisure is a normal good, so that ~!~O, and
the income effect is negative. As the substitution term (see
(17)) is positive, the total effect on individual labour supply
of a change in P, the selling price of the LM-firm's product(s),
is ambiguous. This corresponds to what we know about reactions
of workers in PM-firms when wage changes.
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The Slutsky equation in (18a) should be compared to the one we
find when we assume that y = O. Then, as
= - 1,
i.e. a consta~t, and as the substitution term is given as the
second order derivative of e(·) with respect to y, the substitu-
tion term is zero. Thus, the compensated labour supply is con-
stant whatever is y (or P). Of course, there will still be an
income effect, which we find in the same manner as we did for
y = 1. The Slutsky equation is:
(18 b) X olu(.)= l • r:r. om < O.
In (18b) the substitution term is omitted because it is zero.
Furthermore, if·O < y < 1, we derive the general Slutsky equa-
l 1tion, assuming that L = ~, i.e. all workers supply the same
amount of work initially:
(18 c) = y • X
L
x
+ -
N om
The signs are as in (18a), 1.e. the total effect is amb t quo os ,
The relative importance of the substitution term is dependent on
the value of y.
In the same way we can also find the effects of changes in non-
labour costs (fixed costs). When y = 1, the Slutsky equation
is:
( 1 9 ) ol u ( .) _ ( ol u ( .)of - - by
The effect of a change in F corresponds to a price change, al-
though the sign is opposite. Again we can derive the results for
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different values of y. But these are similar to those in (18b)
and (18c), noting that the signs are opposite. In particular, an
increase in F will definitely lead to more work when y = O, cf.
(1 8b) •
These results should be compared to those obtained by Bonin
(1977) and Ireland and Law (1981). Bonin assumed perfect collu-
sion between the workers, and found that increases in fixed
costs would definitely lead to increased labour supply when
payment was made according to work done. This result was con-
firmed by Ir~land and Law (1981) when their elasticity of labour
~L lsupply, ~ = ar L' was equal to one, i.e. complete collusion.
The reason for the ambiguous sign in our model when the same
specification is made with regard to dividend distribution, is
our implicit Nash-Cournot assumption in individual labour supply
decisions. This is seen from (13) where lh*i is a given para-
meter in the individual workers' labour and consumption alloca-
tion. The effect of price changes corresponds to what Bonin and
Ireland and Law have found. The magnitude of the changes may
differ, however, because of the different assumptions on how the
labour supply of other workers enters into each worker's maxi-
mization programme.
Ireland and Law (1981) discuss the effect on labour supply of
changing the relative importance of the two elements in O also.
They find that labour supply will be reduced if the weight of
the fixed payment element is increased when ~ < 1. This is con-
firmed by our analysis, which we see by deriving the Slutsky
v fequation for a change in y. When y changes, both y and yare
1 laffected. If we assume ~ = C, the income effects of changes in
yf and yV will, however, outweigh each other, and there remains
va pure substitution effect originating from a change in y. An
increased y means that more payment is made according to work,
and it is easily seen that the effect on labour supply of in-
creased y (reduced per capita payment) is, as expected:
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oy
• .9.1:
oy
• PX-F > Ovoy L
(Cf. also Sen (1966)).
5. A NOTE ON THE CHOICE Of EMPLOYMENT LEVEL WHEN MEMBERSHIP IS
VARIABLE AND NON-LABOUR COSTS ARE fIXED
It may be of interest to analyse what happens if the number of
workers can be varied, and non-labour costs are fixed. We have
seen previously, cf. (14), what conditions that have to be ful-
filled if membership level is to be changed in an LM-firm. The
optimal adjustments of employment when e.g. a price changes, can
ievbe seen directly from the value of w-. The ultimate effect is,
however, dependent on the individual labour supply reactions
also. For instance, when the price of a product increases, then
o~rX) < y, and the derivative of vi(.) with respect to L is
negative. Then maximum utility can be increased by reducing
total number of hours worked. But we know from (18a) that the
workers will increase or reduce their labour supply dependent on
the relative strength of income and substitution effects. If the
substitution effect dominates, the individual labour supply is
increased, and if this is an overall reactiån, it is definitely
profitable to reduce the level of membership (N). In the oppo-
u
site case, when ~t is negative (the income effect dominates),
the effect on membership adjustment is dependent on the sum of
each worker's individual labour supply reactions and the totally
optimal change in working hours.10)
It is worth noting that it is possible to use the dividend func-
tion to find the firm's optimal hours of work (L) also, as seen
from the viewpoint of worker i. As non-labour costs are fixed,
we wr it e (5) as:
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(5 ' ) Y" = Max
The properties of Y" are as explained previously, and particu-
larly we find that11)
xor~ > O.
A price increase will lead to an increase in production per hour
worked. But as non labour factors are fixed, hours of work have
to be changed. Marginal productivity of labour is positive and
Xdiminishing, so that an increase in L is obtained by a reduction
in hours worked. Thus we get unambiguously that
(20) aL < OV
when non-labour factors are fixed. This corresponds to the re-
sult we got when discussing the effect of price changes by using
the individual indirect utility functions. The total effect on
employment will be as explained above, i.e. it depends on the
individual adjustments of hours of work.
The results above may relate to an overall price change if there
is joint production, or to a situation where the firm produces
one good only. If it is the price of good q that changes, then
still
> O
from (5'). But now several possibilities emerge. From (4a) we
see that value marginal product of labour differs among lines of
production. If L is constant, this calls for some reallocation
of labour. Then production of good q will increase, assuming
this reallocation of labour is technically possible. Of course,
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the production of the other products will decrease. We can also
consider another interesting case. Assume that no reallocation
of resources is possible within the firm. Then production per
worker of good q can be increased through a reduction or an
increase in L. The reason is that all workers share in the
income from all production activities on equal terms.
It can be shown that the effect on employment (or number of
hours worked) of a price change on product q depends on whether
good q has a large or small part of total sales. This is so
because sales of other products are now to be considered as
negative fixed costs. By differentiating the first order con-
dL
dition (4a) with respect to Pq and L and noting that ~ = 1, we
find:
x axq - ~dl - r-- =dP q a2x--q
Pq 7
The denominator is negative, while the sign of the numerator
X ax
q > - q . .depends on whether c- Z ~. Th~s s~gn can be found from the
first order condition (4a), so that
(20') et, > o~{ as l:q':l:q
P ,X ,q q
>Z F.
Thus, price changes on the main products will tend to have a
negative influence on employment, and thus production of the
product, while the opposite tends to occur when prices of by-
products change.
Generally degree of substitution possibilities and recruitment
policy will determine the finaloutcome.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The intention of this paper has been threefold. Firstly I wanted
to represent some main results from the theory of LM-firms in a
first best environment by means of indirect objective functions.
This is important because these functions have proven particu-
larly useful in second best tax analysis, which will be the
subject of a subsequent paper. Secondly we saw that using an
indirect utility function to represent the workers' equilibrium
choice gave us some interesting information on how the individu-
al workers' decisions are interrelated. We were also able to
relate the labour supply decisions to differences in wealth and
marginal utility of income. Besides, we found that the workers'
labour supply functions may be rather special, as they may con-
sist of different elements depending on the formulation of the
firm's income distribution rule. Lastly I wanted to stress the
importance of the different stages in the total optimization
programme of an LM-firm. Because labour is not a traded good, we
have to consider the workers' contributions in a wider context.
In particular I find it important to focus on how individual
properties of the workers affect the firm's equilibrium, as this
will be the subject of subsequent papers of this thesis.
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fOOTNOTES
l I thank Agnar Sandmo, Kåre Petter Hagen and Bjørn Sandvik
for comments and helpful discussions.
1. See Vanek (1970), chapter 3.5.
2. The complete formulation of the maximization problem is
( i)
Q 5
L P qX q - L r K
9=1 s=1 s sMax Y =
l,K,X l
s.t. f(X,l,K) = O.
The lagrange function is
(ii)
s
LQ P X - L r K
qe l q q s=1 s s
- Å-f(X,l,K,).A =
This gives first order conditions
(v)
all. P afo => q Å- • O, 1 , ••• , Qax = L - ar = q =q q
L P X - Lr Kq q s s afall. O => 9 s Å- = OaL = - lZ - • ~
011. r ofO => s Å- O, 1, ••• ,5.arr = - r - • ~ = s =s s
(iii)
(iv)
From (i i i) we have that
P 1
(vi) l = q • ar q = 1, .•• ,Q,L
~
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which we insert into (iv) and (v) to get
E P Xq q q - Er Ks ss
(vii) = P • (-q ) , q = 1, .•. ,Q,
(viii) s = 1, ••• ,5, q = 1, ••• ,Q,
The right-hand side of (vii) and (v i Lt ) are both positive as
~: < 0, ~ < 0, ~ < 0, and they are value marginal pro-
q s
ducts of labour and marginal product of non-labour factors
respectively, Le., by differentiating (2) we find that:
dXq
ofar-
dl = - ~,arq
and
e f·
dX ar
~ sdK = - ~ ,s m.-q
q = 1, ••• ,Q
q = 1, ••• ,Q, s = 1, ••• ,5.
Thus, (4a) and (4b) correspond to (vii) and (viii). In (4a-
b), however, notation is simplified.
3. See Ireland and law (1982), chapter 2.10.
This function can be compared to the PM-firm's profit func-
tion, and it is the dual to the cost function discussed by
Hey (1981).
4. We see that (6a) and (6d) also explain the short-run equi-
librium of the Illyrian firm when there is only one variable
input and one output. As K is fixed, a price increase will
by (6d) lead to a reduction in l (and N). Then production
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is definitely reduced, although proportionately less than
the reduction in employment, as seen from (6a).
5. A dividend taking into consideration different productivity
of workers as well as workers belonging to different cate-
gories as to type of work and payment, is easily formulated
by a normalization to a common unit.
Suppose firstly that payment to the workers is being made
iaccording to their productivity. A vector a with elements a
> O, I e t , ••• ,N, transforms hours of work of each worker to
efficiency units. Denote efficiency units supplied by worker
ii by IE' Total supply of efficiency units, LE' is then: LE =
I l~ = I ai l i .
i i
Then the LM-firm's maximand is:
(i ) Max
K,LE
PX-rK
LE
s.t. f(X,K,LE) = O.
Solving this with respect to efficiency units yields:
(ii) o(PX)olE =
If compensation is made according to efficiency and hours of
work, each worker will receive y~. ai. i ", i=1, ••• ,N.
Similarly, employment and compensation can be found when
there are, say 8, categories of workers who are to be un-
equally compensated because of different tasks in produc-
tion. Letting p be a 8-vector of relative compensation (re-
lative valuation of one hour of work), the standard maximi-
zation problem is, when each worker belongs to one of 8 cat-
egories, denoted Lb' b=1, ••• ,8, and L8 is a vector of hours
worked by different catego~ies of workers:
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(iii) s.t. f(X,LB,K) = O.
As one group can arbitrarily be chosen as a standard, in
each category workers will be used until
(iv) =
PX-rK
~L • ~b' b e l , ••• ,B.
Payment to the individual workers is then given by (iv), and
it depends on the category to which each worker belongs.
In Furubotn and Pejovich (1973) such a system is demonstrat-
ed for the case of a Yugoslav labour-managed firm.
6. It is worth remarking that such a system of dividend dis-
tribution may be a solution to the free-rider problem. Any
production unit will create its specific working conditions,
to which workers will adapt themselves. Such working condi-
tions may be considered a public good having the effect that
no-one will have an incentive to elicit their true produc-
tivity unless payment is made according to this. Particular-
ly in egalitarian LM-firms this free-rider problem may be
great, as those with productivity above the general level
will have no incentive to work harder than what is needed to
get the fixed payment. This indicates the possible need for
some kind of rewards to better-skilled workers, unless a
well developed social consciousness exists.
7. As this formulation takes into consideration distributional
as well as efficiency aspects, it corresponds to the problem
of constructing an optimal linear income tax.
8. We assume that it is possible to formulate a welfare func-
tion for each firm. This is discussed by Sen (1966).
9• If D 1 then get ave .) a(PX ) aL 1 which is= ~, we alk = • ~
• N"aL
always positive. (Each worker receives 1 k'sN of worker extra
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effort. )
10. Of course, the members do not necessarily have identical
utility functions, so that some may increase and some may
reduce hours of work. Anyway, the net effect will be as
explained.
11. See footnote 4.
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LABOUR-MANAGED fIRMS AND TAXES.
by
Jan Erik Askildsen*
1. Introduction
We can give three motives for taxation of firms and individuals.
Firstly taxes are needed to finance governmental spending in an
economy where the firms are privately owned. Secondly taxes are
used as means for redistribution of income to achieve goals with
respect to egalitarianism. Thirdly taxes may be used to improve
upon resource allocation. In the literature on labour-managed
firms taxation is discussed mainly in the latter context. Focus.
has been on two special problems, viz. the negative short-run
supply response to price changes (negatively sloped ·supply
curve), Damar (1966), and the workers' incentives to supply too
much or too little work, Sen (1966). Little attention has been
devoted to problems of income distribution • In an eonomy
consisting of labour-managed firms, there are two important
reasons for income differentials. The workers may be of unequal
ability, and thereby be paid differently, and the firms may face
market prospects and a productive environment that vary, which
accordingly results in unequal possibilities of paying dividend
(wage). Proper redistribution of income calls for a simultaneous
view of taxation of firms and households. A discussion of how
tax burden can be shifted from firms to individuals, or the
other way round, is the main topic of this paper. In particular
I am interested in analysing how this may affect individual
labour supply. An additional problem to be addressed is taxation
as a means to correct for externalities.
Taxation of labour-managed firms has been discussed in articles
by Damar (1966), Sen (1966), Furubotn and Pejovich (1970), Suck-
ling (1974) and Muzondo (1979). Sen's discussion is an optimal
taxation analysis, in which he formulates an optimal rule for
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distribution of income within a firm. The other analyses are
positive in the sense that they discuss how employment decisions
(Damar, Suckling and Muzondo) and investment decisions (Furubotn
and Pejovich) are affected by different kinds of taxes levied on
the firms. Taxation of dividend (payment to the workers) is
neutral as to the effect on the marginal factor employment deci-
sions. On the other hand, lump-sum taxation and ad-valorem tax-
ation of output have positive effects on the labour employment
decisions of the labour-managed firm.
In the next section of this paper I discuss taxation of
labour-managed firms in a general context, and relate it briefly
to existing theory, which is concerned mainly with taxation as a
means of improving the allocational decisions of labour-managed
firms. The model is presented in Section 3, and in Section 4 I
examine the labour-managed firm's long run allocational
decisions when it is subject to dividend taxation. I discuss
some problems related to the correction for externalities. The
individual labour supply decisions are analysed in Section 5.
The main result is the close connection between the taxation of
firms and workers. This gives the government a means for
shifting tax burden from firms to workers without affecting the
labour supply decisions. Some special tax problems are discussed
in S~ction 6. I summarize the main findings in a concluding
section. In an Appendix I show the effect of cash-flow taxation
on the firm's investment decisions.
2. Some-Groonds-for-Taxation-in-an-tM-economy
Much of the literature on labou~-manage~ firms (LM-firms) relat-
es to analyses of efficiency and comparative static results.
Market conditions are assumed to be perfectly competitive. As it
was shown in the seminal works of Ward (1958), Domar (1966) and
Sen (1966), efficiency problems may arise in an economy
consisting of labour-managed firms (LM-economy). The short-run
problems are an individual over-supply or under-supply of
labour, Sen (1966), and the possibility of a backward-bending
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supply curve for output, Ward (1958), Damar (1966), or at least
low responsiveness to price signals, Steinherr and Thisse
(197~). The problems may be reduced by using more sophisticated
rules for distribution of income than the one used by Ward. But
as pointed out by Bonin (1984), Ward's fundamental result seems
quite robust. The long run problems are mainly the
underinvestment and possible self-extinction of the
self-financed LM-firm, see Vanek (1977). It can be shown, how-
ever, that the resource allocation in an economy consisting of
externally financed LM-firms can be consistent with Pareto-
optimum, Dreze (1976).
Suggestions have been put forward on how to cope with the allo-
cational problems caused by the backward-bending supply curve of
LM-firms. These include lump-sum taxation (Damar (1966)), the
establishment of an Enterprise Incentive Fund (Ireland and Law
(1978)), and ad valorem taxation of production (Suckling (1974),
Muzondo (1979)). Sen (1966) suggests that the problems related
to over- or under-supply of labour should be solved by formulat-
ing an optimal rule for distribution of income among the workers
of the firm. His solution involves deviding the workers' income
into a "needs" payment and a "work" payment. The former is a
predetermined share to each worker in the firm's income net of
non-labour costs. "Work" payment is on the other hand
distributed according to work done. In the long run underinvest-
ment and choice of inefficient capital-labour ratios cause
problems. Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) show how tax discrimina-
tion in favour of surplus allocated to the Investment Fund, as
opposed to surplus distributed as wage, will induce LM-firms to
undertake more internally financed investment.
Distributional goals and general efficiency problems like
externalities1) and imperfect competition constitute in
themselves grounds for taxation. The former will be discussed in
this paper as well as in a subsequent paper dealing with the
normative aspects of taxation. Discussion of taxation as a means
to correct for externalities is a natural part of the positive
analysis presented here.
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In this paper I will discuss distributional problems which it is
particularly important to be aware of in an economy where
LM-firms operate. First I trace out the allocational effects of
different tax schedules. As lump-sum taxation must be excluded,
distortive taxes cannot be avoided. If these taxes are
introduced to achieve distributional aims, the distortion in
prices and allocation is a loss incurred in the economy, which
should be minimized. On the other hand, when trying to cope with
efficiency problems, such allocational disturbances may be
intended consequences of introducing taxes as a free market
process does not result in an optimal resource allocation. Then
we are interested in the sign of the deviation from the initial
equilibrium.
3. The-Model.
In the analysis below the following notation will be used:
X output (production) in quantity.
p price of product produced by the LM-firm.
L number of hours worked.
N number of workers employed by the LM-firm.
li: supply of labour from worker i, i=l, ••• ,N.
K non-labour input, capital.
r price of capital (market rate of interest).
A retained surplus.
F fixed costs (plus a possible retained surplus),
Le. F = rK + A, A ~ o, in the short run.
e : consumption good (composite).
y : dividend (wage) to the workers.
tc, tI tP t t, : ax ra es.
a,b : lump-sum elements in the tax functions.
We examine a firm operating in a perfectly competitive market
economy, which may be considered a sector of the total economy.
The firm takes prices of output and capital as given.
We shall consider the optimization of a representative firm and
household (worker) respectively.
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The firm is assumed to maximize payout per labour unit. In the
short run we assume that capital as well as employment level are
given, while these are variable in a longer time perspective.
Then the backward bending supply curve will not necessarily
exist, as production responses will depend entirely on how the
individual workers respond to changes in price parameters. Thus,
we assume that each worker maximizes a quasiconcave utility
function
(1) u(C,y)
In the long run, however, the management of the firm will con-
sider individual labour supply as given, and their objective is
the maximization of y, where we define y as
(z) PX-rKy = L
Of course, when individual labour supply is given, this is the
same as the maximization of payout per worker. The firm's pro-
duction X is given by the production function
(3) X = f(K,L)
where marginal productivities are assumed positive and decreas-
ing.
We shall assume that taxes are levied on the firms as well as
households.
In the short run we are interested in deriving the effect of
taxes on individual labour supply, as this will determine the
firm's production when employment and capital levels are fixed.
The long run problem I have defined as the firm's problem. But
if the management is assumed to represent the interest of the
workers, they will be primarily concerned with the optimal capi-
tal and pro9uction per worker, and the effect taxes will have on
these ratios. Then it is convenient to discuss the long run tax
rate responses by means of a dividend function, which defines
the optimal capital and production per worker.
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4. Taxes"levied"on-tM-Firms
Firstly we will look at how the LM-firm is influenced by taxes.
We can imagine several ways in which taxes can be imposed on the
firm, e.g. on total sales, on sales minus non-labour costs (to-
tal dividend) or on retained surplus (dividend not distributed
to the workers). Here I shall concentrate on total dividend as
tax base. But the other possibilities will be considered also.
When the tax base is total dividend, the tax on LM-firms will
be
Here tC is the marginal dividend tax rate and b is a lump-sum
element on the firm in the corporate tax function. This allows
for the possibility that the tax system is progressive, which
means that the average tax rate is increasing in the dividend.
This is the case when b > O. The LM-firm maximizes dividend per
worker, and the after-tax dividend becomes
(4) (PX-rK)(1-tc) + bYT = •
The management will maximize (4) taking account of the techno-
logical restrictions given by the production function (3). We
wr Lt e af(K,L) = f and af(K,L) f Th f' t daL L ak = K· e a rs or er conditions
are:
(5a) PfL =
PX-rK
L
b
+
(5b) PfK = r ,
Here we see that (5a) deviates from the corresponding first
order condition 'in a first best economy if b * O, but (5b)
corresponds to the first best condition. That is, the price of
non-labour factors (capital) is not directly influenced by this
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tax structure. The "price" of labour is on the other hand
dependent on the lump-sum element b. If b = O, taxes will not
influence the first order conditions, and taxes are neutralZ)
with respect to the LM-firm's allocation of labour and other
factors of production. This should be compared to a tax on pure
profit in a PM- economy. As shown by Sandmo (1974), such a tax
schedule is neutral with respect to factor use when full
deductability of costs is allowed (both labour and non-labour
costs).
A further comment on the conditions in (5) should be made. Taxes
on LM-firms are neutral as far as first order conditions are
considered when they are levied as a percentage of total divi-
dend (surplus). But the allocation is distorted by the intro-
duction of a lump-sum element, or a fixed element which does not
vary with income, into the tax function by affecting the
dividend ("price") to the workers. Inspecti~n of (4) above
indicates that this is not surprising. b is actually an income
element which the workers receive/pay as members of a specific
collective. Thus, we must look at it as part of "wage" (price of
labour), so that when b is positive (or negative), the amount
payable to the workers is directly influenced by a fixep element
in the tax function. Furthermore, since b is tax-free, changes
in tC will affect the relative importance of different elements
in the dividend; e.g. an increase in tC will make b (transfers
from the government to the firms) a relatively more important
element of personal income. Instead, if also b were to be taxed,
Le. if the tax function were formulated as
tC.(px - rK + b),
then changes in tC would not influence first order conditions
as all income elements are affected in the same manner. But
still b would be part of the dividend, and thus the price of
labour in this economy.
If taxes were imposed on sales as an ad valorem tax, however,
the tax would not be neutral, irrespective of the value of b.
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Taxes on a potential retained surplus will be neutral with
res pect tot he pr i ce o f non - labour fac tor s , but la bour" cost"
will be affected.3) Retained surplus is defined as A = PX-rK -
L.Y., which yields a behaviour rule implying the maximization
~ ~
of
PX-rK - A(1+t) + b
L
The conditions for neutrality of the dividend tax can be
illustrated by constructing a maximum dividend function
characterizing the equilibrium. Denote maximum dividend by Yi.
If the behaviour rule is formulated as in (4), we can write: )
(6)
c
y' (PX-rK)(1-t ) + b= max LT L,K
s.t. X = f(K,L)
From (6) we see that for b = O a tax on dividend is a tax on the
firm's maximum payout. Then the same choice of K and L should be
made irrespective of tC• With b > O, however, taxes are the
equivalent of fixed costs, which will affect resource
allocation. Then changes in tC will affect production, while
this was not the case for b = O.
I will not consider the comparative statics of tax rate changes
in detail, as this has been investigated by Damar (1966), and
later by Suckling (1974) and Muzondo (1979). But one alloca-
tional problem connected to taxation deserves a comment.
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It is commonly argued that taxation of production (sales) may be
used to correct for externalities. Assume that an ad valorem tax
is levied on total sales (see footnote 3,a). Under the
assumption that taxes do not affect the gross product price,
i.e. P, a tax rate change will affect the firm in the same
manner as a change in P. As shown in Askildsen (1986), the
production and employment effects are generally ambiguous when
such a change occurs. We can use the properties of the dividend
function Yi to derive the effects of a change in the ad valorem
tax rate, or equivalently a change in P of same magnitude but of
reversed sign. It can be shown that5)
< O and
Ka -L- < O.atC -
In the short run, where non-labour costs are fixed, a price
increase, or equivalently a tax reduction, will definitely lead
to reduced production. These effects will also exist if demand
is not perfectly elastic, i.e. when generally
> O, and
If demand is perfectly inelastic, however, the consumers will
bear the tax burden.
These effects are important to bear in mind if taxes are to be
used to reallocate resources when there are externalities (see
footnote 1). The traditional use of taxes and subsidies is not
necessarily adequate in an LM-economy as effects are ambiguous
when the tax rate is changed. It is only in the short run that
resource allocation can be unambiguously directed as desired.
But then the tax policy has to be reversed compared to its
implementation in PM-economies, i.e. we are to subsidize the
polluting firms. To give a brief explanation of this, consider
the polluting activity as a factor of production to which the
firm has costless access. In the short run the firm cannot
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change prodouction technology. Taxation will therefore imply
demand for more labour to share in the cost burden, while
subsidization is a compensation for reducing the exploitation of
the free factor, and it is optimal to have fewer workers share
in the compensation. In the long run, this policy is likely to
create problems. New firms will probably enter into the sub-
sidized industry which may lead instead to totally increased
production. If ad valorem taxation were introduced, the existing
firms will expand production in the short run, while the effect
is ambiguous in the long run. It is on the other hand probable
that this taxation will lead to exit of firms as relative
profitability is changed between lines of business. Thus,
ultimately the price correcting taxation ~ give the desired
result, although this cannot be confirmed in the partial con-
text used here. The industry's production is reduced if the
remaining firms totally reduce their production. If they end up
with an increased production, total production can be reduced
through exit of a sufficient number of firms. As a policy
instrument, however~ ad valorem taxation is generally not
sufficient to handle externalities.
Before discussing taxation of households, I will draw same com-
parisons between taxes on PM-firms and LM-firms. It has been
stated above that taxes levied on pure profits in PM-firms are
neutral with respect to factor use and production. Then taxes
are
and the profit function is
( 7 ) Max (PX - WN - rK)(1-tP) + b
K,N
s.t. X = f(K,L)
Here tP is the tax rate on the PM-firms' profit, IT is profit of
a representative firm, W is wage-rate, and the other symbols are
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as defined above. (7) should be compared to (6). The criterion
for the tax to be neutral is that deductability is allowed for
all real costs, including true depreciation and costs of holding_
financial and real assets. Neutrality implies that a project is
profitable irrespective of the introduction of taxes. The
factors of production will be used to the same extent and
intensity. It is worth remarking that the introduction of a
lump-sum element does not alter neutrality qualities of the
profit tax system as we saw happened when the tax levied on the
dividend of LM-firms included a lump-sum element b. The reason
is that no decision variables are affected by this transfer from
the government to the owners of the firm. With respect to LM-
firms, we observed that such a lump-sum element affected
directly the internal "market price" of labour (wage), (see
(5a)).
For both types of firms the neutrality result hinges on a cri-
terion of full deductability of all costs. Thus, if the tax
authorities do not allow for deductability of true capital
costs, taxes are no longer neutral neither in PM- nor in LM-
firms6). As to labour-costs, things may be somewhat different.
In the dividend tax schedule of LM-firms as indicated here, it
is not necessary to determine the labour costs so as to find the
correct tax base, as these "costs" are taxed together with a
"possible retained surplus (or pure profit when comparing with
PM-firms). When establishing the neutral tax schedule of PM-
firms, we assume that it is possible to single out and deduct
true labour costs. It may be advantageous in terms of calculat-
ing the tax liability that the tax base is as broad as possible.
Dividend in LM-firms is definitely a broader tax base than pro-
fit in PM-firms. However, if taxes are to be imposed on retained
surplus in LM-firms, it may be hard to solve problems of defin-
ing and calculating true costs.
There is one more aspect according to which the systems differ.
Taxes on LM-firms' dividend directly affect the optimization of
the firms' workers. In a PM-economy the workers are affected by
profit taxation only indirectly, through the effect of the tax-
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ation on relative market prices. Therefore we will now turn to
studying the effect on labour supply when taxes are levied on
firms as well as households, and show that taxation of dividend
may have a largely different effect from a tax on profits of PM-
firms. However, it is worth mentioning that this is not surpris-
ing, as taxes may play an entirely different role in LM-firms
than taxes levied on PM-firms. This is however a subject to
which I will return later in this paper.
5. Taxes-on-Hooseholds-and-Firms;-Individual-taboor-Supply.
Let us look now at how the individual labour supply is affected
when taxes are introduced. For the sake of completeness, and
also because it may be of importance in itself, we suppose that
taxes are levied on firms (dividend taxation) as well as on
households (income tax). The income tax on households (individu-
al workers) is made progressive by' introducing a fixed element
a, a ~ O, into the tax function as we did when examining
taxation of LM-firms only. Letting yi be maximum individual
iincome, i.e. y does not change as a result of a marginal change
in individual labour supply, and tI the income tax rate, O < tI
< 1, individual ils after tax income, y~, is:
i i IYT = Y (1-t ) + a •
We can write worker ils budget restriction as:
( 8) + a, i=1, ••• ,N.
Price on consumption is assumed equal to one. Observe that F is
not necessarily equal to rK. It may also include retained sur-
plus, i.e. F = rK + A, A > O. Remember that we consider a short-
run time perspective.
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We asssume that all income is distributed according to hours of
work. Other rules could have been applied as well, e.g. letting
a proportion y be distributed according to work done, while
(1-y) is distributed on a per capita basis.7) Dividend could be
distributed according to other productivity measures than hours
of work also. But qualitatively the comparative static results
are not affected by excluding these possibilities. On the other
hand, if the tax function were a non-linear one, the results
would have become more complicated. Then we should have consid-
ered the correlation between the marginal tax rate and the pro-
ductivity measure to be used, as the marginal tax rate would
become a function of the productivity also. In the linear tax
function, the marginal tax rate, tI, is constant.
Each worker (household) maximizes the utility function (1) given
the budget restriction (8). Omitting the superscript i, the
first order conditions are (8) and:
(9 a) = O
1 oL l I
+ b • -(1-- -)} (1-t ) = OL ei L
A is a Lagrange-multiplier, where A > O, assuming monotonicity,
OU OUand uC= ac > O and ul = ar < O.
(9a) and (9b) can be compared to the first order conditions when
taxes are not present, and we see that the tax levied on the
LM-firm as well as the individual income tax affect the alloca-
tion of labour and consumption.
In order to see how labour supply is influenced by taxes, we
introduce the expenditure function. The expenditure function
shows minimum lump-sum income, m, necessary to reach a given
utility U • It can be written:o
-.
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(10) e[y(p,tc,tI,b,F,N),a,U ] = e(·) = min C - {[PX_F)(1_tc)o
]1 I }+ b L (1-t ) + a s.t. u(C,l) ~ Uo'
e(·) is concave in y. The compensated labour supply function
lk(.) is found by taking the derivative of e(.) with respect to
dividend, y, and we can easily find the Slutsky equation showing
the effect of an income tax change by differentiating the
identity between compensated and uncompensated labour supply
(lu(.)):
This gives the Slutsky equation by rearranging terms. We use the
identity m - e( .), and find:
(11 ) (PX_F)(1_t
c) + bolk Olu).(_ + loy om
When the income tax rate, tI, changes, the
tion is ambiguous. The substitution term,
since e(.) is concave in y, while the last
labour supply reac-
k
!!_, is positiveoy
term in the parenthe-
sis, the income effect, is negative if leisure is a normal
good.
(11) also shows the effect of tax rate changes when all income
cis taxed on the' households, Le. when t = b = O. In that case,
both distributed and retained surplus are taxed. (This ~ystem
may, of course, lead to liquidity problems if retained surplus
is not an inconsiderable amount.)
- 15 -
The effect can be compared to a price change when taxes are not
present. The signs are opposite to each other, an~ the magnitude
of the changes will differ because of the fraction outside the
parenthesis. Thus, if the price of the firm's product changes,
assuming tC = tI = O, we can derive the following expression:
k
= L~ (ol (.) + l •oy
uol (.))
om •
We can also find the effect of a change in the firm's dividend
tax rate on labour supply. The Slutsky equation is:
(12) =
( P X- F ) ( 1 _ tI) (ol k ( .)
L oy
u
+ l • ol (.)).
om
Here the signs are the same as in (11). Furthermore we see that
the effect on labour supply is identical in the two cases when
b = O and the tax rates are of the same value, i.e. tI = tC• We
see also that in both instances, the magnitude of the labour
supply reactions is dependent on the value of the other tax
rate,i.e. a high dividend tax rate reduces the effect of a
change in tI, and the other way round. Furthermore, it is always
possible to find values of tC and tI leading to identical effe-
cts on labour supply of tax changes also when b * O. This value
is given by
But this means that the government will in some circumstances
possess the possibility to affect income distribution at the
same time as labour supply reactions are minimized. As we see
from (11), (12) and (13), this is done by changing the two tax
rates in opposite directions, and in such a way that the effects
shown there outweigh each other. The condition can be written
as
k
= (~oy
u C I
+ 1~)[-(PX-F)(1-t )-b-(PX-F)(1-t ) ]
om L
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If (13) holds initially, this expression is zero for b
aluby using (13), we find that at
= o if
= _dtI• Generally,
1+ex aLMT----~a~L--'where ex =
1-ex -at c
are the sums
= O if
and .2.L.
at I
burden can be shifted from individuals to firms or the other way
of all individual responses. Thus, the tax
round.
We see however that the neutral tax rate changes are not nec ess-
arily independent on which individual we study. I f there were
only one firm, there would be no problem. In reality this is not
the case, and we see that the outweighing tax rate changes will
bdiffer among workers in different firms unless b = O or ~ are
the same for all firms. If these assumptions are not fulfilled,
it will be possible to find tax rate changes that outweigh each
other on average only. But the labour supply of some workers-will be affected. A further complicating element would be the
introduction of non-linear tax functions. Then the marginal tax
rate depends on the individual income, and constant labour supp-
ly can be attained only when all individuals and firms are iden-
tical (except when the tax functions are individually formulat-
ed). If the tax function is non-linear so as to redistribute
income, the homogeneity asaumption is not realistic. But still
it should be possible to formulate rules which minimize the
average deviations from the initial chosen positions.
This "double" taxation possibility may be of importance, as
income (wealth) disparities can be due to either different pro-
fitability possibilities of the firms or differences in the
individuals' possibilities to earn income from other sources.
If wealth disparities are due mainly to one of these sources,
the indicated tax rate changes may be useful if the objective is
to influence income distribution.
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We have used here a constant marginal tax rate, which is of
course a simplification. Nevertheless the analysis throws some
light on how certain kinds of income disparities can be handled
in an LM-economy. Although it may be difficult to carry through
the exact calculations, we can conclude thus far that the analy-
sis throws light on the policy tools which the authorities can
use to control personal income distribution. Of course, not all
kinds of wealth differences can be handled in this manner. E.g.,
it may well be the case that the overall richest workers are
employed in the overall richest firms. But then we possess the
possibility of reducing the importance of one source of unequal
income between households in a way that reduces the loss of
efficiency by choosing to tax at the heaviest rate the source
where the disturbances are at their lowest.
6. Some-Issoes-Regarding-Taxation-when-tM~Firms-are-Present
From the analysis ab~ve, we see that taxes affe~t. directly the
individual workers even though all tax may be levied on the
firm. This is somewhat different from a PM-economy, where the
households have to own shares in the firms so as to be directly
affected by profit taxation. All other effects on factor alloca-",
tion and income are indirect through the market. This may have
some significance if it is the case that membership rights are
more stable than ownership of shares, which seems to be a
reasonable assumption. But then both fiscally and as a means of
income equalization, profit taxation will probably playa less
important role than dividend taxation of LM-firms. The reason
for this is that the tax base is broader, that more persons
(households) are affected by dividend taxation than by profit
taxation and that ownership rights are more stable than
shareholdings (less elastic supply and demand).
However, a reservation may be appropriate. We are comparing two
tax systems which are comparable from a theoretical point of
view in the sense that under certain assumptions they do not
affect the firms' optimizing behaviour. Thus, the above conclu-
sion is of the greatest interest if this neutrality of the tax
systems is a desirable quality. But these taxes are not necess-
- 18 -
arily the only corporate taxes that are in operation. There may
be different kinds of taxes levied on sales and factor use also,
which will affect wages of the workers in PM-firms as well as
dividend in LM-firms. The ultimate effects of such taxes are
generally hard to calculate, as the incidence will depend on
elasticities of supply and demand in the product markets as well
as in the labour market. Thus, although it is not trivial to
trace out the ultimate effects of taxation, it seems reasonable
to argue that the public sector has at least as good possibili-
ties to raise income and influence personal income distribution
through the corporate sector in an LM-economy as in a PM-
economy. The justification for the statement is the close conn-
ection between the earnings of the firms and the personal in-
come, and the fact that if a tax can be levied on a PM-firm, it
can be levied on an LM-firm as well. However, there may be prac-
tical problems in defining a tax base. It is not the scope for
this paper to consider these.
We have argued that there are reasons to tax LM-firms and house-
holds at different rates. Given the assumption of a perfectly
competitive product market, the households will bear the burden
of the tax8). This is independent of whether the tax is formally
levied on the firm or on the households. But this means that the
two tax rates, tC and tI, can be considered constituting a com-
posite tax rate t, where
Using the composite tax rate t has obvious analytical advantages
if we aim to find optimal tax rates, which is the subject of a
subsequent paper. I find it of importance, however, to discuss
how the workers' optimizing behaviour makes the taxation of both
units, the firm and the households, necessary.
Now, if the economy in question is one consisting of both PM-
and LM-firms, we will have to face the problem of establishing
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tax systems that do not discriminate between types of firms.
Then we should obviously either abolish all corporate taxation,
and thereby only tax households, or non-discriminating taxes
should be imposed on firms, in such a way that the same tax rate
is used on PM-firms' profit, on LM-firms' dividend and also for
-income taxation of the workers of PM-firms. The latter may cre-
ate problems particularly if one aims to use the tax system to
redistribute income, as the distribution of ownership rights to
the proceeds from an LM-firm is generally more egalitarian than
the distribution of shares in a PM-firm. The former mayan the
other hand create problems related to tax evasion.
This view becomes more clear when assuming that the LM-firm does
not maximize income only. Rather the workers are maximizing
their utLl Lt y from participation, which e.g. Furubotn (1976) has
expressed by a utility function
(14) v = ~(C,Q),
where C is ordinary consumption as defined above, while Q is a
vector of aspects affecting the utility of work (worki~g condi-
tions). These may be environmental factors as well as direct
consumption on the work place, several of which may be hard to
assess quantitatively. (14) may also express the utility of the
owners as well as the workers of PM-firms. In both scenarios it
may be considered avantageous to avoid taxation by increasing
work-place consumption. In particular in an LM-firm, which is
owned by its workers, and where the workers can decide themselv-
es on working conditions, the possibilities for realizing such a
policy seem good. Then two distributional problems arise imme:
diately, viz. among LM-firms of different wealth, and between
the workers of a PM-firm and an LM-firm, where the former by
assumption have smaller possibilities to change their working
conditions.
Th~~, as long as the public sector possesses limited possibili-
ties to supervise the firms, there have to be some taxation of
LM-firms, and for the same reason also of PM-firms. On the other
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hand, it should be obvious that surplus taxation of firms only
(profit, dividend) .Ls insufficient if the economy consists of
both PM-firms and LM-firms.
There is another more fundamental problem that should be menti-
oned. Furubotn and Pej~vich (1970) argue that wealth maximiza-
tion, rather than per-period dividend maximization, should be
the maximand of the LM-firm. This is so because investments add
to productive capacity in future periods only. But, as opposed
to PM-firms, the workers of (Illyrian) LM-firms are allowed to
enjoy the usufruct of capitalonly, i.e. they have no individual
property rights. This will increase the price of an internally
financed investment project (Furubotn-Pejovich effect). But it
is the "property-rights adjusted" capital cost which has to be
used in the per-period income maximization if this is to be
compatible with wealth maximization. Then a serious problem when
defining the tax base is that this capital cost is hard to cal-
culate as it depends, in addition to the factors determining the
user price of capital in PM-firms, on the time horizon of the
existing work force.
In an Appendix to this paper I derive the user price of capital
in LM-firms more formally. There I showaiso how a cash-flow tax
may be used to encourage LM-forms to undertake investments. This
may be of special significance in LM-firms since their capital
cost wiil exceed that of PM-firms when investments are intern-
ally financed. In addition it will not be necessary to assess
the "property-rights adjusted" capital cost for calculating the
tax liability.
7. eonclad~ng-Remarks.
I have argued that tax problems constitute an important issue in
an economy where LM-firms are present. Deliberately I have not
defined a pure LM-economy, as I think that the taxation problems
relate at least as much to an economy where PM- and LM-firms
coexist. In addition, a mixed economy will create some special
problems which have to be considered, notably how the tax system
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can be formulated so as not to discriminate between the ways of
organizing firms.
One major point I have made is the close connection between the
taxation of the firms and the households. This relates in parti-
cular to the short run problems, when capital as well as employ-
ment level should be considered fixed. As the workers are memb-
ers of a collective because this gives them the highest utility
in terms of income and work enjoyment, it is correspondingly
their contribution, the labour supply decisions, which it is
important to investigate so as to trace out the comparative
statics of tax rate changes. But this means that the workers are
directly affected by taxation irrespective of whether the tax is
levied on the firm or on the households. In the long run, how-
ever, it seems reasonable to assume that a management can decide
on optimal factor mix and production, taking the individual
labour supply decisions as given.
We have analysed different tax schedules, although we have con-
centrated on the taxation of the equivalent of profit in PM-
firms, viz. the dividend. The dividend tax is neutral only when
the tax function is linear with no lump-sum element. Then the
long run decicions as to factor mix and employment are unaffect-
ed by the tax, although we can split the total effect into out-
weighing price and capital cost effects. However, when there is
a lump-sum element in the tax function, neutrality does not
hold, and factor mix and production are affected by taxation.
When a tax rate increases, production per worker and capital-
labour ratio tend to decrease because of the price effect which
reduces the internal "market price" of labour, while the cost
effect, through the deductability of capital costs, tends to
increase the ratios. Then the effects are generally ambiguous,
and the specific technology will determine the outcome. A prob-
lem this result raises is how to establish rules for taxation/
subsidization to correct for external effects. This problem
becomes particularly urgent in a short run Illyrian model where
the level of employment is variable.
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In the short-run stage, when the decision unit is the individual
worker (household), we found that changes in dividend taxation
as well as ordinary income taxation will affect labour supply
decisions. The result corresponds, of course, to the effect of
taxation of workers in PM-firms. An important difference is,
however, that in the LM-scenario the government has got in eff-
ect two tax rates, and we showed that these can be changed in a
way that do not affect labour supply decisions. This may be of
some importance for distributional purposes, e.g. if the gov-
ernment finds it optimal to shift the tax burden from firms to
individuals, or the other way round, according to where the most
important source of income inequalities can be found.
Lastly we adressed the problem of defining the tax base. This is
particularly important in a mixed economy if the workers are to
be treated in a non-discriminating way irrespective of employ-
ment in PM- or LM-firms. One problem is the incentives the work-
ers may have to avoid taxation by transferring consumption from
households to work-place when tax rates differ between the un-
its. The possibility for doing so may differ between workers in
PM- and LM-firms. Another special problem, which is basic for
the neutrality of the dividend tax, is that the capital cost
used when calculating the tax liability must take the special
property rights structure of the Illyrian firm into consider-
ation.
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Footnotes
* I am indebted to Agnar Sandmo, Kåre Petter Hagen, Karl Ove
Moene and Morten Berg for helpful discussions and comments
on previous drafts.
1. Externalities can be handled in different ways. From the
theory dealing with economies consisting of traditional
firms, we know that price correcting subsidies and taxes
(Pigou-taxes) may lead to the desired results with a
minimum of cost and knowledge of technical relations within
the firms (see Baumol (1972)).
2. We define a neutral tax as a tax which does not affect the
first order conditions, i.e. the introduction of taxes do
not distort marginal decisions concerning allocation of
labour and other factors of production, as compared to the
case without any taxation (first-best economy).
3. First order conditions are in the two cases respectively:
a) Max
N,K
s.t. X = f(K,L)
=> ( i) PX(1_t
c) - rK= +
(ii) r= -,1_tC
and
b) Max PX-rK - A(1+t c) s.t. X f(K,L)Yr = =N,K
(i) Pf L PX-rK - A(1+t
c) b= + L=>
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(ii) P f - rK -
4. See Ireland and Law (1982), ch. 2.10, and Askildsen (1986)
for a discussion of the dividend function.
5. See Askildsen (1986) for a derivation of this result. We
use the property that the dividend function is convex in P
(and _tc). Then the comparative static result follows
directly by noting that resources are optimally allocated,
and no increase in income can be obtained through
reallocation of resources.
6. See e.g. Sandmo (1974).
7. The possibility of reaching a socially optimal allocation
of resources is dependent on the value of y, see Sen
(1966). But y does not influence the sign of the deviation
from an initial equilibrium position following upon a tax
rate change in a way which is qualitatively different from
that following upon a price change. The significance of y
for the comparative static results is discussed in Askild-
sen (1986).
8. This is a partial equilibrium result. In a more general
context it is unreasonable to argue that all other prices
than the implicit price of labour are fixed.
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APPENDIX
Cash-Flow-Taxation-and-Internal-Investment-in-tM-Firms.
Because of the horizo~ p~~~~~m (Furubotn-Pejovich-effecf), the
LM-firm is well known for its reluctance to undertake internal
investment (see e.g. Furubotn (1976)). The reason is that the
work-force at the point of time when an investment is undertaken
will demand the investment expense recouped during their tenure
with the firm, which may fall short of the life-time of the
project. In addition there exists often a requirement that the
capital stock have to be kept intact in perpetuity, by Bonin
(1985) called a strong capital maintenance rule.
In this Appendix I will derive a tax function which will give
equality between the internal cost of capital and the market
rate of interest. I will use a cash-flow tax schedule for this
purpose, as this is a tax function which is directly related to
the treatment of investments. It has also attracted some inter-
est concerning taxation of PM-firms, see e.g. Sandmo (1979).
I will assume firstly that the tax function is linear, and we
find that this tax function is neutral if and only if the tax
rate is constant over time (Sandmo (1979)). But in that case the
tax function fails to give equality between the internal capital
cost and the market rate of interest, which is a desired proper-
ty. The latter can be obtained by using a non-linear tax func-
tion.
I will assume that the tax is payable by the households. In
practice, part of the tax may be paid by the firm. If the tax
schedule is linear, the same percentage will be paid in tax
irrespective of the point of time when the workers take out
their surplus. A marginal investment project will be examined,
and it is assumed th~t any ~JX free thresholds are superceded
without taking this project into consideration.
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Now, with a cash-flow tax the investment expense is deductible.
Every year the firm (the workers) pay tax out of income minus
depreciation of the capital stock. The latter is assumed to be
allocated to the Investment Fund (strong capital maintenance
rule). The Investment Fund earns an interest equal to the market
interest rate. The proceeds therefrom are exclu~ed from the
analysis. A linear income tax will give the workers the oppor-
tunity to postpone payment of tax by investing today for future
income. This amounts to a tax credit but not to a reduced tax on
the total. However, if annual income is highly fluctuating, this
may be a means of smoothing income profiles over time. If the
marginal utility of income in some years is low enough, this may
prove profitable. It depends also on how the tax rates develop
over time.
Assume that the workers are homogenous, and that surplus is
distributed on a per capita basis. Level of employment, N, is.considered given. Let us see whether a linear-tax will influence
the desire to invest through a tax deductible retained surplus
allocated to the Investment Fund. T is the lifetime of the pro-
ject, K the amount invested, t -r the tax rate in year -r, 6 depre-
ciation rate and f(K,N) a production function with usual proper-
ties. The production function is the same over time, and price P
is also constant. The workers have a concave utility function
u(y), where y is the change in income resulting from the margi-
nal project. The workers choose K so as to maximize the present
value of the cash flow V, where the discount factor is the
market rate of interest i. p is the internal rate of return of
the investment. Then we can write the maximization problem as:
(A 1 )
+
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The first order condition is
Here we see that the marginal investment decision will be un-
affeced by t~ if and only if the tax rate is constant over time,
Le. if t~ = t It ~. This corresponds to Sandmo's (1979) result
when investigating cash-flow taxation of PM-firms.
Let us reformulate the condition (A2) as
CA3) o + ~
L ~ 1 (1_o) ~-1(1-t ~)
-e oy ~ (1+ i) ~
which reduces to
CA4) P fK o + (1_t
o) o += ( ) ~-1 = p.
L 1-0 . (1-t~)
~ (1+i)~
t linear Itwhen u(y ) is ~.
This can be used to illustrate the Furubotn-Pejovich effect
(horizon problem). Assume t~ is constant over time. If T = 5,
o = 0,1 and i = 0,1 (the discount factor equal to the market
interest rate), we find that in order to invest from retained
surplus, we must have
PfK = 0,1 + 1,64 = o + p > o + i = 0,1 + O, 1 •
However, note that the average capital cost is reduced by the
introduction of taxation, as the rate p relates to the part of
the investment which the workers have to finance themselves,
i.e. K(1-t). Then, returning to the case where t~ fluctuates, we
see that the cost of internal finance decreases if t~ < ta,
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'& = 1, ••• , T, Le. if the tax rate is reduced over time. This
is not a completely unrealistic case. In order to encourage
internal investment, we observe often that the government gives
special treatment to capital gains by reducing taxes on these.
There is no reason why this should not be done in an LM-economy
as well. Favourable tax treatment does, however, imply certain
demands on the accountancy of the firms to prevent the workers
from manipulation of the tax base. These demands relate to the
registration of activity, costs and income. This problem is,
however, not special for an LM-economy.
Lastly I will look at how taxes may influence internal invest-
ment if the tax function is non-linear. Tax payable in each
period is t(y). With similar assumptions as above, we write the
maximization problem as
(A5) Max V = - ~(1-t(~)) + ~
K1
T
f[ P f K (K 1 (1 - o) '&-1 ,f:l ) - oK 1 (1 - o) '&- 1 ]
1
The first order condition is
(A6) oV =oK1
T
+ ~ f ( P f K - o ) ( 1 - o ) '&-1 [ (1 - t (Y '&) ) - t ' (y '&) • y '& ] e- '&id '& = O
1
'& 1 [ ( '&-1 - '&-1 ]wher e y = N P f K1 1- o ) ,N ) - oK 1 ( 1 - o)
We can rewrite the condition (A6) as
(A7) PfK = o + = o + p
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According to Bonin (1985, Corollary to Proposition 4), the sour-
ce of finance is irrelevant if the internal rate of return
equals the interest rate. Thus, if there e~ists a tax function
K· 1: 1: KteN) and t(y ), where y = g(N')' which makes p, the fraction in
the expression above, equal to i, the (after tax) interest rate,
then the firm is indifferent between internally and externally
financed investment.
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OPTIMAL TAXATION OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS
AND ITS WORKERS: SOME ISSUES*
by
Jan Erik Askildsen
l. Introduction.
Much interest has been devoted in the literature to the effici-
ency of labour-managed firms. Although it can be shown that
under certain assumptions the labour-managed firm will make the
same allocational decisions as the comparable profit-maximizing
firm, Dreze (1976), it is well recognized that situations exist
where the labour-managed firm does not allocate its resources
efficently. Two examples of efficiency problems are the scale of
operation of a self-financed firm, see Vanek (1977), and the
labour supply decisions of the individual workers when the coop-
erative has access to a free factor of production, see Sen
(1966). In this paper I will shaw haw lump-sum and income tax-
ation can be used to cope with these problems, and to obtain a
fair distribution of income in a way which minimizes the loss of
efficiency.
Sen (1966) was the first to acknowledge the relevance of the
individual labour supply decisions to the optimal allocation of
labour within the firm, and his contribution has later been
further developed by e.g. Bonin (1977), Chinn (1979) and Ireland
and Law (1981). The problem addressed is haw the workers can be
induced to supply a socially optimal amount of labour. E.g., if
a labour-managed firm has access to a free factor of production,
the workers will over-supply labour in their strive to capture
the rent accruing to this factor. The problem may be solved
through cooperation among the workers in fixing labour supply.
On the other hand, when cooperat~on is r~led out, Sen showed
that the optimal labour supply can be brought about by distri-
* I thank Kjell Erik Lommerud, Kåre Petter Hagen, Karl Ove Moene
and Agnar Sandmo for comments on previous versions.
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buting part of the net value added according to hours worked,
and the remaining part on a per capita basis. The procedure is
generalized by Bennet (1984) who examines the optimal payout
rule when the workers are heterogeneous and for different formu-
lations of the social welfare function. However, Bennet, and
also Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) in a more general framewo~k,
points to the problems of implementing the optimal policy becau-
se of incentive incompatibility.
Both these analyses are within the framework of optimal taxation
theory. But they assume a high degree of information held by the
planner, as he is supposed to impose individualized taxation. On
the other hand, we know from the literature on the optimal tax-
ation of income that second-best tax formulae can be derived
that require a minimum of information about the characteristics
of the tax payers, see Dixit and Sandmo (1977), Atkinson and.
Stiglitz (1980) and Sandmo (1983). Thus, by applying the app-.
roach used in the optimal income taxation literature, the imple-
mentability problems should be reduced. The derivation of such
optimal income taxation formulae is the main scope of this
paper.
In the next section I discuss some efficiency problems that may
exist in an economy consisting of labour-managed firms, and with
reference to Domar (1966) I show how lump-sum taxation can be
used in influencing the scale of operation. This part is a
reiteration of Domarls result, saying implicitly that I assume
that firms can be controlled by means of lump-sum taxation,
while this is not possible for the control of individual
workerls labour supply. The remaining part of the paper is
devoted to the control of individual labour supply, and in
Section 3 I show how the efficiency result outlined by Sen
(1966) can be established by means of a non-compensating tax
schedule. I compare the tax rate found to one which taxes away
all profit. In Section 4 I derive formulae for the optimal
income taxation of workers in labour-managed firms, following
Dixit and Sandmo (1977). On the purpose of doing comparisons, I
derive also the corresponding formulae when the workers are
employed by a profit-maximizing firm. Some issues concerning the
implementation of the optimal policy are dicussed in Section 5,
while the main results are summarized and some general remarks
are made in the concluding section.
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2. Lump~Sum Taxationand the Optimal Scale of Production.
The Labour=mane qed firm is in its mo:=;.toriginal setting assumed
to maximize dividend, y, defined as sales (net of materials
cost), PX, minus non-labour costs, F, per worker. In the short
run F can be considered given, while the non-labour costs,
notably capital expenses, are generally variable in the long
run. Assume that capital, K, is the only non-labour factor.
User cost of capital is denoted r. We can write the production
as
(1) X = f(K,N)
where marginal productivities are positive and decreasing. The
labour-managed firm's rnaximand is
(2) PX - rKy = fl
First order conditions become:
(3a) PfN = Y
(3b) PfK = r ,
of ofwhere fN = oN and fK = oK· By using the definition of y in (3a),
and inserting for r from (3b) into (3a), we find that
(4) X = fN • N + fK • K ,
which implies from Euler's theorem that there are constant re-
turns to scale at the point of operation. If the average cost
function is U-shaped, this means that production takes place at
a minimum of costs. But certainly it adds restrictions also to
the appropriate formulation of the production function, ruling
out globally decreasing returns to scale as this will result in
a one-man firm. As shown by Vanek (1970) and Ireland and Law
(1984), however, a production function exhibiting first increas-
ing and then decreasing returns will fulfil the condition given
by (4), and production will occur at the cost minimizing level.
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However, a further assumption has to be met if the firm is to
produce at this efficiency level. The firm's capital is general-
ly assumed collectively owned. According to Furubotn and Pejo-
vich (1970) and Vanek (1977) this increases the cost of intern-
ally financed investments, as the workers at any point of time
will demand the principal invested recuperated during their
period of tenure with the firm (Furubotn-Pejovich effect). (In
addition there may also be a requirement that the firm is not
allowed to disinvest.) Then, given a level of capital, the work-
ers will always have an incentive to reduce the level of member-
ship and increase the productivity of labour, and thereby pay-
out. But this reduces the productivity of capital below its
former optimal level, and disinvestment will take place, provid-
ed it is possible (Hard-Vanek effect). According to Vanek, and
Furubotn and Pejovich, this can be solved only with 100 % exter-
nal finance, assuming that the property rights structure cannot
be changed (socialist labour-managed firm). However, a capital-
ist labour-managed firm should be free to allow individual own-
ership of capital, and thus solve the problem of high costs of
internal finance.
Thus, the completely externally financed (socialist) labour-
managed firm with an appropriate technology should be able to
produce efficiently, and the economy consisting of these firms
should be able to reach the same Pareto-optimal allocation of
resources as the capitalist economy (Dreze (1976». But under
internal finance and collective ownership of capital, the scale
of operation will be too low, and under decreasing returns to
scale no equilibrium is reached in which the firms have more
than one worker. On the other hand, given the existence of
an efficient production level, e.g. by assuming a homothetic
technology as examined by Ireland and Law (1984), another prob-
lem is that production tends to be constant when prices change.
Then, unless exit and entry of firms can take place at non-
prohibitive costs, the labour-managed economy will not react
correctly to demand changes in the sense that resources will not
be transferred to the most preferred activity.
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However, if it is the case that the production in some lines of
business is too low (high) because of restricted entry (exit),
this means that there is in effect an economic rent captured by
the producers. But in that case the government can increase
(decrease) production by introducing a lump-sum tax. Then the
firm will maximize
(2') y = PX - rK - S
where S is a lump-sum tax. First order conditions are as in
(3a,b). But now (4) becomes
(4') X = fN N + fK K - ~ ,
which implies that production will take place at decreasing (in-
creasing) returns if S is positive (negative).
This applies correspondingly to the short run optimization,.
assuming that the individual labour supply is given. Let K = K,
and write rK = F. The first order condition for allocation of
labour is still (3a), and we find easily that
dNdP < O dNand OF' > O.
Again, the scale of the firm will be reduced to a level where it
will not pay the remaining workers to reduce the employment
level anymore because of the fixed cost burden. But then obvi-
ously a lump-sum tax has the same effect as increased fixed
costs, and it can be used to obtain the desired level of oper-
ation.
The arguments above can be illustrated by figure l and 2 below,
showing the long-run and short-run responses respectively to
lump-sum taxation, assuming in the long run that X = Q(f(K,N»)
is a homothetic production function, see Ireland and Law
(1984) •
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Fi9ure-l~_ Long run equilibrium with homothetic technology, and
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Thus, the problem of finding the correct scale of operation in
an economy consisting of labour-managed firms can be solved by
means of lump-sum taxes. The lump-sum tax corresponds to the
rent proposed by Domar (1966), which should be imposed on firms
according to l~cation and different natural conditions affecting
the firms' productivities. However, we have assumed so far that
the individual workers' labour supply is constant. This is prob-
ably not a realistic assumption, and we shall see that loosening
this assumption will drastically alter the optimal policy to-
wards producer cooperatives.
A major difference between a classical profit-maximizing firm
and a labour-managed firm is the status of the workers. The
profit-maximizing firm can choose to buy any amount of labour it
desires. The labour-managed firm is, on the other hand, con-
cerned mainly with the welfare of its workforce. This should
incorporate the freedom of each worker to make decisions on the
individual labour supply (hours of work). But this will make
total work done a variable it is hard to control, unless the
collective is able to make compensating changes in the number of
workers. In particular in the short run the latter can hardly
be fulfilled, and the (short run) production level is very much
dependent on the individual labour supply decisions. The first
one to recognize this was Sen (1966). He assumes that each
worker maximizes a utilty function defined over income and
leisure, i. e.
{S} u{y, l-J.) ,
where u is concave, and increasing in y and decreasing in J.,the
number of hours worked by each worker. I have normalized time sa
that O < J.< l. Income is given by
(6) y = PX - F
L • J.,
-.
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N .
where L = L ~~ is the total number of hours worked by all work-
i=1
ers. F is the sum of all non-labour costs.
Sen was concerned with finding the socially optimal allocation
of work effort. ~fuether an efficient solution is obtained or not
depends, according to Sen, on the rule for the distribution of
income from the cooperative and the degree of sympathy towards
fellow-workers, which may vary from none to full sympathy, the
latter being a sufficient condition for attaining a socially
optimal allocation of work.
However, the same aspect can be approached from a somewhat diff-
erent viewpoint. E.g. Bonin (1977) and Chinn (1979) are con-
cerned with the degree of collusion among the workers of a coop-
erative in stipulating individual labour supply. The·degree of
collusion may range from none to full cooperation. The former
may be interpreted as a Nash-Cournot assumption, where each
worker decides on his labour supply under the assumption that
fellow-worker's labour supply remains unchanged. Ireland and Law
(1981) have showed that the two approaches can be expressed in
the same framework with a parameter e € (i,N), expressing the
elasticity of total labour supply in each worker's individual
supply. Thus, a e = ~ is the same as a Nash-Cournot reaction
function, or in terms of Sen' s .terminology no sympathy towards
fellow-workers. With full sympathy or cooperation, e = N, and a
socially optimal allocation of labour-input is obtained.
~Vhen "social consciousness" is not complete, Sen showed that
there is a way of distributing income which will result in an
optimal labour allocation. This will come about if a proportion
a, O < a < l, of income is distributed on a per capita basis,
while l - a is the proportion of income distributed according to
effort (hours of work). The procedure has later been generalized
by Bennet (1982, 1984), see Section 5.
Sen's a is determined so that
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(l-o:) = T')r
where
L PX - FT')= fL X , s = X
This choice of o:will lead to equality between the value margi-
nal product of labour and the marginal rate of substitution
between income and leisure.
Let us find the socially optimal allocation of labour, assuming,
as did Sen, that the workers are homogeneous and that every
worker takes the other workers' supply of labour as given when
deciding on their individual labour supply (Nash-Cournot).
Each worker maximizes (5) w.r.t. 1, given (6) and (l) with K = K
and L substituted for N. The first order condition, where
-_ ~u d a u b wr'tten asuy ~y an u1 = - 5(1-1)' may e ~
(7)
u1
u
Y
= HRS
Now, rms = PfL if and only if (E + ~ :T'))= l. This implies~ = PT'),or, noting that
PX-F L
~ = PT')<=> -x-- = PfL X '
that
(8) PX - rK = PfLL ,
where as noted previously F = rK, assuming that capital is the
only non-labour (hired) factor.
In Section 2 we saw that a labour-managed firm without fixed
costs or access to a free factor at production ("land") will
produce always at a minimum of costs, i.e. at a point where
constant returns to scale prevail. (8) shows that this condition
is sufficient for a socially optimal allocation of labour in the
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labour-managed firm with variable labour supply, provided that
the non-labour factors of production are optimally allocated and
that F reflects fully the associated costs.
Our results so far serve as an illustration of the similarities
between the results derived by Damar (1966) and Sen (1966).
Thus, the allocation of individual labour, choice of employment
level and use of other factors of production in the
labour-managed firm are socially optimal if
(i) There is full cooperation in determining individual la-
bour supply, or all workers have complete sympathy to-
wards their felLow-wo.rk ers,
or,
(ii) there are constant returns to scale at least over same
range, and that production takes place within this range,
which implies that
(iii) there are no free factors of production ("land") and
fixed costs.
Barring these cases, the welfare of the workers and the
economy's resource allocation can be improved upon by taxation.
It should be noted also that the possible inefficiency accounted
for in Section 2 may be further strengthened by the possibility
of tOo low a labour supply when the labour supply decisions are
made individually. Assume that the firm's technology is such
that there is first a range of increasing returns to scale, and
then decreasing returns. Then Vanek (1977) argues that the
(partly) self-financed labour-managed firm will produce
somewhere in the increasing-returns range. As it will be shown
below, this is the range where individual labour supply will be
too low. In addition the workers reduce employment so as to
increase productivity of labour, and accordingly payout. This
will reduce the productivity of capital which induces
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disinvestment. Then the firm will move into areas where labour
supply is continuously being reduced compared to the efficiency
level, cf. (8). Assuming technical complimentarity between the
factors of production, this means a further reduction in the
productivity of capital. But this implies also that Sen1s a, or
the tax rate to be developed below, can be used to offset the
self-extinction forces considered by Vanek. In particular, using
a second-best approach, we can argue that this tax policy may be
used to induce an oversupply of labour if the problems connected
with the scale of operation are the most serious efficiency
problems.
An important objection against Sen1s taxation rule is its
informational requirements when workers are heterogeneous. Let
us therefore investigate whether the same result can be obtained
by a general taxation of the firm and its workers. Then we see
whether second best taxation can be used to control labour
supply in an efficient manner. A tax on the firm's surplus after
the deduction for non-labour costs is neutral when considering
the firm's allocation of labour and capital. But this taxation
will affect each worker's individual supply of labour. This is
an intended distortion, and it should be considered a good
property that the tax schedule does not affect the long run
allocational decisions o( the firm. If t is the tax rate, and
there is no lump-sum compensation, we can write each worker's
maximization problem when subject to taxation as
(9) Max u (y, l-l)
1
s.t. PX-FY = ---- • 1 • (l-t)L
It does not matter whether the tax is technically levied on the
firm or on the workers individually. The first-order condition
is
= tmS = Pf (~ + L-l PX-F )(l-t)L L L PfL.L
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HRS = PfL if t is fixed so that
*(11) t
(L-1) [(PX-F)-PfL·L]
= pfL.L.1+(L-1) (PX-F)
He find easily from (11) that
* > >t < O as (PX-F) < PfL·L.
Assume that F reflects the market valuation of marketed
non-labour factors of production. Then equality in the
conditions above is equivalent to constant returns to scale in
production, cf. (8). When t* > O we have, using (8), that
X > fr« + fL L
rwhere we assume fK = P from first order conditions for optimal
allocation of marketed non-labour factors of production. Then,
if f(K, L) is homogeneous, it follows from Euler's law that the
production function is homogeneous of a degree k < l. The
subsidization condition t* < O can be explained in a similar
manner. We interprete decreasing returns to scale, k < I, as
the existence of a free factor of production to which the firm
has costless access, i.e. a non-marketed factor. If k > I, on
the other hand, there are fixed costs or taxes levied as a fixed
amount on the firm, which induces the firm to increase the level
of operation, Damar (1966).
Then we can state the following rule for taxation of a labour-
managed firm and its workers:
(i) *t > O if there are decreasing returns to scale, or a free
factor of production ("land").
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(ii) t* < O if there are increasing returns to scale, or fixed
costs.
This is equivalent to the rule extablished by Pigou (1924). He
argued that taxation should be used in industries with decreas-
ing returns to scale. The difference from ours is that in
Pigou's case it was related to the optimal production of an
industry. E.g., with decreasing returns, each firm produces too
much in their effort to capture as large a part as possible of
the economic rent. Here it is the workers' strive to capture
the economic rent of the firm that is the argument for a tax.
It should be noted also, that if the workers are heterogeneous,
1 will differ among them. Then the value of t* is not
necessarily correct from an efficiency point of view. But
heterogeneity among the workers does not affect the choice
between taxation and subsidisation. These problems are however
better analysed by using the traditional framework to derive
optimal tax rules, to which we will proceed after having made a
comparison between the taxation of profits in profit maximizing
firms and the incentive correcting taxat.ion of labour-managed
firms.
Let us assume that the labour-managed firm produces under de-
creasing returns to scale. Although an equilibrium cannot be
found in the Illyrian model in the range of decreasing returns,
the assumption is not unrealistic. The reason why the size of
the firm is not being reduced can be explained in terms of soli-
darity, utility of having a given level of employment etc.
The oversupply of labour from the individual workers is explain-
ed by the workers' aim at capturing the economic rent. This
calls for an efficiency correcting tax rate t* > o.
The profit-maximizing capitalist firm operating under the same
conditions will make a profit ~ given by
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(12) n = PX - rK - wL ,
where w is the market ~age rate. We know that a profit tax,
allowing for the deduction of the true costs of production, is
neutral with respect to the firm's allocationa1 decisions, see
e.g. Sq_ndmo (1974). Then the profit-maximizing firm's profit tax
may be set at a level arbitrarily close to 100 %. The labour-
managed firm will make the same profit, distributed as dividend
among its workers. If there were a tax rate, t', which taxed
away all this profit, this tax rate would be given by
t' = n = PX-rK-wL - l _ wL - l _PX-rR PX-rR - PX-rR - w w= l - _YPX-rR
L
Thus, if w = y, and thereby n = O, we have t' = { = O, whereas
:*t', t > O if w < y, which represents the case where a part of
the workers' dividend is profit.
t' and t* have some similar properties. t' is defined as a tax
rate that taxes away all profit, while t* is a tax rate which
gives incentives to a correct labour supply. When n > O, and
accordingly t' > O, this profit can be considered the return to
a free factor, whose existence causes decreasing returns to
scale. The oversupply of labour results from the workers' strive
to capture this profit - or return to a scarce factor, and
*t > O is a substitute for a market compensation. Thereby, if
profit were taxed -away by t', no efficiency correcting taxation
would be necessary. To define this profit would however not be
an easy task.
Now, assume that w = PfL, i.e. the wage of the workers in an
identical profit maximizing firm reflects the value marginal
product of labour. Then we may write
w PfL(13) t' = l - - = l -Y Y
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Now, having developed two tax rates, t* and ti, represented by
(11) and (13) respectively, we can compare them to find that
t' = t* if and only if PxtrK = PfL
which implies 1t *= O and t = O. In particular we find that
pf eL (L-~) [(PX-rK)-PfLeL]
t' > t* if [1 _ L ] > < > Pf < PX-rKl"x-rK Pr eLe~+(L-~) (PX-rK) = L L
L
which holds if t* > O. Thus, if t* > O, the optimal tax rate is
lower than a rate which taxes away all profit. He can give an
intuitive explanation of this result. The 100 % profit tax is
identical to Sen's tax. But Sen's rule imply a compensation in
the sense that the profit is redistributed on a per capita
basis, which neutralizes the income effect. A pure substitution
effect remains. The income taxed away by t* is not redistribut-
ed. Then the income effect of taxation will result in a higher
optimal labour supply, and hours of work should be reduced to a
smaller degree.
4. Pormulae -for 'optimal-Income 'Taxation -of ·Workers··in -Labour-
Managed-and' profit~~1aximizing -Pirms •
I will now, within the ~E~mework used in the optimal income
taxation literature, derive rules for optimal taxation in an
economy consisting of labour-managed firms, in which the workers
may be either homogeneous or heterogeneous. The tax rates will
be compared to those which prevail in a similar economy con-
sisting of profit-maximizing firms.
(i) Hodel
In the LH-economy, an economy consist~ng of labour-managed
firms, LM-firms, we assume that there is a tax rate tI on total
L
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income, levied on each household. The corresponding tax rate in
the PH-economy, an economy consisting of profit-maximizing
firms, PH-firms, is denoted t~. In addition there may be a tax
on profit which we term tn. Lastly there is a lump-sum element
a > O, equal for all households, in the income tax functions.
In both scenarios we assume that N workers are employed by a
representative firm. But whereas each worker in the LM-firrn gets
. iN. .
a share of total dividend equal to y1 i ' where L = L ~1 and y1
i=l
reflects the ability (productivity) of worker i, each worker in
the PM-firm receives wi reflecting his ability, and a share ai
in profit. We can write income of the workers in the two types
of firms as
Zi ~iwi i < i <
N i(14) PM: = + a n , O a 1, L et = 1i=l
(IS) LM: yi ~iy i PX-rK ~iyi= y = L
We abstract from income from other sources. The workers will
maximize the utility functions
(16) iu
(17)
sub ject;to (14) and (IS) respectively.
Generally utility functions will differ among individuals. In
the optimal taxation literature it is common, however, to assume
heteregeneity in terms of ability, rather then in terms of how
workers evaluate income and leisure. He will follow this route
here as well, and assume that the form of u does not differ
among individuals. I will, however, retain the index i on the
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utility functions. Another vital assumption concerns the
workers' choice of labour supply. He assume that every worker
can predict the labour supply of their fellow workers. This
assumption should not be too restrictive in view of the
identical form of the workers' utility functions, provided all
workers know the distribution of abilities. Specifically we
assume a Nash-Cournot reaction function.
The government is assumed to require a given tax income T. In
the two scenarios, governmental tax income will be TP and TL
respectively:
(18) TP = L !iwit; - Na + tnn
i
(19) TL = L !iyyit~ - Na
i
We assume that the government is concerned with finding welfare
maximizing tax rates. Therefore we can formulate the govern-
ment's problem as maximizing a welfare function, W, subject to
the tax requirements:
(20) Max l 2 NU(u, u , •.., u )
s.t. T = T.
We can express the workers' (and capitalists') utility by means
of indirect utility functions, which will facilitate the analy-
sis:
(21) i i I i nvp (w (1-tp ), Cl: n(1-t ,), a) i = l, ... , N
(22) i = l, ••• , N
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Then the social indirect welfare function becomes
(23) l 2 NW = W(v, v, .•., v)
and the government's problems are respectively:
(24) PM: Max
tIP,
...,
\' iiI 'lts.t. ? 1 w tp - Na + t 'lt= T
lo
(25) LI1: Max
ItL, a
s.t.
The problem in (24) can be somewhat simplified by making an
assumption concerning the taxation of profits. As pointed out
before, a profit tax is neutral w.r.t. the firm's allocational
decisions. But the tax will obviously affect each worker's
decision on labour-supply through an income effect and ownership
part (ai) if taxation affects relative profitability of
different portfolios. In that respect it does not matter whether
the tax is levied on the firm or on the households. As a profit
tax below 100% will not affect the firm's allocational
decisions, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that taxation
should not discriminate against different types of income. This
leads us to assume that the tax rate on profit equals the rate
paid on income from labour services, i.e. t'lt= t~, and each
P~1-worker's tax liability is, when we drop the superscript I:
i i i(26) tp • (w 1 + a 'lt), i = l, ••• , N, O
< i <
a l
- 20 -
iWe must consider also whether (l will be affected by economic
factors like changes in the tax rates. (limay be given by exter-
nal factors which are not likely to be affected by these. Then
a tax on profit will have a pure income effect. However,
generally it would be a reasonable assumption that these owner-
ship rights may be traded, and that each household's optimal (li
will depend on economic factors like the tax rates. Thus, with
the restriction that we must always have L (li= l, this will
i
imply that we will have a Slutsky-equation for property shares
as well as for labour supply.
With the problems formulated as in (24) and (25), they can be
solved by using Lagrange' method, see also Dixit and Sandmo
(1977), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, ch. 13) and Sandmo (1983).
The Lagrange expressions and the resulting first order
conditions when solving for tL, tp and a are reported in the
Appendix.
(ii) Homogeneous Horkers
Let us first assume that all workers are identical (equal
ability). Then we may carry through the analysis as though the
i
economy consists of one worker (household). Obviously ~ andatp
i
~~ are both zero, i.e. taxation does not influence the
distribution of ownership rights in the PH-economy.
In equilibrium we can use the properties of the indirect utility
function, saying that
a i i . i i avivp AiJ.~,
aVL a avp Ai(li Ai.= = A J.L, = =~ ~ an(l-Ep ) , aaaW (l-tp) ayy (l-tL)
-.
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Using this in the first order conditions, we can derive (see
Appendix) the following well known rule for optimal taxation of
PM-workers:
e is the Lagrange multiplier in the welfare maximization
p
problem (24), to be interpreted as the shadow price on
governmental spending, and
= - (~ip+ ~ w,t)
is the substitution term of the SlutskY7equation for changes in
tp. Of special interest to us is the latter element in the
paranthesis in (27). According to (27) the efficiency loss of an
.income tax is offset by the taxation of profits, which has a
pure income effect. On the other pand it is quite obvious that
this does not necessarily hold if ~ changes following a change
in the tax rate. But, as argued above, this can hardly take
place when the workers are homogeneous without violating the
restriction I~i = 1, so that we abstract from that possibility.
i
Nevertheless, the optimal tax rate will only by a mere
coincidence deviate from O, as compensated labour supply is
generally affected by the tax. However, if t~ = O and t~ > O,
and also if ~ = O, it can easily be verified that equilibriumat~
requires Gp = A, and the optimal allocation is not responsive to
the profit tax, which may then be fixed according to the
government's tax requirement.
We now turn to the taxation of the homogeneous LH-workers. ~ve
ican set y = 1 since all workers are equally productive.
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He define
'Oy J.
e: = aJ. y
and eL as the shadow price on governmental spending in the
LM-economy. We use the Slutsky-equation where
is the substitution term accounting for the compensated labour
. . *supply to obta~n the opt~mal tax rate tL:
*.\Ve note that when e: = O, we have tL = O. As e: = O when 1& = O
(see (29) below), this corresponds to the optimal income tax
rate in the PM-economy. However, whenever e: * O, and 1& * O, the
opimal tax rate is non-zero, while this is the case in the
PM-economy only if a profit tax does not affect labour supply.
But in the PM-scenario there is no efficiency argument favouring
a given profit tax rate~ it may indeed take on any value since
the tax has an income effect only. In the LM-scenario efficiency
*requires tL * o.
As it will be shown below, Sen1s taxation rule emerges as a
special case of (28). Before proceeding to interpreting the
formula further, it might be useful to consider implementation
of the tax schedule, or more precisely what kind of information
is needed, and how it can be extracted. The extraction of
information from the workers causes no problems as they are
assumed identical. All workers know that the taxation improves
welfare of all workers, and they have no individual
characteristica to be concealed. Larger problems may arise if
the firms in the economy are not identical. Then information
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is needed about each firm's production and use of factors of
production. This problem, relevant for the "heterogeneous-
workers-case" as well, will be further discussed in Section 5.
In addition to information about the production environment, we
must know the shadow price on governmental spending and costs of
taxation as reflected by eL. This problem, is general for all
taxation. It will be shortly commented upon below.
~LLet us examine the term € further. Assuming ~ = l, we can
e J.l.
elaborate on it to get
(29) €
i. e. € =1= O if there are fixed costs or a free factor ("land"),
and the result corresponds to that obtained previously.
He note also that in the general tax formula, it is not suffici-
ent to consider only the efficiency correction in production.
In that sense this tax rate differs form the one derived by Sen
(1966) and t* in section 2 of this paper. There are costs of
taxation involved, and the cost of government spending, eL' may
differ from the private utility of money. (Both parameters are
positive.) This will affect the value of the optimal tax rate in
one direction or the other.
It may be of interest to consider a special case. Assume that
e = A. Then the utility of money is the same in the government
L
and private sectors. The optimal tax rule becomes
(28' ) t* =
L - €
Pf ·LJ. L
= L (l - px-rK)'
which we remember is the tax rate that taxes away all profit,
see (13). This also corresponds to Sen's a, which is that part
of income which should be distributed on a per capita basis. The
reason why this tax rate deviates from the tax rate developed in
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section 3, which are both claimed to be optimal, is exactly the
one we gave there. ~fuat we have got here, is a situation where
the government can compensate the workers by using the lump-sum
element a, and it will then be able to induce the workers to
supply the optimal amount of labour, simultaneously as all
profit is taxed away and distributed on a per capita basis.
More generally, the optimal tax rule (~8) says that the govern-
ment may be able to obtain a given tax revenue simultaneously as
the allocation of the resources in the economy is improved upon.
This depends on the values of eL and A. Thus, if eL is very
high, which indicates high costs of government spehding, the
optimal tax rate is low. In the PH-economy we have a situation
where the government is under some circumstances able to get a
tax income without loss of efficiency.
(iii) Heterogeneous Workers
I will now proceed to considering the optimal tax rate when the
workers are heterogeneous, and derive optimal tax formulae in
the PM- and LH-scenarios.
The first order conditions are as reported in Appendix. He
derive the optimal income tax when the workers are employed by
PH-firms, and the same workers also share in the resi.dual
according to ownership rights. After lengthy manipulations of
first order conditions (see Appendix), and using the definition
of covariances, we find that tp should be set so that:
*(30) tp
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where
i
Cov( ~~ 1t, i(X 1t)
Si and si are substitution terms of the Slutsky-equations forw (X
labour supply and ownership rights respectively. A bar denotes
average values. If ownership rights change, we assume that this
occurs in a zero-sum way. vVhen (Xiis given, e.g. from histori-
cal reasons, the terms involving changes in (Xiare zero.
In a similar manner we find the expression for the optimal in-
come tax in the LM-economy:
**(31) ~ =
. .. i ..
[ ~( ~ ~ a~) ~ ~J ~ ~ ~ ~Cov \'li A. l+y e Yaa- ' y ~ - vVi A. y € Sy
i
€ is defined as above. But it relates here to each worker~s
elasticity of income in hours of work. Observe that if 1t = O,
and consequently € = O V i, (31) converts into (30), and the
taxation rules are identical in the PH- and LH-economies,
provided costs of taxation do not differ.
From the expressions (30) and (31) above, we see that the opti-
mal tax rates are of any sign, and they are positive if and only
if numerator and denominator are of the same sign. In the
denominator of (31) we recognize the terms determining the
optimal tax rate in the one-consumer case (homogeneous workers),
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see (28) and (AS) in Appendix. Thus, it is reasonable to
interpret the denominator as taking care of the efficiency
aspects, while the numerator captures the distributional
aspects.
The informational requirements are quite considerable when an
optimal tax rate is to be formulated, which is supposed to take
into consideration efficiency. aspects as well as distributional
aspects. This holds true in any economic system, and constitutes
as such no special problems for the formulation of optimal tax
rates in LM-economies. \'lhatis needed is knowledge of the
distribution of abilities. But as utility functions are the
same, we do not need to know which individuals who have got the
specific abilities. There is one additional informational
requirement in the LM-scenerio which needs a comment. It relates
to comparisons with optimal taxation in a PM-economy and when
comparing with the formulations of tax functions in Sen (1966)
and Bennet (1984). The planner has got to know the productive
conditions of the different firms, assuming these differ. In
Bennet's formulation this information is held by the manager of
the firm, in addition to the information he has about each
worker's ability. It is a matter of judgement whether it is
easier to extract information about firms' productive
environment than individuals' abilities.
The optimal tax rule in the PM-scenario is discussed elsewhere
in the literature, see e.g. Sandmo (1983). Here it will be used
for comparison purposes only. But before doing these compari-
sons, some comments should be made on the expression for optimal
income taxation of U'l-workers. The term W .A.iis the social mar-a,
ginal utility of consumer ils consumption. In the covariance
term in the numerator of (31), we see that the social marginal
utility of consumption is multiplied by a term showing the
effect of lump-sum income on labour supply and thereby on
profit, which will again affect the government's income. This
makes it reasonable to interpret the term
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as the social marginal utility of i's income, cf. Diamond
(1975). Then the tax rate depends on the covariance between the
individual marginal utility of income and the supply of
efficiency units of labour, which corresponds again to Diamond's
prescription for taxation in a many-person economy. The sign of
this expression is ambiguous. It may be reasonable to ass~me
that cov(WiAI,yi~i) < O, in particular if W is utilitarian and
\'1.= l V i. It is harder to assess the additional effect caused
1.
by lump-sum income affecting labour supply and profit. \'1eshould
therefore limit ourselves to note that the characterization of
the optimal tax rate is affected in either way by this term.
It may be illustrative to give a tentative comparison between
the two tax rates t; and t~*. The two tax rates will be identi-
cal if € = O V i, which depends on the technology, and in which
case, as mentioned, 1t = o. \'1ewill use this as a benchmark posi-
tion. Specifically, we a~sume t; = t~* > O initially. This can
be justified by assuming Cov(W.Ai,~iwi) < O and
• 1.
o~1. i i iCov(aa- w , w ~ ) ~ o. We
sponding terms explaining
i i ithat cov(\viA ,Y ~ ) < O and
si. < O.
Y
iknow that Sw < o. Of course the corre-
t~* will b7 determined accordingly, so
i o~1. i i >Cov(y ~,y ~ ) = O, while obviously
Assume that profit increases marginally above zero, e.g. by a
slight increase in production, so that this takes place on the
increasing part of the average cost curve. In both scenarios the
tax rates may be increased or decreased. But it is of some int-
erest to examine the efficiency and distributional effects sepa-
rately.
The distributional argument for a tax rate change in the PM-
scenario (the numerator of (30» depends on the term
Cov(WiA
i,ai1t). It is reasonable to assume that it is negative,
i.e. the higher an individual's share in profit is, the lower
- 28 -
the social marginal utility of consumption will be (or marginal
utili ty of money if H is utilitarian). Then the tax rate should
be increased according to distributional arguments. The
i
bi B Lf <H-am 19uOUS. ut 1 --caefficiency arguments are generally
cai cai i >aa- < O and Cov(~n,a n) = O, the tax rate should be reduced to
better the allocation of the resources in the economy. The total
effect will depend, of course, on the relative strength of the
< O,
distributional and efficiency considerations.
In the LH-scenario the distributional considerations are ambigu-
ous, as we have to assess the covariance between marginai utili-
ly of income and individual labour supply. The other term in the
itax rate as ~ < O anddenominator calls for an increased
iS < O.
Yarguing
Then a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
in favour of a reduced tax rate, using distributional
arguments, is that
This condition is met if the social marginal utility of income
tends to vary less negatively with the supply of efficiency
units of labour than does the social marginal utility of con-
sumption. This will depend on the effect of a lump-sum income
ion individual labour supply and "profit", i.e. ~. It is not
unlikely that the condition above will be met~ cf. the co-
o~i ,variance term when e.g. ~ is uniform and note that ~1is, va
increasing in ~1. The efficiency considerations are examined
previously, and the same argument applies. Note however that the
net effect is ambiguous, in particular because of the efficiency
of government spending, i.e. the term (0L-Wi~i).
Thus, although it is impossible to reach any clearcut results,
the above discussion points to the difference in the recommend-
ations concerning an optimal income tax. In the LM-scenario the
optimal rate depends on the distribution of productivity
("skill"), i.e. yi, and the hours worked. This explains all
income differences. In the PM-scenario, however, the distri-
bution of the ownership rights is an additional argument to be
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considered. These may of course outweigh the effect of the
productivity distribution. But there is no reason to believe
that this is more likely than the opposite possibility.
5. some·comments-on·the-Im21ementabi~ity·of-ogtimal-Tax-Rules.
Some comments should be made on the implementation of an optimal._; • t'--. -, ~ . ,'d • • • •
tax schedule in an LM-economy. Different classes of problems may
arise. On the one hand there are activites aimed at avoiding
taxation. On the other hand we have the problems of incentive
compatibility.
Some of the problems relating to the first category are discuss-
ed in Askildsen (1985). Host important are the incentives which
may exist to disguise income as consumption within the firm if
the main burden of taxation is levied on the households, and the
problems of obtaining satisfactorily distributional effects when
firms are the main object of taxation. However, it can be shown
also that there exists a tax levied on the households which has
the same effect as a tax levied on the firm. This means that a
part of the tax may be paid by the firm, while the households
make up for the distributional aspects. Thus, we can define a
function (or a correspondence)
where tH and tF are taxes levied on households and firms respec-
tively. For every pair of (tH, tF) there is at least one tI
which will give the same resource allocation as would exist if
tH and tF were used separately. The "general" tax rate tI is the
one investigated in this paper. But the technical composition of
the tax schedule may cover a sophisticated system of double
taxation as well as deductability on households for taxes paid
by the firm. What is of ultimate interest in our context is the
actual percentage of income paid in tax. But having said this,
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it should be noted that a neutral tax rate will be incompatible
with a tax rate taking distributional considerations.
The other category of problems create more difficulties. The
problems connected to the implementation of the first best rule
are discussed by Bennet (1982, 1984) and Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984). In order to be incentive compatible, the relative remun-
eration should be positively related to productivity, i.e. the
more able workers should receive the highest payment per hour
worked. However, if there is a planner, e.g. the management
of a firm, who is assumed to maximize the welfare of the work-
force, Bennet (1984) shows that for different formulations of
the welfare function welfare is maximized if the most able work-
ers receive the lowest work-related payment, which is equivalent
to a high individual tax rate. This is incentive incompatible as
it will induce the workers not to reveal their true
productivity. However, if the firm is large, and the elasticity
of substitution between income and leisure exceeds unity, Bennet
(i982) finds that the incompatibility disappears for a
utilitarian welfare function. Bennet assumes in his models that
the firm's management knows the preferences of all workers, and
will give each heterogeneous worker a welfare maximizing work-
related payment. This amounts to implementing an individually
based tax schedule. The individual tax rates are chosen so that
the most productive workers supply the highest amount of labour.
This is the cheapest way of increasing the welfare of all
workers. Through the complex income formula of a revenue
sharing firm, where income of each worker depends on production
and his marginal productivity in addition to his and other
workers' work-related payment, this is obtained via a reduced
work-related payment to the most able workers. Guesnerie and
Laffont (1984) discuss the implementation of the first best rule
in an optimal taxation setting also. They assume that the
government has incomplete information about the productivity of
a firm, to which it is to allocate labour from a pool of
workers. The government maximizes a utilitarian welfare
function. They find that an allocation can be implemented if and
only if the decision variable, the amount of labour to be
allocated to the firm, is negatively correlated to the unknown
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productivity parameter. Then the demand for labour has to
decrease in productivity if the first best rule is to be
implemented. The firm will have no incentive to reveal the true
productivity if higher productivity implies more workers to
share in the income.
The above-mentioned studies point to the problems of obtaining a
socially efficient allocation of labour when households and
firms are taxed separately. Because of huge problems with
incentive incompatibility, the prospects do not seem promising
to implement first best taxation schemes. In our approach some
problems vanish, as we do not need any knowledge of each
worker's characteristic. He will be taxed (or subsidized)
according to his income, not according to his ability. Indeed,
this is also the general argument against the lump- sum taxation
approach taken by Bennet. If the government knew all the
properties of the taxpayers, there is no need for using
second-best rules. But incentives are large to conceal individu-
al properties which affect a person's tax liability.
An intended contribution of this paper is to reduce the
incentive problems resulting from Bennet's individual tax
functions. However, problems remain, which need comments.
Firstly there are limitations as to what kind of heterogeneity
with which we manage to cope. We have limited attention to
differences in ability, and thereby income. But utility
functions are assumed identical. If this were not the case,
knowledge would be needed of distribution of ability and the
associated utility functions.
A second, and probably more serious problem, concerns ~he issue
raised by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). \ie have seen that the
optimal tax rates require information about production
conditions, see (28) and (31). In a one-firm setting this does
not cause problems. But an economy consists generally of several
non-identical firms. Then the planner must decide on how much to
tax each firm by fixing a firm specific T, which may give the
firms incentives to, on behalf of its workforce, to conceal
- 32 -
information about the productivity conditions so as to affect
tax burden. This problem is probably not very significant when
the workers are homogeneous, as they know that taxation is a
means of increasing welfare of ~ workers. Thus it is a
substitute for a rule requiring all workers to work equally long
hours (full cooperation in fixing labour supply). vfuen the
workers are heterogeneous, however, problems arise in extracting
information about distribution of skills. In addition the
planner must know under what productive conditions each worker
operates. The solution to the problem may be to levy this part
of the "efficiency tax" on firms according to information about
the conditions under which production takes place, while the
remaining part of the taxation problem is solved in the ordinary
way by trading off distributional consierations as against
efficiency aspects through taxation on the individual
households. Thereby we are left \.,ith the problem of extracting
information about each firm's productive environment, which we
will face also when the workers are identical.
6. Concluding··Remarks.
The model and the problems we have examined above have their
roots in the theory of the labour-managed firm as well as in the
optimal taxation literature. \fuen deciding on an optimal income
tax, there are three considerations to be taken. Firstly, there
is the problem of obtaining an optimal allocation of labour
because the workers employed by a labour-managed firm have in
some instances an incentive to over-supply labour, in other
instances incentives to under-supply labour. This problem is
specific for a labour- managed economy. Secondly there are
distributional problems, i.e. how to obtain a fair distribution
of welfare. Thirdly we may face problems with incentive-com-
patibilty of the tax system.
Our main results are that a governmental body can use taxes to /-
improve upon the allocation of labour in a labour-managed
economy where the workers decide individual ly on labour supply.
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Of course, in the most general setting, where the workers are
heterogeneous, this is only part of the story, as there is a
trade-off between efficiency and distributional considerations.
Two different efficiency correcting tax schedules were develop-
ed. One of them did not allow for any redistribution of income,
and we showed that this implied that not all potential profit
should be taxed away. On the other hand, if the taxation were
combined with a poll tax, the tax function is identical to the
income distribution rule developed by Sen (1966) if taxation can
be carried through costlessly. This means that all'profit should
be taxed away and redistributed on a per-capita basis. In
contrast to these results we know that in the profit-maximizing
economy profits can be taxed without worsening the firm's
resource allocation. However, profit taxation may influence each
worker's capital and labour supply, and neutrality no longer
holds. vfuen the workers are heterogeneous, the maximization of a
welfare function will generally call for some redistribution of
income. In the profit-maximizing economy the ability (produc-
tivity) of the workers and ownership rights in the residual of
the firm are the main reasons for income inequality.
In a labour-managed economy any residual is distributed
according. to supply of efficiency units of labour, which is then
the sole explanation of inequalities. If we introduce taxation
to redistribute income, the strive to capture economic rent will
influence the distributional arguments for a given tax rate in
one way or another. Lastly, this second-best way of influencing
the allocation and redistribution of income does not suffer from
the incentive-incompatability which is the problem of
individualized tax,schedules based on information about the
workers' productivity.
It should be noted that our analysis is short-term in its char-
acter. yvehave simply assumed that capital and other non-labour
factors are optimally allocated. This may be a reasonable simp-
lification if the firm is completely externally financed at a
given market price of capital. However, if some internal finance
would have to be undertaken, the Furubotn-Pejovich effect will
result in a self-extinction of the firm, see Vanek (1977). Then
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of course the comparison with the profit-maximizing firm is no
longer valid. On the other hand, it should be noted that the
profitability of internal investment may be influenced by tax-
ation. This would hold in particular if the firm were subject to
cash-flow taxation, and the individual tax rates were progress-
ive. Then tax policy could be used to encourage internal invest-
ment in the labour-managed firm.
APPENDIX
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Following the procedure used by e.g. Dixit and Sandmo (1977),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, ch. 13) and Sandmo (1983), we
formulate the government's maximization problems by means of
Lagrange expressions, where ep and eL are Lagrange multipliers:
(Al) PH: LP = W[v~(wl(l-tp)' 'It(l-tp),a), ..., v~(.)]
[~ i i i -+ ep f(1 w +a 'It}tp- Na - T]l.
(A2) L~1.. LL [l ( (l ) l) N ( )]• = W vL y -tL y , a , ..., vL •
+ eL[?1iyiy~ - Na - T]
l.
o'It oLUsing the property ~ = (PfL-w)~ = O when the PH-firm allo-
P p
cates labour optimally, we can write the first order conditions
when (Al) and (A2) are maximized w.r.t.
(A3a)
(A3b)
(A4a)
(A4b)
and a as:
i
_-:--o_v_P__ wi
owl.(l-tp)
'It+
oLP ovi 01i . iLW. P L~ N]aa = aa + ep [?aa wl.tp + 'It - = O. l. r ea Pl. l. l.
oLL i . iLW.
oVL (_yiy + yl.t r-e ) OY. .EL.)otL = . l.oy(l-tL) yl. L 01l. otLl.
01i i . . i I1iyiy]+ eL [IotL y ytL +
I1l.yl.oy 01 ~+ = ol. 01l.~ l.
oLL ovi 01i
i
oy i oVL= LW. ( L Y (l-tL) + a-a)oa ..___,. aai l. oY(I-tL)yl. 01l.
01i i ?1iyi~ oy 01i - N] O+ eL [?--oa yY~ + ra- =l. l. 01l.
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In (A3) and (A4) W. = ~ reflects each worker's weight in thel. ovl.
social welfare function. Note that y is endogenous, so that any
change in ~ may change y as well. Howeve~, when there is no
profit, i.e. n = O, and (locally) constant returns to scale
prevail, we find that oy = O V i, and the two sets of equations
o~l.
turn out to be identical.
(i) Homogeneous Workers
a) PH-worker
We rewrite (A3a, b) as
(A3a') - A~W - Aan + e (~ wtp + ~w + an) = Ootp
(A3b') A + ep(~ wtp - l) = O
Note that ~ = ~ = O when the workers are identical.
p
By multiplying (A3b') with (~w + an) and adding it to (A3a'), we
obtain
Rewriting this we get (27).
b) .LM-worke r
Set i l, and rewrite (A4a,b)y = as
(A4a' ) A~(- Y + (l-~) oy o~ ) + ~(o~ t +ioy ~~ tL+ ~y) = Oo~ otL otLY L o~ L
(A4b' ) A(l-tL) ~~
o~ o~ oy o~ l) Ooa + A + eL(aa: y~+~~ TIaa - =
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We multiply (A4b') by ~y and add to (A4a').
Define E = ~~ ¥ and use the Slutsky equation to obtain
From (AS) we get (28).
(ii) Heterogeneous Workers
a) PH-workers
In the.first order conditions (A3a,b) we use the properties of
the indirect objective function stated in the text to obtain
A.i~i i W. A.i i o~i wit
i
(A6a) E \'1. E + 9 [E + E oa; 'Itt- w - a;1t at otpi 1. i 1. P . P i P1. P
+ E (~i i + i1t) o.w a; =
i
A.i o~i witp
oa;i(A6b) E T;l. + 9p (E + E 1ttp- N) = O.i 1. i m;:- i mr-
E.(~lwi + a;i1t)
Hultiply (A6a) by ~ and- (A6b) by 1. , and add the two
N
equations. We rearrange and use the definition of covariances
saying that
i i o~i i wi ni).and likewise for cov (WiA. , a;) and cov ( aa- w, Å We also
use the Slutsky equation in the text to obtain an expression in
terms of substitution effects and income effects. Then we can
derive:
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i i i) i (/) eptp[S~Wi Si 'Tt(A7) - cov (H.]I., 1 w - 'Tt cov (W.]I., + +l. l. a
~li i wili) ~ai ai) 'Tt2 ~ll.wi
--.--
+ l.- cov (~ w, - cov (aa' • a 'Tt~a
'Tt •
where
S~wl. = ~ S~ wi ~ is the average substitution effect of labour
i
supply functions. Other average substitution and income effects,
and average wage and share dividend, are defined in a similar
manner.
Now (A7) can be solved for t to yield (30).
p
The condition (31) for optimal taxation of LM-workers is derived
l i i lin the same manner. We multiply (A4a) by~, (A4b) by El y y N2
and add the two expressions. We rearrange terms and use the
definitions of covariances and average substitution and income
effects as illustrated above to obtain
. .. i ..
+ Cov(H ,l.l.l.y~l l.ol.)]i I\. Y e: aa-' y Å.
where
i i i~li i i W l.l.l.Sl.B = Cov(W.]I.y e: -~--, y 1 )y - .]1. y e:l. va l. y
which can be simplified to yield -(31 ).
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THE FINANCE OF A LABOUR-MANAGED FIRM.
AN EXAMPLE OF CREDIT RATIONING.
by
Jan Erik Askildsen
o. Introduction
In the seminal paper by Ward (1958), the author assumes that the
labour-managed firm is completely externally financed. In later
contributions, notably Vanek (1970, 1977a), it has been argued
that this is a necessary as well as a desirable property of a
firm where the workers are assumed to participate and manage the
firm as workers rather than as capital suppliers. 100% externaf
finance at a fixed capital cost (rate of interest) creates
problems. Firstly it may induce a high demand for credit in the
economy. Furthermore, the workers may consider it suboptimal to
take on all risk themselves, Vanek (1977b), and bankruptcy risk
will affect financiers' willingness to supply capital, McCain
(1977). This calls for risk sharing finance from outsiders.
Ideally this should occur without reducing the workers' control
of the firm. However, because of control problems agency costs
are likely to be high, see Jensen and Meckling (1976), and it is
a question whether the workers will prefer to trade off control
as against reduced capital costs. But then the workers accept
vote carrying shares held by outsiders, as a means to obtain
sufficient risk-sharing and fixed interest rate loan finance.
The problem can be representd as optimization under credit
rationing. The workers choose composition and degree of risk
sharing finance. Then they are able to obtain a given, desired
degree of fixed interest rate loan finance.
In addition the firm will often face an ordinary credit
rationing due to lack of capital in the economy. OWing to high
demand for debt finance, labour-managed firms may be
particularly serverely affected.
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In this paper I will investigate a model of a labour-managed
firm which is rationed in the capital market in the sense that
it is restricted in choice of financial position. Exclusive
fixed interest debt finance is ruled out. The model is intended
to represent some features which may be important to a
labour-owned firm operating in a classical capitalist
environment.
In the next section I will establish how it is that credit rati-
oning is an important issue when discussing the finance of a
labour-managed firm. Possible solutions to the problem will be
discussed. Then in Section 2 I present the model to be used. Its
main feature is that the firm can issue shares, and that a
minority of these shares can be held by outsiders. In Section 3
I analyse the allocation of capital under credit rationing. The
firm can obtain a given level of risk sharing finance through
internal investment in owned assets, external shareholding and
recruitment of new workers. Degree of internal and external
finance (shareholding) depend on the credit ration; the degree
to which the workers are willing to relinquish control, and the
workers' opportunity cost of capital. All workers in the firm
own an equal number of shares. Therefore the employment decision
will directly affect the capital level, and the employment level
will generally differ from that of the Illyrian firm. Allocation
of labor is dicussed more generally in Section 4. Hith reference
to Miyazaki (1984) it is shown that a possible dilution of the
firm as labour-owned and labour-managed is affected by credit
rationing. Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of how workers
may choose degree of outsiders' participation, while I in
section 6 briefly investigates how willingness to undertake
internal finance is affected by the workers' attitude to risk.
In Section 7 I discuss some aspects concerning the subsidization
of a labour-managed firm. In particular I argue that the govern-
ment can subsidize the firm by supplying capital at a rate below
or equal to the market (risk free) interest rate. This should be
considered in the light of the alternative employment prospects
of the workers, by carrying through a cost benefit analysis.
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1. CREDIT RATIONING OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS.
There is a general consensus in the literature that proper fin-
ancial institutions are essential if a labour managed firm shall
be able to obtain an efficient allocation of its resources. The
classical labour-managed firm, Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970), is
assumed to be completely externally financed. If internally
financed investments are undertaken, there is no private
ownership of the capital. On the background of the social
ownership of capital, and with further reference to special
Yugoslav institutions, notably the requirement to maintain the
book value of an investment in perpetuity, Furubotn and Pejovich
(1970) and Vanek (1977a) show that the self-financed
labour-managed firm suffer from cronical underinvestment, often
termed the Furubotn-Pejovich effect. The answer to this problem
is always to apply external finance, as the cost of borrowing to
undertake an investment will generally fall below the cost of
financing the project from internal sources. These problems
concerning internal finance are more closely discussed in a
literature review in another chapter of this thesis.
The possibility of obtaining 100 % external finance is however
questioned by some authors, and Furubotn (1980) argues that
except when loans are-given in perpetuity, i.e. the principal
need not be repaid as long as the book value of the capital
stock is kept intact, the required internal rate of return will
still exceed the market interest rate. Jensen and Meckling
(1979) argue that pure rental is impossible mainly because there
will be difficulties in obtaining funds for investment in intan-
gibles (education, organizational development). The problems
caused by uncertain market prospects are perhaps even more sig-
nificant. Due to the "law of increasing risk", Kalecki (1937),
i.e. the bankruptcy risk, borrowers will demand an increasing
interest rate as the gearing ratio increases (HcCain (1977».
Capitalist firms can avoid this problem by issuing shares, while
this is more problematic in a system where firms are supposed to
be self-managed. Furthermore, the workers may find it suboptimal
to bear all risk through the fluctuation of wage income, which
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is a reason to introduce outsiders who are willing to share in
the risk (Vanek (1977b)).
This has led both Vanek and McCain to suggest systems of risk
participating bonds. The bonds are issued to outsiders and/or
insiders. But they carry no voting rights. By tying the return
on the bonds to the workers' wage dividend, the maximand of the
firm, it is assumed that the bond holders can be sure of receiv-
ing a rate of return reflecting the performance of the firm.
Vanek suggests that the bonds should be supplied by a "National
Labor Management Agency". Using a similar idea, Putterman (1984)
argues that a system of labour-managed production firms and
financial institutions, devoid of the bureaucratic inefficien-
cies of the Yugoslav economy, will produce a capital market
where returns are equalized and an equilibrium is established.
Then the capital costs will reflect agency costs in the same
manner as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the
obtained equilibrium cannot be denoted suboptimal.
Whatever the actual institutions look like, a labour management
equilibrium seems to require a well established financial infra-
structure. Then the problem remains how the existing Western
financial system can be converted into a desired scenario. Att-
"empts have "been made, like the Mondragon in Spain (see Bradley
and Gelb (1982)). But there seems to be no generally observable
tendency of conversion of Western capitalist institutions. This
means that the scattered labour-managed firms will have to oper-
ate within the framework of a traditionally capitalist struc-
ture. Thus, although problems of control and confidence which
are the basis for this paper, may be present in a pure labour-
managed economy as well, they will most likely cause problems
for labour-managed firms operating in an economy consisting of
traditional capitalist (profit-maximizing) institutions.
The confidence problem exists beween insiders and outsiders, as
insiders have got the exclusive right to make allocational deci-
sions. McCain (1977) argues that there should be no reason for
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outsiders to worry, as long as the firm is maximizing a payout
measure to which the outsiders' return is coupled. However, the
workers are not primarily concerned with what the maximand looks
like. \fuat matters is the utili ty (income) they get from their
participation. In a sense the outsiders and insiders have oppos-
ing interests, and the workers may in different ways redefine
the maximand if that is appropriate. On the other hand, this
means that the existence of outside bond holders represents a
restriction on the workers' behaviour if they have to stick to
some given rule. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
this outside interference in defining the rnaximand will increase
as their part of finance increases. But this is the same as
saying that the outsiders own shares carrying voting rights, not
only non-voting bonds. In this paper I shall model this voting
right explicitly. But I assume that it is used merely to secure
a satisfactory payout.
There is another source of outside interference which may be
just as important. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we can
argue that credit rationing may be used by the banks in order to
screen and discipline their customers. By supplying credit at an
interest rate below the market clearing rate to some borrowers,
or using other instruments affecting the effective interest rate
in a discriminating way, there will be a queue of borrowers, and
the financiers can require certain conditions to be fulfilled
for being willing to grant a credit (see Lommerud (1985), p.
123-4). Because of the labour-managed firms' high costs of in-
ternal finance, they may be willing to pay a high interest rate
on borrowings. With imperfect (asymmetric) information, credit
suppliers do not know what is the real risk associated with a
project. The lenders may use the interest rate which borrowers
is willing to pay, as a signal of riskiness of the project. Then
willingness to pay is used as a screening mechanism in the
credit market. Stiglitz and \leiss argue that the customers with
the highest willingness to pay may be refused a loan as a result
of this screening.
On the background of this, I argue that a labour-managed firm
operating in a capitalist economy will be credit rationed. This
will affect the performance of the firm, and measures have to be
found, which can reduce the problem. One procedure to follow is
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to let outsiders participate with risk sharing capital. The
outsiders will, however, exercise some supervision and influence
decisions. But then capital is supplied de facto by means of
vote carrying shares.
I find it reasonable that the outsiders will use their influence
to guarantee themselves a minimum share dividend. Thereby they
get a preference in payment decisions which reduces their risk
from participation. Simultaneously it reduces the workers' poss-
ibilities of increasing their payout at the expense of the out-
siders by different forms of manipulations. As seen from the
workers' point of view, it should be considered the price they
will have to pay for a certain degree of self control.
Unless the outside interference is some governmental body grant-
ing a subsidy (see Section 5, and Bradley and Gelb (1980», we
will assume that the outsiders will maximize the yield on the
capital invested. They will accept a state-contingent payment.
But the workers, who have the voting majority, should take on a
larger part of the risk. This happens when the workers are bound
by a minimum share dividend. The minimum share dividend must of
course be agreed upon in advance, as the point o'f time when the
investment takes place is the only moment when the minority
group can influence decisions by exploiting the fact that the
workers need (want) their participation. This takes into consid-
eration the fact that once the capital is invested (i.e. the
shares are bought), the outsiders can sell their shares to other
outsiders, but they cannot require the shares redeemed.
The existence of a minimum share dividend is well known from
theory on the managerial firm, see e.g. Yarrow (1976). In that
case the conflict is between wealth-maximizing shareholders and
the utility maximizing management. Profit can be absorbed as
managerial slack or emoluments. This may provoke intervention
from the shareholders. But there is a minimum share dividend
which will prevent them from intervening. The minimum share
dividend is a choice variable in the management's optimization,
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whereas it is here treated as exogenous, given a state of na-
ture.
In addition to a minimum amount, the dividend on shares may, and
probably it will, depend on wage-dividend paid to the worker-
owners. Then McCain's (1977) and Vanek's (1977b) rules emerge as
special cases. Such a rule is a possible candidate for solving
the problem of confidence between the two opposing groups. The
minimum dividend will generally exceed the market interest rate
because of credit rationing and the fact that the workers are
dependent on the outsiders. Or, stated slightly differently, if
increased debt finance were to take place, this wou Ld take place
at increasing borrowing costs. It should be noted, however, that
it is profit after the deduction of labour costs valued at the
market wage rate which matters for the outsiders when assessing
profitability of the firm. On the other hand, this can easily be
taken explicitly into account in our formula, as share dividend·
can be made increasing in the excess of wage dividend above the
relevant market wage rate.
As shares are negotiable in the sense that insiders can sell to
other insiders (e.g. newcomers) the Furubotn-Pejovich problem is
not existent. Those workers will reap the advantage from an
investment decision, who are engaged at the point of time when
the decision is made. This is independent of how long a time
they stay with the firm, as long as the shares correctly reflect
the value of the firm. The informational problems connected with
this are not trivial to solve. But it will always be possible to
find a price which is acceptable when shares are transferred,
e.g. from leaving members to newcomers, through use of correct
incentive-compatible mechanisms.
We will assume that the firm can borrow proportionally to its
share capital. This is reasonable, as capital consists of tang-
ibles as well as intangibles. He conjecture that it is easier to
borrow for investment in machinery and fixed equipment than for
investment in knowledge and human capital. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the "law of increasing risk", the interest rate will in-
crease as debt increases in proportion to capital (gearing ra-
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tio). This last point is analysed by McCain (1977). We assume
that the exogenous gearing ratio is sufficient to enable the
firm to obtain debt at a given interest rate (nothing of impor-
tance is lost by making the interest rate exogenous).
From the above, we see that the firm faces two constraints:
that on external borrowing and that on external shareholding.
However, as it will become clear later, the truly crucial con-
straint is that on borrowing. External shares are introduced to
provide sufficient capitalonly. The cost of this external share
finance is the possible excess dividend above the market inter-
est rate that has to be paid to outsiders. The extent of the
external ownership can be made endogenous instead, attaching
utility too to the degree of shares held by the insiders (the
workers). This will be briefly considered in subsection 3(i).
In the short run membership should be considered constant. It is
difficult to recruit new members as these will have to raise
some capital. Symmetrically it will be very difficult to dismiss
workers who have invested some of their private funds in the
firm. Furthermore, we know from the theory on the labour- manag-
ed firm that if the members are to be treated equally, i.e.
dismissals are to be enforced randomly or dismissed workers are
to be compensated, employment is constant if workers are not
risk-lovers (Steinherr and Thisse (1979». It seems unlikely
also that the outsiders can force the majority to vote for chan-
ges in membership that it does not want, except in special situ-
ations.
The problem is, according to McCain (1977), that the pure rental
labour-managed firm faces credit rationing unless reliable
financial instruments can be created. This is however a diffi-
cult task if capital suppliers are not to be given any voting
rights (Jensen and Meckling (1979». On the other hand, as
argued by Miyazaki (1984), it will pay in some circumstances to
reorganize a bankrupt captitalist firm as a worker cooperative.
The reason is that the workers' long term utility may be in-
creased compared to the alternative employment prospects, or
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even possible unemployment. Indeed, it is often in this case we
observe the emergence of labour-managed firms. They are however
in some cases not long lived. This may be due to the financial
problems considered above. But Miyazaki shows that it may be
optimal to reduce membership by substituting hired workers for
worker-members if the firm does well. Then the firm will eventu-
ally convert into a capitalist firm. But as argued by Miyazaki
imperfections in the capital market may affect the possible
dilution of the firm as labour-managed.
Thus, in a capitalist market economy the optimal solution for a
labour-managed firm may involve compromising with capital supp-
liers. In this paper I will discuss one possible way of compro-
mising. It may be of interest when considering a socialist lab-
our-managed economy as well.
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2. THE MODEL
I shall investigate the functioning of a labour-owned and -man-
aged firm, which is financed by shares and debt. The shares are
procured from the workers as well as from outsiders. The workers
have the voting majority, and we shall assume that the shares
are equally distributed among the insiders. Outside shares must
not exceed a certain limit (percentage of total number of shar-
es). This limit is set by the workers themselves. Borrowing is
restricted to a given percentage of share capital.
I shall consider different modes of financing the firm. The
alternatives open to the workers are
- increase internal finance (retained surplus) by means of
shares
- recruit new workers supplying vote-carrying share capital
- allow (more) outsiders supplying vote-carrying share capital
- increase borrowings.
The latter, however, is endogenously determined by an
exogenously given gearing ratio.
T~e period of consideration - the production period - is
the rest of the horizon as it is seen from the point of view of
"the initial workers, i.e. it is the remaining employment period
for the workers who are employed at the beginning of the
production period.
In the discussion in Section 4, I shall assume also that there
is a spot labour market where the firm can hire workers at a
given market wage rate.
The price of the firm's product is dependent on uncertain market
conditions. It is thereby to be considered a random variable
with a known distribution. The firm produces one product. The
price of shares is assumed equal to unity, and there is no
depreciation of the capital.
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Notation:
x
p
Y
'!t
r ·
B
b
K
A
A
Ia
Ea ..
Na
M
m
N
n
w
a ··
~
6
quantity of output.
price of output.
wage dividend to the worker-owners.
share dividend (amount per share).
rate of- interest on debt.
borrowings.
limit on loans as a percentage of total stock of shares.
capital.
initial total shareholding
share capital, number of shares at price l in the
production period.
number of shares bought by each worker at the beginning of
the production period (retained surplus).
number of shares invested by outsiders.
number of shares bought by new worker-members (exogenous)
number of initial worker-members of the firm.
>new workers employed, m.= O.
total number of full-time workers engaged by the firm.
number of hired workers.
market wage rate, to be paid to hired workers.
internal discount factor.
minimum share dividend.
maximum percentage of share capital that can be held by
outsiders.
Additional notation will be defined in due course.
I shall present the initial workers' (the majority group's)
optimisation problem. The influence of outsiders is introduced
as a restriction on the payment of share dividend ('!t). The firm
maximizes wage dividend per worker for any value of '!t chosen.
The choice variables are aI, m, aE and '!t.
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We can establish the subsequent basic relations and defini-
tions:
(l ) y = PX - rB - nA-M + m
This is the payout to every full-time worker in the production
period. As we restrict attention to full-time workers, payment
depends on membership only, and it is equalised among the perma-
nent work-force.
According to (l) the workers will for every choice of n receive
a wage dividend y. As there may be outsiders who possess shares,
the workers are not indifferent to relative payout rates.
Distributing surplus according to share holdings means that also
outsiders receive a part of total value added which would
otherwise have accrued to the workers. Therefore share dividend
is a choice variable which will be fixed so that wage dividend
is maximized. But, as we shall see below, there are restrictions
on the choice of n, so that generally it is not zero.
If the initial workers are to invest more capital in the firm
(retain surplus), they supply each an equal number of shares,
aI. In addition to the initial shareholding A, whose
distribution we do not consider, total share capital in the
production period is made of capital supplied by inital workers,
new workers and external financiers (outsiders). Risk taking
capital, share capital A, is then:
(2) - I N EA = A + Ma + rna + a
Total capital consists of shares and borrowings, B. All capital
invested is used in production, so that
(3) K = A + B
The credit rationing, i:e. maximum possible, or desired, fixed
interest rate debt finance, takes the form of an exogenously
determined gearing ratio. We write this as
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(4) B < bA.
We will assume that the restriction in (4) binds. The reason may
be "classical" credit rationing. But it may, as discussed
above, also reflect the workers' optimal choice of degree of
fixed interest rate debt finance.
There is a lower limit on share dividend. The limit is fixed in
bargaining between insiders (initial workers) and outsiders.
Generally there may be any coalition among shareholders which
may influence the minimum share dividend denoted ~. In
particular this is likely to happen if the workers' shares are
unequally distributed. That problem, however, is relegated to
another article of this thesis.
We do not consider the bargain to determine minimum share.
dividend ~. It is taken for granted that the workers and the.
outsiders manage to agree on a rule for the distribution of
surplus.
The insiders will reduce the outsiders' yield as much as
possible. But the outsiders would not have participated, were it
not for two reasons, viz. that the workers need them and that
the expected outcome is acceptable given the investors'
opportunity cost. We have argued previously that this is above
r . Then the outsiders will demand ~ > r. r1arket conditions must
however be taken into account as well. They are reflected by the
random variable P. The higher P is, the better are the market
conditions, and the higher dividend will be claimed. But wage
dividend y is increasing in the product price, and its value
will thereby reflect the market prospects. Although the workers
may manipulate the wage dividend, a functional relationship
which will satisfy the outsiders can be established in negoti-
ations and by use of proper control mechanisms whose costs the
workers have to cover. Thus we will assume that given the market
interest rate and any realised state of nature, ~ (and ~) may
vary with y according to an agreed upon rule. One example of
such a rule is given in McCain (1977). Another example is found
in Bradley and Gelb (1980) who instead use a maximum wage divi-
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dend. He will not stick to any fixed formula here. Instead we
interpret the relationship between ~ and y, together with the
minimum level of ~, see below, as reflecting the bargaining
power of the two parties.
Making ~ dependent on y means that its determination is endogen-
ised. The workers are maximizing y for every value of ~. The
outsiders will demand a share in surplus. Their share is through
negotiation given by the relationship between ~ and y. Thus, the
workers decide on wage and share dividend, given the outsiders'
reactions to different levels of wage dividend. If the outsiders
feel that this does not give them a sufficient share, or that
they are being exploited, they have got the right to renegotiate
conditions or withholding their supply of capital. This takes
care of the control aspect. He write the determination of share
dividend as
~ = ~(y~ r),
where ~y = ~ ~ o. Since the outsiders participate only when
their expected return, E~, exceeds the market interest rate, we
will have that
~. > rnun
unless in very bad states of nature where ~ may drop below r.
We depict the relationship between y and ~ in Figure l.
By making shares negotiable, capital costs will decrease as the
principal - i.e. the original amount of capital invested - can
be repayed at any time. Losses incurred by issuing negotiable
shares can be grouped into two classes. If egalitarianism
matters, the fulfilment of that goal may be impeded. That
problem will not be considered here. The other class of
problems arising relates to the discussion above concerning
shares held by outsiders. The workers have to pay some of the
firm's surplus to non-members. I consider the determination of ~
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~ (y; r)
~min
y
Figure ·-1: A possible relationship between the minimum dividend
and wage dividend.
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to depend on the degree of outsiders' participation. Thus,
allowing outsiders to share in surplus, also means that they
influence the allocational decisions o~ the firm. Therefore, the
functional relationship between share dividend (n) and wage
dividend (y) holds for a given degree of outsiders' control, as
measured by the part of share capital they control. This maximum
outside control, O, is determined (exogenously) by the workers.
Behind all this, the workers have traded off control as against
incme. This will be discussed more closely in Section 5.
Then we have that
(5 ) > -n = ~(Y70, r)
It follows that a desired level of control by the workers is
guaranteed by restricting the outside shares not to exceed a
limit oA of total shares:
(6) E <a oA
In addition to the behavioural restrictions, we have the foll-
owing non-negativity restrictions:
(7a) I >a = O
(7b) >m = O
(7c) E > Oa =
Total employment level is
(8) N = M + m.
The relationship between the input factors labour and capital
and the output is described by a production function f(K,N) so
that
(9) X = f(K,N)
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positive marginal productivities i. e. fK
6f
° and\ve assume =6i< >fN = 6f > 0, and a concave production function. It is assumedOR'
also that f(O,N) = °
The workers have the voting majority. This is obtained through
ownership of a majority of the shares. They may also enjoy
codetermination (voting rights) as workersl).
\le shall consider the workers' maximization problem as presented
above. As the market conditions are uncertain, we must make
assumptions concerning the workers' attidude to risk also. It is
reasonable to assume that each worker is risk averse. This will
affect his willingness to invest in the firm and his supply of
labour. The individual attitude to risk will be the subject of a
subsequent paper, and we consider here the workers' collective
attitude to risk only.
I shall assume that the firm (i.e. the workers as a collective)
is risk neutral. This will simplify the analysis, and enable us
to concentrate on the main issue, which is to single out the
sources of finance that the workers will find it optimal to use.
Because of limited diversification possibilities of the owners
of the firm compared to the owners of a capitalist firm, the
assumption is not innocent. A justification may be that the risk
is spread among all workers and that each project is considered
marginal. Furthermore, the workers are able to spread the risk
in deciding on their product range (see e.g. Ireland and Law
(1982), ch. 7). If so, P and X should be considered vectors of
prices and quantities. Also it is reasonable to believe that it
is mainly through the individual supply decisions that the
workers' possible risk aversion may playa crucial role (see
section 3(i». Lastly, if the maximization is carried through by
a management, the management will generally not know the
preferences of the workers. Therefore, the management may
reasonably assume that any hedging is done individually, leaving
it to maximize the expected income.
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Then, if we assume risk neutrality, the management of the firm
will maximize expected income per worker. Let the variables in
the production period denote expected values, and we can write
the maximand as
I l I a](10) Max [(y + na ) ~ - a ~
I E(10) is maximized w.r.t. a , a , m and n by using the defini-
tions (l) - (3) and (8), the non-negativity restrictions in (7)
and the restrictions (4) - (6) and (9).
We will assume that the credit rationing is binding. Then we may
substitute bA for B in (4). The capital to be used may be
written as:
By making substitutions in (10), the Lagrange-function
simplifies to:
l I a I [(11) L = l+a (y + a n) - l+a a + y n - ~(y~ r,
y and e are Lagrange multipliers. y reflects the restriction on
share-dividend, imposed by outsiders. The workers' utility (pay-
out) is decreasing in n (or ~) whenever aE > O. This is easily
seen from the definitions of wage and share dividend: A marginal
increase in y gives each worker __l_th of the additional income.
M+m
By increasing n instead, each (homogeneous) worker receives
I l
~ < as A < (M+m)aI when aE > O. However, note that this
M+m
result does no longer hold if ownership rights are distributed
>in an inegalitarian manner. Thus, we will have n = ~, and y = O
as the workers' income (utility) is decreasing in ~.
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9 measures how strongly the restriction on outside shareholding
is binding. If aE < 6A , 9 is equal to zero. On the other hand,
if the restriction binds, it means that the workers could in-
crease their income by increasing o. The reason why they do not
enforce such a change is obviously the fact that they are will-
ing to pay for a certain degree of control. But as to the
maximization of income, obviously income is lower the lower is
o,' as long as the credit ration binds. The sign of 9 is
discussed below.
(Il) is maximized w.r.t. Ia , Ea , m and n. The Kuhn-Tucker first
order conditions may be written as:
(12a)
l-y~ (1+0:)
{[PfK(l+b) - rb -n] • -__.;;;..y_-
(M+m) (l+ o: )
+ 96M} aI = O
• M + n-o:
1+ o:
(12b)
l-y~ (1+0:)
~~ = O => {[(PfN-y)+(PfK(l+b)-rb-n)aI] • _--::y~--
(M+m) (1+ o: )
- I}+ 90a m = O
(12c) oL = O =>
oaE
l-y~ (1+0:)
{[PfK(l+b)-rb-n]. y - 9(1-&) }a
E = O
(1+0:)(M+m)
(12d)
1-y~y(l+0:) al
= O => {- A + 1+0:+ y}n = O
(M+m) (1+0:)
The solution to the programme is given by (12a-d) together with
(5) and (6). We assume that second order conditions are met.
Because of the nature of our problem (credit rationing), we can
assume n > O. Then (12d) holds by equality, and we find that
y = A_al (M+m) >---------------= o
(1+0:)(A~ +M+m)y
-.
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Er > O if a > O, and the restriction on share dividend will be
binding. As the workers are homogeneous we will have r = O when
aE = O, since the workers are in that case indifferent as to the
way payment is made. \ve can sbstitute for r into the other first
order conditions to obtain
l-r~y( l+a)
(M+m) (l+a)
=
Il+a ~y = C > 0,
(l+a) (A~ +M+m)y
which we shall use in our analysis.
We see that in addition to (the restricted) borrowings, the
workers have three ways of financing their activity:
(i) Retain surplus in the initial period (internal finance).
(ii) Increase externally held shares.
(iii) Increase the level of membership.
These means will again trigger off increased borrowings. In the
next section I will investigate these three possibilities in
turn. Afterwards I will look more closely at the conditions for
changes in membership (Section 4) and choice of degree of
outsiders' participation (Section 5).
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3. ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL
As noted
binding.
the firm
above, we will assume that the credit rationing is
. . h f 2) fTh1s amounts to saY1ng t at PK> r . vVhen P K = r,
is able to obtain the credit it wants. As we assume
that the workers prefer higher degrees of control to lower, they
will not finance the firm by shares held by outsiders demanding
a payout exceeding r (see below).
Let us now investigate the condition (12c) for allocation of
externally held shares. The condition may be rewritten as
(12c') (PfK - i:~b)(l+b)C - 0(1-6) < 0, a
E > 0, with at least
one equality.
Let us give an interpretation of 9. It may be termed the shadow
price on outside held shares. It reflects what the workers are
willing to pay for allowing outsiders share in the surplus of
the firm. The sign of 9 depends on degree of credit rationing
and willingness to pay for the outsiders' financial
contribution. Rewriting (12c') when aE = 6A, i.e. outsiders'
share finance is at its maximum, we find that
(13) 9 = (Pf _ ~+rb) (l+b)
K ~ (1-6)
• c.
e = ° if ° ~ aE < oA, otherwise non-zero. The shadow price is
equal to the deviation of value marginal product of capital from
the average price of capital multiplied by capital provided
through increase in share supply and taking into consideration
the relation between wage dividend and share dividend.
According to (13),
> > ~+rbe < ° as PfK < ~.
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Shadow price of outsiders' risk sharing contribution is posi-
tive, zero or negative as value marginal product of capital
exceeds, is equal to or is smaller than an average price to be
paid for each unit of money value of capital. This price is a
weighted average of share dividend and the interest rate on
borrowings, where the weight is r!h for share capital and l~b
for borrowings. As the credit rationing becomes less severe,
i.e. b increases, the average price of capital approaches r, the
interest rate paid on borrowings:
n+brlim ~ = r
b-
With infinite b - no credit ratoining - the price to be paid for
a money value of capital is the market rate of interest. If
outsiders demand a higher share dividend, there is no reason for
the workers to issue shares to them.
n+brNow, assume? finite and r < PfK < I+D:' i.e. a binding ration.
From (13) e < O, which again implies aE = 5A. There is a nega-
tive shadow price on shares, which means that the workers are
interested in reducing outsiders' shareholding. We can inter-
prete e as the price the workers are willing to pay for a reduc-
tion in the maximum outside shareholding.
Given b, the credit rationing becomes more severe as PfK app-
roaches the average price of capital i!~r. vfuen equality holds,
e = O, and O ~ aE ~ 6A . The restriction on outside shareho1d-
ing is not binding, and the workers are indifferent to its
level.
. n+bre > O ~f PfK > l+b ' and the shadow price is thereby the price
the workers are willing to pay for an increase in outsiders'
share supply. The workers are able to increase income by
increasing 6. If they do not do so, it means that this is a
price they are willing to pay for the given degree of self
management. In the objective function (Il) the control aspect is
- 23 -
taken care of by the exogenous choice of 6, which represents a
restriction the workers have chosen themselves. This choice will
be further discussed in Section 5.
Outside share finance may be chosen as long as value marginal
product of capital exceeds the market rate of interest on
borrowings. Whether it will be chosen or not depends on the
share dividend, or rather its excess over the rate of interest.·
vfuen the marginal valuation of capital falls short of the
weighted average capital price, the workers will consider a
reduction in outsiders' maximum shareholding. In the reverse
case they have a willingness to pay for its increase. When
considering the valuation of share finance from outsiders,
the borrowings made possible by changes in share capital and the
outsiders' influence on distribution of surplus matter as well.
Specifically, ceteris paribus we can show by partially
differentiating the expression for e in (13) with respect to a
given ~ , i.e. how steep the ~-function is in figure l, that they
shadow price is falling in ~ . He may interprete ~ as they . y
influence excerted by the outsiders, or their agressiveness in
negotiations. e is also decreasing in n.
The second source of increasing risk-sharing finance is internal
investment in owned shares. It is equivalent to withholding
surplus for investment in productive capital. The condition for
this to occur is given by (12a). It may be rewritten as:
(12a') {(PfK - l:bb) (l+b)CM + ~~: + 06M} ~ O,
I >a O, with at least one equality.
If there is no credit rationing, b tends to infinity, and the
average price of capital equals the interest rate paid on
borrowings. The workers are indifferent to outside shareholding
if the outsiders' accept a remuneration equal to the market rate
of interest. Internal finance is dependent on the workers'
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opportunity cost of capital, reflected by the value of a. If a
exceeds '!t- the cost of providing capital is higher than the
bank lending rate of interest, say because the workers are
individually risk averse - then the workers will not choose
internal finance. For a = '!they are indifferent. yve find that
internal finance will be strictly positive for a < '!t.Then the
workers can provide capital cheaper than external financiers. In
a situation without credit rationing this situation seems
unlikely unless the workers are risklovers.
Let us investigate the conditions for increased finance from the
initial workers more closely when the credit ration binds. \ve
rewrite (12a') as
(14) < '!t+br l '!t-a --- (--- - SoM)l+b cM(l+b) l+a
aI = O if inequality holds, whereas equality holds if aI > O.
Assume firstly no outside shareholding. Then S = O. Let
furthermore share dividend, '!t,be set equal to the opportunity
cost of capital, a. If they exceed the market rate of interest,
e.g. because of the workers' risk aversion with respect to their
individual capital, then the average price of capital exceeds
the borrowing rate of interest for a finite b (credit
rationing). If so, internal finance will be undertaken until
equality is brought about between value marginal product of
capital and average price of capital. If the latter exceeds the
former, no internal finance is undertaken.
It may be of interest to investigate how willingness to
undertake internal finance depends on some parameters of the
model, viz. the maximum outside shareholding (o), the credit
ration (b), the outsiders' share in surplus (~ -function) and
y
internal opportunity cost of captial (a).
IIt is convenient to assume that a = O initially. Assume also
that m = O. The workers have considered whether external finance
will be chosen. If the result of this consideration is that
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value marginal product of capital exceeds the right hand side of
(14), internal finance will be made. The r.h.s. of (14)
represents the real capital costs. It is taken into
consideration how internal finance affects the total financial
position of the firm.
If an initial choice of aI = O results in a value marginal
product of capital above these real capital costs, income will
be increased by choosing aI > O. Now, substitute for e from
(13), and denote the new right-hand side of (14) e. e will of
course depend on all variables of the model. Then we can write
(14) as:
(14' ) ~ ~+rb l - 6 ~-aPfK ~ - (l+b)cM l+a =
H reflects capital costs. Wether these exceed or fall
short of what is previously denoted average price of capital,~:=,depends on the in~ernal opportunity cost of capital, a. If
it is initially below share dividend, i.e. ~ > a, internal
capital is cheaper than shares supplied by outsiders. Then, if
the workers choose aE = O, ~ can be reduced to equality with a.
The resulting capital cost is
a+rb-l+a
which exceeds r if b is finite and a > r. If the initial choice
of aI = O gives a value marginal product of capital above this,
internal finance will be undertaken before outside share finance
is considered. See also subsection 3(iv).
However, the workers' opportunity cost for providing individu-
ally owned capital may be high. Investing in own firm limits
diversification of (human and non-human) capital, while the
'.
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outsiders who invest probably are highly diversified. For a > n
external share finance is cheaper than internal. The workers
-have already invested some capital, A, in the firm. Will they
increase their shareho1ding in this case, i.e. choose aI > 07
Obviously this depends on the capital shortage when a
distribution over market prospects is known and any slack is
exhausted. If PfK > H with an initial choice of aI = O, then
income is increased by investing more from owned resources. For
given employment level, i.e. m = O, decreasing marginal
productivity of capital implies that capital level and
production will be higher the lower is PfK. If initially H <
PfK, internally financed investments will increase production
and income accruing to the workers.
~ve can calculate how the value of H depends on the parameters'
mentioned by taking its partial derivatives. These are3)
aH > aH aH < oH ifa6 = O, aD = 7, o~y = O, oa > O, n > a
oH O, oH < O, oH O, oH > O, if50 = mr a~y = Fci' n = a
aH < O, aH < O, aH > O, aH > O, if n <"50 OD 0Ty aa a·
It is assumed that n > r and that ~yy = O, cf. Figure 1.
I have made calculations for different values of n in relation
to a. My comments are concentrated on the situation where
internal discount factor exceeds share dividend rate.
The results reported above say that, for a maximum level of
external share finance, capital level is more likely to be
increased through internal finance - ratained surplus - the
higher is the accepted outsiders' participation and the credit
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ration, and the lower is the opportunity cost of capital and the
outsiders' influence on surplus distribution via the steepness
of the minimum share dividend function. The results seem
intuitively reasonable. High values of 6 and b mean that the
effects of internal finance will be large, as outsiders' share
supply and borrowings can be increased accordingly to a high
degree in a situation where capital shortage is urgent. Note
that the sign of ~~ is reversed when share dividend rate exceeds
the discount factor. This is so because we have assumed that the
restriction on outsiders' shareholding binds. Increased internal
finance also means increased external finance, which is less
attractive when the price demanded by outsiders, n, exceeds the
price the insiders will claim, a. Therefore, for a < n, the
restriction on maximum outside shareholding does not necessarily
bind. For given employment level and when a > n, this implies
that production is increasing in 6, the maximum number of shares
held by outsiders, and the credit ration b. It is decreasing in
the internal opportunity cost of capital. Also, if the outsiders
manage to negotiate a "tougher" relation between wage and
share-dividend (a shift upwards in the ~ -function), the optimaly
capital level and production will be lower.
Let us now examine how the choice of membership level can affect
the firm's financial position. The number of workers enjoying
membership is assumed constant during the production period.
Changes may occur at the beginning of the period. Recruitment
will take place according to generally agreed upon procedures4).
In this subsection I will discuss how variations in membership
may be used for affecting the financial position of the firm. In
Section 4 I will investigate the optimal size of the firm and
the composition of its work-force in a more general context. vie
rewrite (l2b) as:
(l2b') [(PfN - y) + (PfK -
< O,
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>m O, with at least one equality.
> n:+rbThe sign of e depends on whether PfK < ~' see (12c'). Then
(12b') implies that
n:+rb}(15) sgn (PfN - y) = - sgn (PfK - ~ ,
provided there is an interior solution where m > O, which we
will assume for the time being. From (12c'-)we know that
Pfk > i:bb if e > O and accordingly aE > o. This implies that
the firm will recruit members to a point where the wage
dividend, y, exceeds the value marginal product of labour. Of
course this does not mean that the firm should employ members to
a point where they extract more resources from the firm than
they bring into it. Their total contribution and yield are
dependent on the supply of capital as well as work. Thus, the
workers will take into consideration the effect on finance also
when deciding on the optimal level of membership. He see this
more clearly by substituting for e > O from (12c') in (12b') and
rearranging:
(16) (Pf ) (Pf _ n:+br) IN - Y + K ~ a l1-6
(l+b) = O
I
a
Ia
is the number of shares that each worker contributes. Then
• _!_ is the total increase in share capital made possible by1-6
additional worker. Multiplying by (l+b) gives total increasean
in capital from a change in the level of membership. We see that
the excess of.wage dividend above the value marginal product of
labour is explained by the value of the marginal worker's
induced capital contribution. The value of this contribution is
again dependent on the credit ration the firm is able to obtain.
Therefore, whether new members will be hired, depends, apart
from the general market prospects, on how the credit market
develops.
We note that the rule for the allocation of labour approaches
the condition for labour allocation in the Illyrian firm as b
increases. When the firm is no longer rationed in the credit
market, the second term in (16) vanishes, and labour is allocat-
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ed to a point where PfN = y. However, this presupposes that all
capital can be borrowed, or that the workers are able to raise
all funds internally at the market interest rate r. On the other
hand, when the shares are negotiable, the horizon problem is not
present. The reason why we may still find n > r is risk-
aversion, high individual costs of raising capital etc. From
(16), when insiders own all shares, this situation will imply
PfN < y. Thus, the capital-labour ratio will generally differ
from that to be found in the 100 % externally financed Illyrian
firm.
We cannot state unambiguously whether the level of membership
will exceed or fall short of the level of membership in the
Illyrian firm (see also section 4). This is so because changing
the level of the permanent workforce is not the only financial
instrument available. We see however, that if internal finance
rc+rbis given, and the excess of PfK above ~ is a measure of the
credit rationing, the initial workers will apply more workers
the more severe is the credit rationing. This means an increase
in membership compared to that of the Illyrian firm with the
same capital cost but no individual stakes in capital.
(iv) Comparisons
I will make a comparison among the financial instruments
available. The instruments are issuing shares to outsiders,
Iundertake internal investment, a or change the level of
membership, m. The choice to be made concerning these variables
will again affect the level of borrowing. Let us express the
Ea ,
three conditions in a manner which makes comparisons more
simple:
(17) PfK
< n+br 9(1-6) E > OI+b + C(I+b)' a
(18) PfK
< n+br 96 l n-o: aI > O= l+b + C(l+b) -C(l+b) - ,1+0:
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-(19) Pf ~ ~ _ e6 lK ~+o C(l+b) -(~l+~b~)-
\le will make a judgement as to which degree, and when, the three
modes of finance are chosen. To be able to do so, some simpli-
fying assumptions are helpful. Assume that the firm is initially
in a position where external finance - from previous periods -
is at its maximum. Given market prospects and a finite b, the
firm is going to decide next period's optimal financial struc-
ture. Initially let aI = aE = m = O. Which instruments will be
chosen?
The three conditions (17), (18) and (19) require equality
between marginAl value product of capital and what I interpret
as cost of internal finance, cost of external finance and cost
of increased membership level respectively if the instruments
are used (variables strictly positive). We see immediately that
not all variables are necessarily positive .
. . . 11 h t Pf n+br C . (17) d (18)Assume ~n~t~a y taK >~. ompar~ng an , we
find that equality in (18), which is a necessary condition for
increasing internal finance, excludes external finance if & <
0,5 (less than 50% ownership to outsiders) and a < n. For a > n,
however, internal finance will not be chosen if the restriction
on maximum external shareholding does not bind, i.e. unless
e > O. But the internal opportunity cost of capital may be so
high that internal finance will not be undertaken at all. The
result depends also on the accepted degree of outsiders'
participation. If this is low, O < 6 < 0,5, internal finance may
be undertaken for a discount rate exceeding the share dividend
rate.
Thus, the workers will base their choice between internal and
external share finance on the relation between their own
required minimum return, a, and how much they have to compensate
outsiders, n, and the maximum accepted ownership rights on the
hands of outsiders.
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The workers' required return must reflect their best alternative
investment project, with the addition of a risk premium if
investment in the firm is considered riskier and the workers are
individually risk averse. If risk is small, and deposits in a
savings bank to the market interest rate r represents the
-alternative, a: should be close to r, and the worke,rs prefer
internal finance. Employment may be increased also, which again
reduces the demand for external finance.
On the other hand, if the workers are incurred large costs in
providing capital, because of riskiness or other problems in
raising funds, we have a: > n, and internal finance may be
excluded. Then the workers will choose a combination of external
share finance and recruitment of new workers.' If external share
finance is initially at its maximum, obviously a necessary
condition for increased external finance is an increase in the
level of employment if internal opportunity cost of capital is
so high that further finance from the initial workers is
excluded.
-.
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4. EMPLOYMENT. IN A CREDIT RATIONED LABOUR-MANAGED FIRM.
(i) Optirnal-Allocation-of-Labour.
I will no broaden the scope of analysis, and allow for a spot
• ;.'.1,. ~
labour marked where the firm can hire labour as non-members.
Denote non-members by n, and let them receive a market wage rate
w. The wage-dividend y which the worker-members receives, is
then
(11) Y = PX - rB - wo - nAN-n
where
(81) N = M + m + n
Subsituting (11) fnstead of (l) into (10), and solving the
maximization problem (11) as above, we get an additional first
order condition as level of employment of hired workers is to be
chosen as well. The condition for use of hired workers is:
(12e)
l-'Y~ (1+0;)
~~ = ° => {(PfN - w) Y }(M+m) ( 1+ o; ) n = O.
The total employment of the firm is given by the number of memb-
ers of the collective (M+m) and the employment from hiring work-
ers in the spot market. Although I do not make any specific
mention of short-run behaviour, we may consider contracts which
do not give membership rights as short-term contracts.
/
The condition (12e) for employment of hired workers may be
rewritten as:
< >(12el) (PfN - w)C 0, n 0, with at least one equality.
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If n > O, hired workers will be used to a point where value
marginal product of labour equals the market wage rate w. On
the other hand we will find n = O if the wage rate exceeds the
value marginal product of labour.
The firm makes use of hired workers to the extent that the value
marginal product of labour no longer exceeds the market wage
rate. An apparent problem is that the initial workers may be
interested under certain market conditions in transferring these
short-run hiring contracts to long- run contracts without owner-
ship rights. This is discussed by Miyazaki (1984), who finds
that it will happen in the labour-managed firm who does well,
i.e. when the utility of the representative worker-owner exceeds
what could be attained elsewhere. This means that there is an
economic rent, which has not been competed away. If so, retired
workers will not be replaced, and the firm will convert into a
one-man owned firm, using a number of hired workers on traditio-
nal contracts (a "capitalist" firm). In our model this would
involve the possibility of an m < o. Viewill investigate this
problem more closely in subsection (4ii) by discussing the
conditions under which it will be favourable to substitute hired
workers for worker-owners.
Firstly, however, we will consider the optimal employment level
somewhat more closely, and relate this to an efficient alloca-
tion of the factors of production.
I EI shall assume that n > O, a > O and a > O. Then we can
substitute for y from (12d) into (12a-c), for e from (12c) into
-e+rb(12a- b), and lastl~ for (PfK - ~), assumed non-zero, from
(12a) into (12b), to obtain, after some rearranging:
(20) <PfN = Y +
AØ + M+my
• (n- o:) = y + gh
> >Here g > O, while h < O as n < 0:.
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If m > O, (20) holds with equality.
We investigate the relationship between wage-dividend and the
market wage rate in Figure 2 below.
> >The two PfN schedules reflect h < O respectively or n < a.
It will be advantageous for the workers in terms of income maxi-
mization to employ additional hired workers if w < wI for a > n,
and if w < w2 for a > n. On the other hand, if w > wj' j = l, 2,
we have n = O as payment to hired workers exceeds the maximum
acceptable payment to non-members. Then we can infer nothing
from the equilibrium as to how well the firm is doing compared
to other firms where the workers receive w. But when hired
workers are employed, we see that the worker-members receive a
payout above the market wage rate if a > n, whereas it may be
optimal to employ hired workers for w > y when a < n. We
remember that internal finance may not be chosen for a high
internal opportunity cost of capital. Then the workers are
inclined to pay surplus according to employment rather than
capital ownership. It may be the other way round for a Iowa, as
a high share dividend rate may increase the initial workers'
share in surplus when aE > O. Note that the maximum acceptable
wage is lower than WI and w2 respectively if m = O.
For n = a, the conditions for choice of employment level are
similar in this share financed labour-managed firm and the
Illyrian labour-managed firm. Capital costs differ, however, so
that the levels of employment will differ. Denote the condition
the Illyrian employment level. If the internal (the workers')
opportunity cost of capital exceeds the share dividend.rate, the
share financed labour-managed firm chooses employment below the
Illyrian level. ~fe remember from Section 3(iv) that the firm
tended to prefer external to internal finance as a exceeds n.
Thus, high internal capital costs give small incentives to
internal investment, and the workers restrict membership size
- 35 -
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as wage dividend is high. For a lower opportunity cost of
capital, more internal finance may be undertaken, and the
workers worry less for an increase in workforce to share in
wage-remuneration as the initial workers' payout preferences are
shifted in the direction of share dividend.
The resources are obviously not efficiently allocated when the
firm faces a market restriction like a (binding) credit ration.
The deviations from an optimal resource allocation can be found
by inspection of (12e'), (14') and (16). Assume that all condi-
tions hold by equality. Then we find
> rr;
This may alternatively be formulated as
The production does generally not take place at a minimum of
costs. Furthermore, the marginal rate of substitution in produc-
tion deviates from the internal remuneration unless PfK = ~
and PfN = y. The degree to which the resources are suboptimally
allocated can be represented in a (K,N}-diagram (Figure 3),
representing the case where h < O in Figure 2.
In point I in Figure 3, given the production X, the ~-ratio is
too low. This holds true irrespective of how the marginal pro-
ductivities compare to market valuations. It is not surprising
that a rationed firm produces inefficiently. But if a perfect
functioning finance system cannot be created, the situation
depicted in Figure 3 may well prevail.
On the other hand, given the workers' choice
is one extreme, the situation emerging after
specific o cannot be termed suboptimal. Then
- -of o, where o = l
the choice of one
the pivoting of the
relative cost line from the first-best optimum represents the
K- 37 -
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playaminor role. Then the remaining workers will capture an
increasing part of economic rent. This. is a variant obtained
from the problem discussed by Miyazaki (1984). The economic rent
corresponds to the difference between the utility obtained from
being a worker-member of the firm and the utility from alter-
native employment. When the difference is positive, the firm may
convert into a one-man-owned capitalist firm.
There are increasing returns to coalition if:
(21)
M+m I > AI A A
f (a 1t +y)(M + m) dm = (a 1t + y)(M + m)..
l
A I Awhere a 1t and yare share-dividend and wage-dividend respective-
ly when the workers are self-employed. The economic rent is the
difference between the left-hand and right-hand side of (21).
Conditio~ (21) states that the workers will join a firm only if
they receive at least the remuneration they would have earned as
self-employment. The expression under the integral sign is
payout received per worker-member in coalitions of differing
sizes.
The condition can be illustrated in a diagram, see figur 4. OCB
represents total payout when the workers incorporate, while OA
is total income when the same workers operate as self-employed.
On the segment OC there are increasing returns to coalition.
The optimum size of the firm is (M+m)oPt, and at this point
there are locally constant returns to coalition. It will not pay
to increase the coalition beyond this point, as the recruiting
members will do better as self-employed or by forming a new
f· 6) Th .. .. ..~rm . e econo~c rent ~s CE = OD, wh~ch ~s to be d~v~ded
among the co-owners.
Now, assume that a member withdraws. A decision has to be made
whether this worker is to be replaced. Previously, using the
first order conditions (12), we discussed how this is dependent
on financial aspects. If there are increasing returns to
coalition, an additional problem is introduced. Let us assume
Total
payout
to the
workers
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F19are-4~ Constant and increasing/decreasing returns to
coalition.
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that the leaving member can be substituted by a worker of same
ability. The remaining workers decide whether the new worker is
to be a member (permanently employed), or one hired on a
contractual wage w. If there are no financial considerations to
take the solution is trivial. If the origin in Figure 4 is
changed so as to start in aIr, i.e. payout is [aI(n - r) + y],
the curve OA should reflect the market wage rate. \'Jhen
membership is M (F in figure 4), each member receives ~O of
M
economic .rerrt, Each contractual worker receives EF < CF where CF
is total payout to worker-members. Then it is obvious that
payout per worker-owner is increased when m < o.
Now, the financial situation may create problems as discussed
above. Here we assumed implicitly that the leaving members'
shares could be converted into debt (or outside held shares,
which would probably reduce the gain from replacing the leaving
worker by a new member). It is not obvious that this is possib-
le. The alternative may be to redeem the shares, or sell shares
to remaining insiders or outsiders. The latter will increase the
outsiders' control of the firm, and may result in an increase in
n. Assume that the shares from leaving members have to be re-
deemed, and that the debt of the firm is at its maximum. If a
leaving member is replaced by a hired worker, the change in the
value of production is given by (cf. (2), (3), (4) and (6»:
- Pf + Pf - Pf • aK
N N K am
= - PfK al • l=o(l+b): S
Note that the number of outside held shares is reduced also.
Payout is reduced by
I -= Y - w + a (1+0) [n +(l+b)r] : R.
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Membership is reduced if
R - S > O
which we in terms of figure 5 can write as
(22) R - S = OD OD > o.
M+m-l M+m
The contraction of membership takes place as long as the remain-
ing members can gain by capturing an increasingly larger part of
economic rent and substitute leaving worker-owners by hired
workers 7) .
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5. CHOICE OP EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION
IIn the analysis above we have considered degree of outsiders'
participation, 6, as exogenous. It is of interest to investigate
how the optimal aE and eS can be found if both vaoriables are
allowed to vary. To simplify I will assume that aI, m and n are
given. This means that the ~-function is excluded from the
analysis as we are to find optimal outsiders' participation for
a given share dividend. Probably it would have been more
realistic to assume that ~ varied (positively) with 6. Then also
n would have to be determined.
However, this would result in some ambiguity and complexity, and
I have excluded it in order to simplify the analysis.
Now, assume that the workers (the firm) have a welfare function
defined over income, Y, and self-control (1-6). Write the wel-
fare function as
(23) v(Y,1-6)
where
r-Y = Y + aln
and y is defined by (l). The partial derivatives, denoted v andy
v respectively, are assumed positive. v is assumed con-(1-6)
cave.
By making the necessary substitutions from the definitions
E -above, (23) is maximized w.r.t. a and 6, subject to (6). 0 is
the Lagrange multiplier, and we write the first order conditions
as:
(24a) Vy[PfK(l+b)-rb-n]
(M+m)
l - e( 1- 6) < E >O, a O,
with at least one equality
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.... < >(24b) - vel-o) + eA = O, o = O, with at least one equality.
o is defined on [0,1]. We cannot rule out corner solutions.
Nevertheless, assume that there is an interior solution. Then we
substitute from (24b) into (24a) to obtain
(25)
vel_O) .[PfK(l+b)~br-1t]A
=
Assuming O < o < l, the expression on the right hand side of
(25) is positive, zero or negative as
1t+br >PfK - ~ < O.
From the welfare function in (23), and by using the assumptions
made concerning its partial derivatives, we know that
dY
Q6
We can represent the equilibrium in a diagram, see Figure 5.
Utility is defined so that v * > vo. In Y , aE = O, and it repre-
o
sents the lowest utility the workers will get. If the right hand
side of (25) is zero or negative, the possibility set is bounded
by y B and Y C respectively. Then utility is maximized by choos-o o
ing o = O. However, if PfK exceeds the weighted average price of
capital (right hand side of (25) is positive), then it may be an
optimal policy to pursue, as seen from the workers' point of
view, to introduce outside shareholders. Y DA represents a
o
possible boundary of the opportunity set. Optimum is found in D,
Eresulting in o * > O and Y * > y , and consequently a > o.o
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Note that the boundaries indicated are examples only. The oppor-
tunity sets may take any form, and they are not necessarily as
well shaped as indicated in Figure 5. E.g., convexity of the
sets does not necessarily hold for PfK > r:~r, which implies
that we cannot rule out a non-unique solution. Also, in extreme
cases, where e.g. the credit institutions are hostile to labour-
managed firms, an eq~ilibrium in A may be optimal. This means
that the workers are unable to obtain finance at conditions
which make labour-management profitable. Then complete conver-
sion to a profit-maximizing firm owned by outsiders is the opti-
mal strategy, and in terms of Figure 5, v* > vO intersects & = 1
at A.
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6. INTERNAL FINANCE AND ATTITUDE TO RISK
I will examine somewhat more closely the workers' willingness to
supply capital. It will depend, apart from practical problems in
raising funds, on their attitude to risk. Specifically, let us
investigate the value of share dividend preferred in the absence
of outside shareholders, i.e. for aE = O. This involves
reasoning and discussion outside the model presented in Section
2.
If inside shares are evenly distributed, there is no reason to
bother about the value of ~ compared to y (i.e. ~). (The workersy
work equally long hours). But by investing out of their own
savings, they increase their risk from participation. For risk-
averse workers this is suboptimal compared to external finance
at the market interest rate. Denote each worker's expected in-
come I. We have
Iy+~a =I.
The net expected income, I, is, after the deduction for the
opportunity cost of capital:
I
I = I - a r
I -By borrowing the amount a (M+m), the workers will receive I.
Then their gross income, I, is made up by, an uncertain income,
I, and an amount aIr paid with certainty. Let us express the
representative worker's utility in terms of gross income,
denoted u(I). u(I) is each (identical) worker's individual
utility function which is maximized w.r.t. hours of work and
amount of capital invested in the firm. Let II denote gross
income when the firm is completely externally financed, and I2
is income when there is some internal finance. Then, assuming
that the representative worker is risk averse and labour supply
is given,
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1 2u(I ) > u(I ).
In the absence of credit rationing, risk-averse workers will
prefer external finance, while risk-neutral workers are indiff-
erent. Note the assumption that shares are negotiable. If they
were not, share dividend would have to include the principal as
well. Then a risk neutral worker receiving y + a~r would defi-
nitely prefer external finance. The results correspond to those
of Jensen and Meckling (1979) and McCain (1977).
But as pointed out earlier, the firm cannot rely on external
fixed rental finance only. The workers may choose to supply the
necessary capital themselves, e.g. on an equal basis. If they
were risk neutral, they would demand a total payout of
I > II = Y +na w + ra •
wand r are opportunity costs of labour and financial capital
respectively. The composition of I (the relative size of y and
n) does not matter. If the workers are risk averse, they require
a payout of
I = Y + Ina I> w + ra .
Again, the composition of I does not matter, assuming all work-
ers manage to raise the funds private1yon equal terms. If not,
the composition of I may matter.
Assuming that pure rental has to be ruled out, we conclude that
capital costs will exceed the market interest rate unless strict
asumptions are fulfilled, even when the internal shares (bonds)
are negotiable. In particular we note that all workers have to
be risk-neutral and able to raise funds on equal terms for capi-
tal costs to be equal to the market interest rate. Therefore it
will generally be optimal to issue all shares in the market as
non-participating bonds, leaving the voting rights vested with
the workers. However, I have argued that this may be difficult
to put into effect in a capitalist market economy, see section
1, nor is it a trivial matter in a labour managed economy gener-
ally, see Jensen and Meckling (1979), pp. 486-488.
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7. SUBSIDISING THE FIRM
<We have so far assumed ~ > r. Suppose that ~ = r. If the workers
are the sole owners ~ may 'take any value. What matters to the
workers is the total payout, i.e. ~aI + y. Let us- assume that
the outside shareholder is some public authority (government,
local authority). Under certain conditions they may be willing
<to accept a ~ = r during a substantial period (remember that ~
is an expected value). Then the governmental capital supply
plays the role of a subsidy granted to the firm. This may be
considered a better result than leaving the workers unemployed
for a shorter or longer time period. The case of the "Scottish
Daily News" (SON) may be considered a good example of this, see
Bradley and Gelb (1980). The SDN was in 1974/75 taken over by
the workers upon a threat of moving printing of the paper from
Glasgow-to Manchester. The British government intervened and
supplied the workers with a "once and for all" governmental
loan, provided the remaining capital could be raised elsewhere
from sources aware of the risk. Part of risk taking capital was
supplied by the workers. Bradley and Gelb argue that this way of
supporting a firm is desirable. As the support is easily with-
drawable, the long-run misallocation of resources is minimized.
The workers managed to run the firm for half a year.
For example, firms threatened by bankruptcy may be taken over by
the workers. But they may be short of capital. A private firm
threatened by bankruptcy will hardly be able to raise capital in
the free market. Either the government (or others) has to inter-
vene, or the workers have to raise the capital themselves.
It is not obvious that 100 % state ownership is the best way of
refinancing the firm. As seen from the workers, this means a new
group of owners. The basis for conflict and attitude to choice
between wage and employment are probably changed if the workers
themselves own the fi!~. Thus, subsidising a labour-owned firm
by co-ownership may be an optimal way to support firms when the
aim is rescuing employment in a certain area. If risk averse
workers are willing to invest in the firm, this shows that they_
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to some degree believe in it, and that they are willing to sac-
,f ' h ' f ' t '18 }r~ ~ce somet ~ng or ~ s surv~va .
Now, in our model, if ~ ~ r, the workers will of course finance
as much as possible by public shareholding. But there are limits
to external finance if control is to be vested with the workers.
Also the suppliers of capital, the government, will not be
willing to supply an unlimited amount. Then from (ll) and (12c)
the restriction on outside shareholding is supposed to bind, and
Thereby, cf. (12c'), (PfK - i!~b) ~ O, and PfK > ~. As
aI is chosen so that the government shares reach a rnaxi-
> o.e
> O,e
mum.
h (f ' 'l) 'l ~+br,We see that t e average ~nanc~a cap~ta cost,~, ~s equal
to or below the value marginal product of capital, PfK• It will
stay below the market interest rate if ~ < r, which would seem-.
ingly give the workers an incentive to increase shareholding
beyond limits. This can take place through-the recruiting of new
members, or through retained surplus. Both these ways 'of finance
involve a cost as seen from the existing worker-members, either
in terms of delayed payment or that more members are to share
the gain from subsidising. But of course the net yield may be
everywhere positive, resulting in an optimum with infinite pro-
duction. Thus some restrictions have to be imposed. A limited
governmental capital supply is an obvious restriction which will
solve the problem. Of course the workers will then take the
maximum amount offered9}. Another remedy to the problem can be
found in the technical restrictions. Thus, a technology with
first increasing and then decreasing returns to scale will at
some point make further growth unprofitable. We also note that ~
may be influenced by an increase in y. Thus, ~ will probably
approach r as the firm becomes more profitable for the workers.
Th f th t t' can be foundlO}.ere ore we assume a an op ~mum
The equilibrium should be found where the restriction on borrow-
ing is binding, as there is no need for government subsidisation
when the firm can obtain its funds in the credit market on equal
terms with others. Thus, we have to assume that
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1t+brPfK > r > I+b
• An interesting feature, of this subsidisation programme is that
it affects directly the employment and investment decisions of
the firm. Furthermore, by influencing the marginal value of
capital of the firm in the direction of market remuneration, at
the same time, given R, the remuneration of labour is driven in
the direction of its marginal product valuation, see (16). (PfN
is, however, not necessarily equal to the market valuation).
The case when 1t< r is probably of most interest when the work-
ers' alternative to employment in the labour-owned firm is unem-
ployment. The government grants a subsidy by receiving 1t< r.
But the alternative is paying unemployment compensation to the
workers. A cost-benefit analysis will show which alternative is
the best·one. The fiscal effects as well as the utility of the
workers should be taken into consideration.
Assume that M workers stay with the firm. If the firm leaves
• business, a fraction ~ of the workforce will be unemployed for a
fraction ~ of the planning horizon. Unemployment compensation is
supposed to be ~% of the market wage rate, w. Then the total
unemployment compensation, D, which is to be paid to the work-
ers in question is:
This amount is to be compared to the loss from buying shares
giving a yield 1t < r. The fiscal effect of the subsidy is (ex-
cluding other periods than the production period):
E >- (1t- r) a + D < O
By taking over the firm, the workers receive Y*, where
y* = (1t+ y) M
If the firm is closed down, the same workers will be paid Y,
where
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y = D + (l - ~)(l - ~) wM
• Then, although n + y < w + r, the total payout to the workers by
running the firm may exceed what they will receive from the
best alternative occupation. The net benefit by taking over the
firm is:
* E >W = y - y - (n - r) a-O.<
We are here disregarding the personal non-pecuniary costs of
unemployment. Different attitudes to risk should also be taken
into consideration, as the variance of the values may be of
importance to the parts involved. Thus, it points only to some
aspects relevant to one way the government can subsidise bank-
ruptcy threatened firms. It is not necessarily the best one,
although it may have some advantages.
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS•
•
\V'ehave investigated a model of a labour-owned firm which is
partly self-financed. If the workers own shares in the firm, and
if these shares reflect perfectly the value of the firm, the
efficiency problems vanish, which may result in self-extinction
of the Illyrian firm. This could be handled by means of non-vot-
ing participation bonds as well. But I argue that it is doubtful
whether outside investors will contribute capital without being
given the right to codetermination, particularly if the firm
operates in a capitalist market economy. Furthermore, I argue
that the outsiders will use their influence on decisions to
guarantee themselves a minimum income, which may be state con-
tingent. Then the workers' willingness to rely on outside finan-
ce by means of shares is dependent firstlyon the possibility to
obtain debt, and secondlyon the willingness to trade off
control of the firm.
• Individualistic ownership of the residual is needed to avoid
problems incurred by social ownership. But we have to bear in
mind, that relying on outsiders will result in reduced control
over decisions by the workers. The aim was here to showone way
in which this may occur. In a subsequent paper, I will discuss
the problems of internal finance when the workers are hetero-
geneous.
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APPENDIX
..
".
H is defined by (141) in the text. By using the definitions of C
the complete expression is:
(Al) H rc+br= - e!+O rc+br= !+O
- - - I N E -(l-o} [(A+Ma +ma +a )~y+M+m]
(l+b)(l+aI~ )My
• (rc-a)
Its partial derivatives w.r.t. 6, b, the ~ -function and a are,y
when we assume that ~ = O, cf. Figure l:yy
ae (A~ +M+m)
= y (rc-a)
00 (l+b)(l+aI~)M
- y-= r-rc + (l-o)(A~y+M+m)
(1+b)2 (1+b)2(1+aI~)M
y
T•.T Th aH O' f h' l aHne assume rc > r. en an < ~ a > rc,w ~ e ~ =
(A2) oH =
00
> >
"( O as rc'( a
(A3 ) • (rc-a)
? if a < rc.
(A4) = - oe =
O~y
I -
- (l-'6)(rc-a) A -a (M+m) ~ O as rc~ a.
(l+b)(l+aI~ )2M > <y
(AS) . = -
= (1-6) (A~y+M+m) .
(l+b) (l+aI~. )My
> o.
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FOOTNOTES
,.
l) In Scandinavian countries, as well as in Hest Germany, the
workers are by law granted voting rights in firms larger
than a certain minimum size, in FRG denoted "paritatische
Mitbestimmung", indicating a 50 % participation in the
boards of the firms.
2) Alternatively the credit rationing can be formulated as
r = r(B), or r = r(~), cf. McCain (1977). vie find then that
borrowing will be used to a point where PfK = r(l+€ ),~,r
where € is the elasticity of demand for debt in r.~,r
3) See the Appendix for complete expressions of the derivativ-
es.
4) There is a possibility for short-run variations in the
"fixed" employed labour force by exploiting the unemploy-
ment security system. Here we rule this out.
5) See section 9, pp. 1136-7.
I -
6) Note that in C, a/Ca 1t~~) (M+m)dm = (~'I~+Y).
7) We disregard solidarity with hired workers. Furthermore, if
the outside shares are held by the government or trade
unions, their major claim may be that membership is not to
be reduced.
8) Bradley and Gelb (1980) argue that the existence of indivi-
dual capital stakes screens out pessimists, and a hard-
working work-force will remain (see p. 670). The governmen-
tal intervention will affect this screening by its demands
on individual participation from the workers. In Bradley
and Gelb (1982) they discuss screening mechanisms with
reference to Mondragon, and they argue that a capital re-
quirement is a device which simultaneously take on the role
of a locking-in mechanism.
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9) In our programme (11) this would imply the introduction of
an additional parameter (restriction) .
..
l
10) In their analysis of the "Scottish Daily News", Bradley and
Gelb (1980), the authors model the restriction by imposing
a maximum wage the workers may receive, to avoid the work-
ers pursuing a policy aimed at recuperating the capital
invested as soon as possible.
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ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN A LABOUR-O\-lNEDFIRH
CONSISTING OF HETEROGENEOUS HORKERS
l. Introduction
In this paper I will study the functioning of a firm which I
will term a capitalist labour-managed firm. Three main features
distinguish the model from the Il1yrian (socialist) firm, viz.
individual ownership of capital, an inegalitarian distribution
of voting rights, and an inegalitarian distribution of income.
The latter of these is to some degree discussed in models of
labour-managed firms where individual labour supply decisions
are taken into consideration, see e.g. Ireland and Law (1981).
But in most analyses, like the one referred to, the workers are
assumed homogeneous. Hodels where ownership of capital is indi-
vidualized are analysed by e.g. I1cCain (1977) and Vanek (1977b).
They assume that the shares (bonds) carry no voting rights.
Thereby the models fulfill a condition set by Putterman (1984)
that a labour-managed firm should have an egalitarian power
structure. On the other hand, l1iyazaki (1984) has investigated a
labour-managed firm which makes use of hired workers without
giving them voting rights.
The background for most of the analyses referred to is the pos-
sible allocational inefficiency of the Illyrian labour-managed
firm. The problems arising result from the strive to capture the
economic rent, see e.g. Sen (1966) and l1iyazaki (1984), the high
cost of internally provided capital when capital is collectively
owned, see e.g. Vanek (1977a), and a likely credit rationing
facing labour-managed firms, see e.g. HcCain (1977), Putterman
(1984) and Askildsen (1986). I have argued elsewhere, Askildsen
(1986), that these problems will be of special significance to a
labour-managed firm operating in a capitalist economy. Therefore
I will investigate here a model which is intended to resemble
some features of such a firm.
I will assume that the labour-owned and -managed firm is
financed by vote-carrying shares supplied by the firm's hetero-
geneous work-force. The internal finance is sufficient for the
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firm to obtain the desired level of debt finance. The firm's
optimization problem is solved by a Nash-Cournot arbitration
formula with the individual workers' voting power as weights.
However, as the workers supply capital as well as labour, the
individual workers' relative capital and labour supply are
determined by their utility maximization behaviour.
The intention of the paper is threefold. Firstly I want to
characterize the firm's equilibrium choice of internal finance,
employment and payout rates, and the individual workers' labour
and capital supply. Secondly I am interested in investigating
how these equilibrium choices are affected by some of the para-
meters of the model, like expected price and opportunity cost of
capital. Finally I will discuss the possibilities for reaching
unanimous decisions.
The model to be used in the analysis is outlined in Section 2.
It will be assumed that the optimisation takes place in two
stages, which for the matter of exposition will be dealt with
separately. Uncertainty is introduced through the price of the
firm's output. In Section 3 I characterize the optimum of the
firm, and I investigate how the initial workers as members of a
producer cooperative decide collusively on level of internal and
external finance, and employment. I assume for the sake of
simplicity that borrowings are given. But capital can be
increased by internal investment (retained surplus) or by re-
cruiting new workers supplying share capital (external finance).
I show how the decisions depend on scale advantages and distri-
bution of shares and hours of work. Conditions for unanimous
decision making are discussed, and comparative static responses
to changes in the price of output and opportunity.cost of
capital are reported. The coupling together of capital supply
and employment level leaves most responses ambiguous, so that
special cases have to be studied. Not surprisingly, the
responses will differ markedly from those known from the
Illyrian firm. The reason is that the workers possess here two
instruments to capture the economic rent. In Section 4
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I examine the individual workers' decisions on capital and
labour supply. I focus on the importance of risk-aversion, time
preference and disutility of work, and I compare the model with
the Ekern-Wilson mean-variance model (Ekern and Wilson 1974) for
unanimous decision making. Finally, in Section 5, some con-
cluding remarks are made, in particular concerning the modelling
of non-Illyrian variants of labour-managed firms. I argue that
interesting features can be further analysed and discussed by
using special functions and making assumptions enabling us to
investigate special cases.
2. -The Hodel
The reason why the workers supply capital by means of shares may
be credit rationing. Here, however, I will not be particularly
concerned with that problem, as it has been carefully examined
in a preceeding paper. Although the scenario considered may have
its root in credit rationing, I ...V'illbe concerned primarily with
internal supply of capital from heterogeneous workers. This is
equivalent to considering at one stage the individual labour and
capital supply decisions, and at another stage to trace out
conditions for a group of labour-owners to decide on changes in
internal supply of capital and in the employment level (member-
ship), which may affect the capital level as well. As we shall
see, special conditions must be met for the decisions to be
taken unanimously.
In the analysis to follow I will assume that the firm's optimi-
sation problem is solved collusively by its workers. The deci-
sions are not necessarily unanimous. I will assume that the
firm (the workers as a collective) is risk neutral. But the
workers are heterogeneous- in the sense that their capital and
labour supplies differ. Then it matters how payout is being
made. Payout will be made according to shares and labour contri-
buted, so that income will generally differ among the worke~s.
Distribution of income is decided through bargaining. In a code-
termined firm it is common to use the Nash bargaining solution
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to model how bargains between labour and capital are solved, see
Svejnar (1982). I find it natural to use this formulation here
as well. He can write the bargaining problem as
(l)
No
l1ax IT
i=l
- ~i
(H. - W.)~ ~
where each of the N workers receives income W. and has a weight
~
of ~i in the bargains (bargaining power). Wi is each worker's
reservation income, which may be the income he/she can obtain
elsewhere in the economy. He can consider ~. as voting power.
~
Formal (or informal) rules may give special rights to some
groups. E.g., elder workers may have a larger say than younger,
or large capital suppliers may have a larger weight in decisions
than small capital suppliers.
.
Let us assume that a given number of workers, N , has formed a. o
firm. Each worker has initially supplied a~ units of capitalo
(shares) at price l. In addition they have borrowed some
capital, B. Then the total capital stock of the firm is the
borrowings and the number of shares contributed by its workers.
~ie denote capital by K. Together with labour input, L, where
N
(2) L = r l i,
i=l
and Ii, i=l/ ..., N, is each worker's individual labour supply,
combinations of the two inputs are capable of producing quanti-
ties of a product X which are sold at an expected market p~ice
p. We write the production as
(3) X = f(K, L)
Marginal productivities are assumed positive and decreasing,
i.e.
0,
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and
He also assume technical complementarity, i.e.
a2f a2f~ = fLK = aK aL = fKL > O.
The firm's stock of capital is
N
ai(4) K = A + B = E + B.
i=l
Now, assume B is given, as well as the initial capital supply
ai. Assume also that membership level cannot contract, i.e. noo
workers can be dismissed without full compensation. He are
interested in investigating conditions for utility increasing
changes in internal finance and level of membership (permanent
workforce). Increased internal finance means that the workers
contribute with additional capital. First imagine that the
workers consider increasing total share capital by the amount R,
which may be e.g. a retained surplus from a previous period. In
addition they consider whether the employment level should be
increased. Individual ,labour and capital supply are assumed
given. New shares are assumed distributed according to initial
shareholdings. Afterwards I will consider the individual
workers' incentives to supply labour and capital respectively.
Then the level of the workforce (membership) will be assumed
given.
The changes in membership will affect total share capital. The
potentially new workers will buy some shares. It will be assumed
that each new worker will supply on average an amount propor-
tional to the average period of shareholding of the initial
workers. If membership is constant, we assume that changes occur
in total and in individual stock of shares if and only if
internal finance is increased (retained surplus)l).
Given these assumptions, the stock of shares is
( 5) A = A + R + geN),
o
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where R is internal finance (retained surplus) and
(6)
is the initial stock of shares, which is assumed given exogenou-
sly. He denote the new level of employment by N. In the forth-
coming period, each initial worker owns shares given by
(7 ) i i Ra = a (l + - )o Ao
The g-function is defined by
(8 ) geN) = m(N-N ), N > N ,
o o
where
(9) s, s > O,m =
is an average of shares bought by each new worker. s is assumed
given, and its role is to indicate how many shares new workers
will buy. The workers will receive payout by means of wage divi-
dend (y) and share dividend (~). Note that the product price p
is an expected value with known distribution. Then, given a
value of one of the means of payment, say ~, the firm maximises
the wage dividend. However, it is not arbitrary which weight is
placed on the two means of making payment. Depending on relative
participation by means of labour and capital, the marginal bene-
fits of payment according to work and payment according to
shares will differ among the workers. This will be further dis-
cussed below. Now, let us write wage dividend as2)
(10) _ pf(K,L) - rB - ~AY - L
It should be clear from the discussion above that decisions are
in reality taken in two stages, viz. by the workers as a collec-
tive, deciding on employment and total capital supply, and by
the individual workers, who decide on hours of work and their
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individual supply of capital. The individual decisions will
again affect the collective's allocational decisions. To simpli-
fy things somewhat, I will look at the two stages separately. I
will assume that the firm takes each" worker's labour and initial
capital supply as given. The individual workers consider the
level of employment and borrowings as given.
Thus, the analysis is carried through as follows:
(i) Given ai and Ii for all i = 1, ..•, N, the collective maxi-
mises collusively y for any value of ~, by choosing R, N and ~.
As mentioned above, initial level of membership, N , and stock
o
of share capital, A , are assumed given, as well as externalo
finance B.
(ii) The workers decide on capital supply and labour supply,
given external finance and level of membership. He will assume a
Nash-Cournot reaction function among the workers. Thus, what we
will consider is how ihdividual capital and labour supply depend
on some parameters of the model.
A comment should be made on the particular model investigated.
There may be several reasons why the firm is financed partly by
individually owned shares. Firstly there may exist some under-
lying credit rationing, which may force the workers to contri-
bute with some finance internally (see Askildsen (1986».
Secondly, some workers may find it profitable to invest in their
own firm. In particular a controlling group of workers may then
possess the possibility to affect means of payout ("wages") in a
way which is favourable to them. Thirdly, the firm may have come
into being by a take-over of a former capitalist firm by the
workers, e.g. a bankrupt firm, or a buy-out of former capitalist
owners. Fourthly, it may be found advantageous by the workers to
form a firm which does not vary too much from the ordinary way
of organising firms, assuming indirectly that the firm operates
in a capitalist market economy. There may be legislative con-
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siderations to be taken, as well as problems of discrimination
against unfamiliar organisational forms. Lastly, the fi~ may
be one in which the original shareholders have sold their shares
to the workers as part of incentive schemes. In that case, how-
ever, it would probably not be reasonable to assume that the
workers were to own all shares, or even a najority of the
shares.
It is assumed that the firm does not employ hired workers, i.e.
all workers have voting rights. Nevertheless, some effects of
using hired workers are discussed briefly in Section 3.
When we investigate the optimisation of the firm, we assume that
the individual workers are willing to supply the capital which
they agree they should contribute. He assume also that there
exist potential new workers that are willing to accept the terms
given by the initial workers.
The firm chooses R, N and relative payout rates so as to maxi-
mise income to the existing workforce for the remaining part of
their tenure with the firm, which is assumed to be one period ....._
We assume risk neutrality when considering the workers as a
collective.
Each worker's income may be written as
(Il) l i i riRHi = r-F'F (yl + 'Ita) - T-Fr ao (l + Jr)o
This formulation means indirectly that one option available to
the workers is cashing in the shares and close down the firm.
However, we assume they continue running it. The first element
of (Il) is the present value of future income, while the second
term represents the cost of supplying shares to the firm. He
assume that the common discount factor is the market rate of
interest r, which is also the interest rate at which capital is
borrowed.
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The maximum welfare of the workforce is found by maximising the
weighted product of the workers income. Taking the logarithmic
transform of (l), the utility to be maximised is
(12) u = E ø. In (W.- ~.).i 1. 1. 1.
When maximizing (12) there is a restriction that each worker
receives at least the reservation income. However, the restric-
tion will not bind. As shown by e.g. Roth (1977), a local
maximum can be found where the product formula is maximized. All
analysis will take place around this maximum where 'v. > W. for
1. 1.
all i. Then we can exclude the reservation income from the dis-
cussion.
(i) "First Order conditions
By substituting from (4) - (9) into (10) and using (10) in (11)
the problem in (12) can be solved as a Kuhn-Tucker programme
where the welfare is maximised w.r.t. R, N and 'It. H. is given
1.
from (11). The first order conditions are, after some simpli-
fications:
N i
o~. li a l
(13a) i!l ~ [~ (pfK - 'It) + A: ('It - r)] l+r < O, R ~ O, with at
least
NO
z
i=l
one equality.
(13b) < O,=
(N - N ) > O, with at least one equality.
o
(13c)
N
o ø.
E -= [-i=l Hi
equality.
A li + ai] l <~ l+r O, 'It > O, with at least one
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If the level of membership changes, we have asumed that the
recruiting members supply on average I units of labour. This can
be considered an approximation to the average labour supply of
the workers, as there is a priori no reason to belive that there
is any bias in the labour supply of workers entering the firm.
Note that ~ = gl = m if N > No • gl = O if N = N .O
The first thing to be noted from (13) is the possibility of
obtaining a unanimous
~W. ~W... ~ ~requ~r~ng ~ = ~ =
for all i, and we see
decision. I will define unanimity as
~W.~ = O for all i = 1, .•., No' or negative
that all decisions are unanimous when each
worker supplies an equal proportion of shares and hours of work,
i li
i,e.: = r- for all i = 1,.•.. , N. The investment decision is
unanimous also whenever pfK = ~ = r, while the condition (13b)
for level of employment always fulfils the criterion for unani-
mity. Ekern and \Hlson (1974) have analysed the unanimity pro-
blem in an economy with incomplete markets. The shareholders of
a firm will be unanimous in their investment decisions if the
marginal return of an investment in a firm can be expressed as a
linear combination of the returns of other firms, i.e., the set
of state-distributions of returns available does not change
because of this firmls decision, or if the shareholders value
only the mean and variance of their portfolios. 'Vlhen
pfK = ~ = r, the set of returns in the economy are not affected
if r represents the market rate of interest.
When this equality does not hold, we do not know whether state-
distributions available will change without further spesifica-
tio~ of the capital market outside the firm, i.e. the alterna-
tive portfolio selections available. As pointed out by Ekern and
Hilson, each individual will acquire the same fraction of each
firm if they care about mean and variance of their portfolios
i i
only. This would in our model imply : = i, which is the condi-
tion given above. This means that the workers differ in scale of
participation only, and the result corresponds to decision
making in the Illyrian firm with variable labour input across
individuals. However, .the workers of a labour-managed and
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-owned firm will generally value properties other than mean and
variance of their portfolios. This will be further discussed in
Section 4.
We will not necessarily have an interior solution in (13). As
to the level of employment, it should be noted that there are no
hired workers. Thus, if N = O also L = O, and production is
zero.
But we see from (13b) that an interior solution is possible
where N > No. This occurs, e.g., when y < pfL and n > pfK, from
(13b), implying from (13a) that n > r as well. In this situation
the insiders, i.e. the original workers, gain in income by
increasing the 'return to capital above its opportunity cost.
The increase in employment level may be profitable for two
reasons. Firstly pfK > r if there is credit rationing, which may
induce employment of new workers supplying capital. Secondly it
måy be the result of strategical considerations, owing to
differing relative labour and capital supply between insiders
and outsiders (new workers). This will be further discussed in
the comparative statics section.
Let us examine now the determination of share dividend.
The share dividend to be paid, n, is determined by (13c). We
observe that
ai li-x > ~' i = l, ...,N,
for those workers whose earnings are increasing in n/y. Now,
assume firstly that ~. is uniform and that W. = W for all i.
k k
This means equal bargaining strength among the workers, which
can be compared to a voting rule where there is one vote per
worker, and that all workers expect the same income. Then the
>left-hand side of (13c) is necessarily zero, and n = O as the
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workers are indifferent to n/y. However, when a.* a. and/or l. *
~ J ~
l., i,j = 1, •.., N, i * j, each worker's relative supply of
J
labour and capital is weighed by the inverse of his income (see
l3c). We shall show that n > ° when ~. is uniform, i.e. the~
equivalence of one vote per worker. Assume n = 0, and income
will be lowest for those workers whose parts of shares exceed
their parts of labour supply. But then (l3c) requires n > 0, a
contradiction. Furthermore, as bargaining power (voting rules)
is changed in favour of large shareholders, i.e. ~. is increasedai
in K-' n will have to increase further so as to meet condition
.(13c). Thus we can conclude that the bargaining among hetero-
geneous workers results in n > 0, where each worker's relative
power may constitute the equivalence of one vote per worker, one
vote per share, or any rule in between these.
It is reasonable to assume that new workers do not supply more
share-capital per worker than the initial workers. Therefore
the next question to pose is whether y > O. Also this question
can be answered by inspection of (13c). He find that if the
initial workers are fairly homogeneous, with respect to labour
supply as well as capital supply, and if the possible new
workers supply on average more labour then capital, then (13c)
i li
may be stri::tly ~ostive since 1 > L may occur for i = l, ...,
~ l~
No' while K- < c- for new workers, and n is increased beyond
limits. The problem may be solved by assuming that the distri-
bution of shares among initial workers is sufficiently inegali-
tarian. Another remedy is to require a sufficiently high level
of s. The latter requirement corresponds to a rule operating in
Hondragon, see Bradley and Gelb (1983).
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So much for the technical explanation, which is, of course,
contingent upon the special bargaining model chosen. A more
general economic explanation should be given in terms of the
strive to capture the economic rent, which we assume is to be
distributed according to hours of work (labour supply) and
shareholding (capital supply). The bargaining strength between
those who supply relatively much labour and those who supply
relatively much capital will determine the finaloutcome. But
the resulting relative payout rates will affect capital and
labour supply. Thus, as everyone has got the right to'withdraw,
a threatpoint is established, which in our model may be consi-
dered reflected in the voting rules. If some workers were able
to force upon the collective sayan = O, this would imply that
internal share supply is not needed, and consequently ai = O for
all i. A model where the individual labour and capital supply
decisions are taken explicitly into consideration when
determining relative payout rates, can be found in Askildsen,
Ireland and Law (1987).
Inspection of (13a) shows that whether R > O depends on the
relation between n, pfK and r. The following possibilities can
be singled out:
(i) pfK < n < r => R = O
(ii) pfK, r > n => R > O=
(14)
(iii) pfK = r = n => R > O=
(iv) pfK, r < n => R > O=
According to (14i) , the firm has been allocated too much
capital, and further internal finance will not be desired,
leaving R = o. (14ii) may represent a symptom of credit
rationing, which may require R > O. According to (14iii) the
workers will be indifferent as to ways of finance, while R may
be strictly positive from (14iv) because of the capital remuner-
ation exceeding its opportunity cost.
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l'lecan substitute
~. li ~. i
L
~
L
a aw-: L = Wo Ai ~ i ~
from (13c) into (13a-b) as (pfK-n) and (pfL-y)l are independent
of i. From (5) and (7) we find that
iaO a.- > ~ N > N"A = A as O
O
Assume N = NO' i.e. the employment level is constant over the
production period. \fe will illustrate how the n/y-ratio may be
determined by bargaining among the original workers. From (13b)
pfL = Y as g' = O. (13a) reduces to
~. i~ a(pfK - r) f ~ ~ = o.
However, we may have pfK ~ n, depending on bargaining strength
among the workers. Thus, using (13c), a high ~. for those~
workers whose relative capital supply is high, will induce high
values of n.
Now, let us assume that there is an interior solution, i.e.
R > O, N > NO and n > o. We find by substit~ting from (13a)
into (13b) that
l ~. lipfL g'm L ~- Y L i v: A(15) ~ o s N > N .= - = - !r =,~. opf - n l l ~ li o lK L L W-i ~
It follows that
sign (pfL - y) = - sign (pfK - n)
Also, if pfL = y, then pfK = n = r, and (15) have to be met by
l'Hopital's rule, which will again imply that
pfLLl = - pf m
} assuming
KL
and pfLKI = - pfKKm pfL = y and pfK = n = r.A Land =
Aos NoI
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We see from the above discussion that for any given level of ~
(share-dividend), the level of employment will fall short of or
exceed the employment level of the Illyrian firm, given by pfL =
y, depending on whether pfK (value marginal product of capital)
falls short of or exceeds~. Thus, if there is credit
rationing, we may have pfK > ~, and the employment level may be
increased so as to provide more capital. On the other hand, if
share dividend is very high, there will be a reluctance to
recruit members sharing in the high capital remuneration. How-
ever, if s = a, then from (13b) workers will be hired until pfL= y, which is the Illyrian employment level.
(ii) Second Order Conditions.
Let us assume that there is an interior solution, i.e.
R > a, N > N and ~ > O. To simplify notation we will writeo
N
o
= r
i=l
2s, oW.
[
l. l.
fr. ~l.
~. oW. oW.
l. l. l.].
(w . ) 2 .n- ay ,
l.
y = R, N, 1ti e = R, N, ~, r, p.
The complete second order differentials are reported in the
Appendix. Generally it is hard to determine the signs of the
second order differentials. The individuals' income will differ
cf. the
as their favoured changes in the different variables,
oW. oH.
l. l.terms ay- ae- in the Appendix.
as well
A negative definite matrix if second order differentials is a
sufficient condition for a maximum. Thus, we require that
IHll = ARR < O
IH21 = ARR A - ARN ANR > ONN
IH31 = ARR ANN A~~ - A~R ANN AR~ + ARN AN~ A~R
- A~N AN~ARR + AR~ ANR A - A ANR ARN < O~ ~~
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Inspection of the second order differentials will show that a
maximum may exist, in which N > N , R > O and ~ > o. On the
o
other hand, if pfK = ~ = rand pfL= y, we find from (15) and
using l'Hopital's rule, that IH21 = IH31 = O.
This case should be further investigated. Using the results
derived from (15), we find that
which implies, from Euler's theorem for homogeneous functions,
that the production function exhibits (locally) constant returns
to scale in L and K, remembering that fLK = fLA from (4). The
result corresponds to the dividend maximising choices of K and L
made by the Illyrian firm, where the firm's production function
exhibits first increasing and then decreasing returns to scale,
cf. e.g. Ireland and Law (1985). The existence of fixed costs
represents a right-ward shift of the minimum average costs when
the cost-curve is U-shaped, and thereby a higher production
level.
We have shown above that all decisions are unanimous when all
workers supply the same proportion of labour and capital.
Remember that this must hold as an average for new workers. But
then from (13c) the workers are indifferent to the value of ~,
or more generally the ~/y-ratio, which may be fixed at any ratio
without affecting any worker's income (utility). Furthermore,
we find that A N = A = O, and the second order conditions are
~ ~~
met for ANN = O only, which implies constant returns to scale
and IH21 = IH31 = O. This is again the Illyrian property of the
firm. The content of the property is that the workers will
agree on surplus distribution rules when they differ in scale of
participation only. Then pfK = ~ = rand pfL = Y will hold as ~
may be set equal to r initially.
-.
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(iii) comparative statics
The comparative statics can be presented in general terms.
Thus, writing e = r, p respectively, we find:
dR l - f..1te(f..RN\11t- "m~~1t)(16a) CI1f = IRJ I [- f..Re(f..NN~1t1t- f.."ItN\11t)
- f..Ne(f..R1tf..1tN- f..1t1tf..RN)]
(16b) dN = I~I [-f..Re(f..N1tf..1tR- f..1t1t~R)- f..1te(f..R1t~R - \11tf..RR)Q'9'
- f..Ne(f..RRf..1t1t- f..1tRf..R1t)]
d1t l - f..1te(f..RR~ - ~R f..RN)(16c) CI1f = IIi) I [- f..Re(f..URf..1tN- f..1tR~ )
- f..Ne(f..RNf..1tR- f..1tNf..RR)]
The responses in (16) are ambiguous, cf. Appendix. However, by
making some assumptions and simplifications, the signs can be
determined in special casei.
Let us assume that the firm consists of two groups of workers,
so that within each the workers are identica13). Hithout loss of
generality we can assume that group one consists of the workers
with the highest W. This implies, see Appendix, that the
a\i. avl.. ~ ~express~on E ~ a--y , where e, y = R, N, 1t,is non-negative.
i
Furthermore, let Il = 12, i.e. everyone works the same number of
~ours. Then higher shareholdning is the reason for higher
income. We will assume also that the workers with the higher 'vi.
~
vote for the highest N, Rand 1t,and that
x , p,
i.e. the elasticities of income with respect to r and p are the
same for both groups.
Some more simplifying assumptions will be briefly commented upon
below. Let 1t~ pfR, let the production function exhibit constant
returns to scale in A and L, and let s be fixed so that new
workers supply less shares than the initial workers. Lastly we
assume that there is a negligible difference between the two
groups of insiders measured in terms of shares they hold.
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With these assumptions, the signs of the second order differen-
tials can be determined as reported in the Appendix.
Then we can derive the comparative static results shown in the
table, where the signs of the changes are indicated (a ? denotes
an indeterminate sign):
l 2
P r r r
R ? - + ?
N ? - + ?
n ? + - ?
lThe effect of a change in r has been split into two effects: r
shows the effect of a change in the internal discount factor,
2and r represents the effect of a change in the rate of interest
on borrowings, which is initially assumed equal to the internal
discount factor.
The effect of a price change is indeterminate. There are two
opposing effects, and it is not clear which one will dominate.
Let us consider the employment reaction. We know that the
Illyrian labour-managed firm react perversely to price changes.
The same tendency may exist in this model because of fixed costs
and an economic rent, whose existence is the reason for the
reluctance to hire new workers. On the other hand, the insiders
own relatively more capital than the outsiders (new workers). We
have assumed n > pfK, implying y < pfL from (15). Then the
insiders will gain from hiring additional workers supplying the
same amount of work, but less capital, as this increases the
insiders' share in the increased total surplus. But the
ambiguity exists although B = O (fixed costs are zero). The
reason can be found by considering the internal finance response
(~R) simultaneously. In the comparative static expressions, the
same elements which tend to reduce N tend to increase R. Thus,
after a price increase, and increase in employment and an
increase in internal finance may be considered substitutes.
- 19 -
As to the effect of a change in r, one comment should be made.
An increase in the internal discount rate reduces the scale of
operation, while an increase in fixed costs (r2) increases the
scale of operation. The latter corresponds to the effect of an
increase in fixed costs in the Illyrian labour-managed firm.
However, these signs may change if the outsiders are consider-
able captial suppliers, i.e. s is large.
In the comparative statics we have assumed a low s-value. It is
probably reasonable to assume that new-comers supply less
capital than those who have been with the firm for some time, as
membership will generally imply some accumulation of capital
(see Bradley and Gelb (1983) for a discussion of this in the
Mandragon cooperatives). But remember that we may then run into
problems as the n/y-ratio may be increased beyond limits. This
problem can be avoided for a sufficiently smooth distribution of
ownership rights, where the new workers own marginally fewer
shares than the "poorest" insiders. Such a distribution of
shares seems reasonable in a dynamical generation model, and it
is probably not far from the reality in e.g. Mondragon (Bradley
and Gelb (1983». Also, if n tends to increase beyond limits,
naturally it will be difficult to recruit new-comers supplying
relatively few shares. Then there must be an upper limit for n,
which in our model could be solved by fixing n in advance, so
that n > r. But as noted above, the comparative static -respon-
ses may be different for other values of s. This is due to the
strategic considerations concerning employment of new workers,
which can be shown more detalied by making different assumptions
in the comparative statics.
Generally the comparative static responses depend on:
>
- n (' pfK, r.
- returns to scale, or a possible economic rent.
- distribution of shares, or in the special case where
we have two groups of workers, degree of inequality between
the groups.
- voting rules, i.e. distribution of ~..a
labour and capital supply by new workers, i.e. the value of
s.
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However, what really matters, is how the insiders can make
choices so as to capture as much as possible of the surplus, or
an economic rent. Thi,s strive is being pursued along two dimen-
sions: firstly the distribution among insiders, thereafter the
consideration of advantages of recruiting more workers. In the
special case when decisions are unanimous, we saw that no
possibilities exist for exploiting relative differences as the
workers differ from each other in scale of participation only.
Therefore this firm is similar to the Illyrian firm with
variable labour supply. The difference is that capital is here
individually owned, rather than socially which is the case in
the Illyrian firm. But this means that the model solves the
problems connected with social ownership of capital, which it is
well-known creates incentive problems.
Although we have in the preceding discussion been able to
investigate closely rather special cases only, we have been able
to draw attention to the close link beween labour and capital
supply, and in particular to the necessity of considering simul-
taneously relative payout rates, internal capital supply and
possibilities of using outsiders of various categories to
provide capital. The ultimate results depend on the functioning
of the capital market and the strategic positons of the various
groups within the firm.
4;--The-Individual-worker"s-supply of Labour and Capital
Each worker chooses ai and Ii so as to maximise utility. The
individual labour and capital supply decisions will affect wage
and share dividend in a manner which is well known from the
literature on the internal labour market of cooperatives, see
Sen (1966) and Ireland and Law (1981). Sen concentrated on the
social optimality of a cooperative's allocation of labour,
drawing attention particularly to the strategic decisions each
worker will make because of his monopoly power. Thus, when
deciding on labour supply, the worker will consider the marginal
benefit of an extra hour of work as well as the effect this will
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have on his total share in income. Then there will be equality
between the value marginal product of labour and the marginal
disutility of work only in special cases.
I will not at any length consider the efficiency aspects of the
individual factor supply decisions. This is carefully discussed
by e.g. Ireland and Law (1981) as far as the labour market is
concerned. The monopo-Ly aspects of the optimisation are valid
correspondingly for the capital market. There is an efficient
resource allocation only when there is full cooperation between
the workers in fixing individual supply, or when an optimal
payout rule is established, which requires some payment being
made according to effort (contribution) and a share of total
payout being distributed on a per capita basis, or when there
are constant returns to scale.
I will assume that payout is made according to contribution
(individual labour and capital supply), and that each worker
determines his labour and capital supply. After briefly com-
menting on the efficiency properties of the optimal solution, I
will concentrate on how attitude to risk, time preference and
disutility of work affect labour and capital supply.
Each worker has a separable, additive utility function4)
i ~iwhere Y is the present value of expected income and a is the
net cost of buying shares. Marginal utility w.r.t. income and
labour are respectively positive and negative. The utility
function is strictly concave in (yi + ai) (risk aversion). yi
~iand a are given by
(18) i i i 01- oy = (~a + yl ) ~
l+o:l.
(19) ~ia = io: i
l+o:l. a
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where we have assumed that the capital invested in the firm by
each worker i can be provided from his/her own resources, with
ian opportunity cost a reflecting the time preference. He will
later assume that a is identical for all i, and equal to a risk
free market rate of interest. As the price is a random
variable, the representative worker will maximise expected
i iutility, i.e. choose a and l so that
i iEu + v
is maximised.
Then the problem is
[ i( i ~ai) + vi(li)](20) Max Eu Y +
i lia ,
i ~igiven the definitions of Y and a in
are defined and explained previously.
(18) and (19). 'Tt and y
Employment and borrowings
are given exogenously. We assume a Nash-Cournot reaction
function among the workers, i. e.
oA OElii.---.- = l,
ol~
= l, for all i,
oa~
and
oA oElii= O, - = O, for all i.oli oa~
The first order conditions are, assuming that there is an
interior solution that i O, li o:sa a > >
i o(yi+ ai) i li o'Tt i(2la) Euy = o => E{Uy[r:- (pf - 'Tt) + 'Tt + A (~oa~ K oai Ali ,,__.ai]} O-} =L
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E~
oyi + vi E{~
li i(21b) (pfL y) on (a _- = O => [L - + Y + ol~ Aol~ l Ai
l )] .2__.. } + i Ovl =L 1+Cl:~
i illy and vl are the partial derivatives w.r.t. income and labour
respectively. He assume vil < o, while Uiy = o.
From (21a-b) we see immediately that we will generally not have
equality between value marginal products of capital and labour
and the respective remunerations to capital (n) and labour (y).
This indicates that the resource allocation is generally not
efficient, cf. also Sen (1966). To illustrate, let us assume
that each worker's utility function as well as the welfare func-
tion are risk neutral. Alternatively we can assume that all
decisions are taken under certainty. Then resources are soci-
ially optimally alloqated when pfK = n, in which case pfK = Cl:,
an~ when pfL = y, which implies equality between pfL ~nd
-v~. But this is exactly the case when the decisions of the
firm are unarrd.nous, see Section 3. ~ye shall see that this is
not a particularly likely situation in a firm consisting of
heterogeneous workers bargaining to agree on payout rates.
Now, following Bonin (1977),5) we can compare the allocation
established by (21a,b) to its certainty equivalence. ai and li,
and thereby income '(yi+ ai), are given by (2la,b). \vrite
i ",ia(y + a ) i i i ioz ' z = a , l , as gz(a , l). The price that can be
obtained is the source of the income uncertainty. The differ-
ence between the uncertain environment and the certainty
equivalence is reflected by the covariance between marginal
utility of income and the uncertain price. The sign of this
covariance is dependent on the attitude to risk. ~ye have
iassumed that worker i is risk averse, i.e. uyy < O. Then
(22) icov (Uy' p) < o.
Using the laws of variance, we can write (21a,b) as
(23a) i i iElly Ega(a , l ) + cov (lly' p) = O
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oga ogl
~ < O and < O from second order conditions. The signs of
oa~ ol~
Ogl= (Young's theorem) depend on whether
oa~
(24)
Oga Ogl
Note from (21) and (24) that the property ~ = ~
ol~ oaa
In the unanimity scenario (24) reduces to
, I' ona.mp aes oa =
li
L PfLK > o.
iNow, we can divide through by Euy in (23a,b).
the higher is cov (uy, p), the higher is Eg , zz ,
the second order conditions, this means that l~
Then we see that
= ai, li. Using
iand a are
reduced if there is a marginal increase in risk aversion, i.e.,
if we are comparing two different situations, where everything
is identical except from the worker's attitude to risk, the more
risk averse type will supply the lowest quantities of labour and
capital. However, the magnitude of the changes in supplies
, Oga
depends on v~land
ivalue of vII' the
about equality in (23b) following upon an increase in risk
og
aversion. Secondly, --! may become negative if e.g. n isa,ol '~ ~
sufficiently high, l_ > ~ and/or ~ < O. Then the reductionL A ol~
in. ai needed to bring about equality in (23a) is being reduced
given that Ii is reduced from (23b), and likewise for Ii.
ol~·
lower is the reduction needed in Ii to bring
Firstly, the higher is the absolute
The effect of the disutility of work on labour supply should be
well known. But capital supply may be affected as well from
varying disutility of work, although we cannot a priori state in
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which direction. This will depend on whether the two variables
are complements or substitutes. In the former case, the ten-
dency to reducing Ii will be somewhat offset by the reduction in
ia .
The effects on labour and capital supply of varying time prefer-
ence, ai, are found by doing comparative statics on the first
order conditions in (21). To simplify, and avoid too much
iambiguity, we assume that the worker is risk neutral. Then uy
is constant across states of nature, and we do not need to dis-
cuss how the covariance term in (23) is affected by changes in
the variables. We denote the differentials by Aa 7 ~ = ai, Ii;
i i i 1-',,;,;= a , l . a. Aaa and All are negative from second order
conditions. The signs of Aal = Ala are briefly discussed above.
Ala and A are negative.aa
The effects of changes in i given bya are
(25) Aaa Aal da - Aaa
=
Ala All dl - Ala
Then we find that
dai -AaaAll + AalAla :~} {<24l is non-negative(26) - = if (24) is negativeda~
where D = AaaAll - AalAla > O from second order conditions for a~
maximum. da~ is negative e.g. in the unanimity scenario. But
. da.
when a~ and l~ are substitutes, a counteracting force exists,
which makes the net result indeterminate. This is the case also
dlifor -da~
(27) =
dai
-A A + A Aaa la aa la
D : ~} if
f< 24)
1(24)
is non-negative
is negative
dl
- 26 -
Before concluding, let us investigate the conditions for
unanimous decision-making somewhat more closely. From Section 3
i li
we remember that a sufficient condition for unanimity is ~ = L'
wh Lch corresponds to Ekern and Hilson's (1974) result for
unanimity among stockholders when their preferences can be
represented by a mean-variance model. To see whether this
conditon may be met in our model, let us rewrite the first order
i iof Eg (a., l )aconditions. Using (23), (24) and the definitions
and Ega(ai, li) we can rewrite (21) as
li i i cov(uy,p) i(28a) E[17(pfK "It) + "It - ~.L(a _ l )] + E\y = EC(ol~ A. L.
li l. ~ cov(lly,p) i(28b) y) o"It A(a l) ]E[:r:;-(pfL + Y + ol~ + Euy = wA-L
ivlwhere w = - > O is the marginal rate of substitutionEUy
between leisure and expected income, i.e. the implicit price of
leisure or opportunity cost of labour. It is reasonable to
iassume that C( represents the return to a riskless asset which
iis available to all workers. Then EC(
i
= ~ for all i. He may
assume that ~ = r.
ai li
Obviously ~ = ~ represents one possible solution to (28). But
these equilibrium ratios are not more likely than any other
possible ratios where the equality condition is not met. There
are two reasons for this. Firstly we see that wi will generally
vary across individuals when they are heterogeneous, and the
workers will have differing opportunity costs for "investment"
in the "asset" labour. Secondly, we observe that the workers
take "strategic" considerations as well (monopoly power), by
valuing the effect their decisions have on the dividend rates "It
and y. Thus, our model cannot be considered a pure
mean-variance model, and we should not expect the Ekern-Wilson
result to hold.
i l i iOn the other hand, ~ = 17 may hold by coincidence if w varies
li
positively with r- across individuals. Apart from this
situation the conditon is met only when the workers are
homogeneous.
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5;--concluding Remarks
In the preceding sections I have investigated the functioning of
a labour-managed and -owned firm consisting of heterogeneous
workers supplying labour and capital. The model chosen was
rather general, so as to be able to see how various assumptions
may influence the results. The price to be paid for this
generality is a lack of clearcut results in characterisations
and in the comparative static analysis. However, by making
certain simplifying assumptions, some special cases could be
analysed. In particular we were able to draw attention to the
close link which will exist between internal supply of capital
and the demand for labour and capital services from potential
new workers (outsiders). The outsiders are allowed into the
firm in so far as they contribute to increase welfare of the
initial work-force.
An analytically simplifying assumption made is the separation of
the individual supply decisions and the firm's allocational
decisions. I have assumed that the firm takes each worker's
labour and capital supply as given, and optimises with respect
to total labour and capital to be used. A slightly more sophis-
ticated procedure would be to allow for individual adjustments
depending on the collective decisions. If this were to be done
in the general context chosen here, we would, however, impose
further losses in terms of clearcut results. On the other hand,
by making proper choices of the functional forms to be used, we
may be able to consider several interesting cases. This is
obviously the way to follow in further research in this field.
For one such example, see Askildsen, Ireland and Law (1987).
I have chosen to investigate a collusive model of the firm.
This can be justified by the long term perspective of the ana-
lysis. We could instead have assumed a competitive scenario
where each worker casts his vote for the desired values of the
endogenous variables according to his individual preferences.
Then we would have to concentrate on defining the median worker,
his optimal strategy and the restrictions facing him in his
- 28 -
decisions. We see from the simplified analysis of Section 4
that in this case the median worker's attitude to risk, time
preference etc. will be of crucial importance to the firm's
labour and capital allocation decisions.
The main purpose of investigating the specific model chosen was
to represent a possible way of organising labour-managed firms
in (Hestern) capitalist economies. In many lines of business we
will find workers owning larger or smaller parts of the shares
in their firms. This ~ develop into firms which can be
denoted labour-managed. Of course, as the models to be investi-
gated will be something in between the classical capitalist and
the Illyrian labour-managed models of the firm, several formu-
lations can be chosen, and different aspects discussed, which
are all of interest. In that sense this model is only one
special case. In particular the assumptions made concerning
capital supply from initial workers and new workers will be
crucial. I have assumed here that the workers act rather uni-
formly and mechanically when capital supply decisions are to be
taken during the lifetime of the firm. The reason is that I
have been concerned mainly with the collective decisions on the
level of capital and employment, and that it is not unreasonable
to assume that e.g. new workers must adjust to established
rules. This is the case in r1ondragon, where empirical obser-
vations seem to confirm that there is a queue of potential new
workers allowing the insiders to put certain screening
mechanisms into effect, see Bradley and Gelb (1983). The model
highlights also the importance of the decisions taken concerning
how to share the surplus of the firm. The efficiency aspect of
this is additional to the problems caused by inefficient moni-
toring and the lack of proper incentive schemes in "traditional"
labour-managed firms. However, some problems (the horizon
problem) may be solved by the introduction of individual owner-
ship of capital. Other problems may, however, develop, e.g.
distributional problems.
It is important to note that the actual structure of a firm will
depend on its historical background. Then I think it is of
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importance to draw attention to heterogeneity in the workers'
capital supply, because this is an aspect I belive is central to
a labour-managed firm operating in a capitalist environment. As
commented upon before, the reason for this may be credit ratio-
ning. There may be other reasons also why workers would like to
invest in their own firm. Although risk-taking is being
increased by investing in the same firm as the one where the
worker's human capital is invested, the worker may find this
profitable, and it may be advantageous for the collective to
reduce its dependence on external financiers. It is a well
known feature of different profit sharing schemes, and we often
observe that the managers of firms own a considerable stock of
shares in their own firm. But we see that the individual
ownership of capital introduces several strategic as well as
allocational considerations, which may differ significantly from
problems facing capitalist profit-maximising firms and Illyrian.
labour-managed firms. My intention was to draw attention to
some of these problems, and indicate also how these can be
further investigated in more special models. The real problem
at stake, however, is how to capture a possible economic rent,
or generally how each participant can get as large a share as
possible in the total surplus. In this respect the model
investigated here does not deviate from models of traditional
labour-managed firms, trade unions and joint-stock firms.
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Footnotes
1) These are simplifications made for the matter of exposition.
A number of different possibilities and stories could be
considered. In particular, share capital and the distri-
bution of shareholding may change even if membership is con-
stant. This would happen if leaving workers were replaced by
new workers with different time preference, attitude to risk
etc., which might induce them to supply diverging amounts of
capital (and labour). Furthermore, some members might leave
without being replaced. However, in this case different
assumptions as to the distribution of shares can be discussed
within the framework of the model.
2) If ~ were to be the maximised for any value of y, this should
be written symmetrically as
(10 I ) ~ = pf(K,L) - rB - yLA
3) If there are two groups of workers, and the workers are
homogeneous within each group, the last elements of the
second order derivatives in A.l - A.3 may be written as:
~, oW, o~l.
~ ~ ~ ~
(W,)2 ay ar
i a
0\12 0'Vl2
oy as]
Now, from the first order conditions for an interior solution
we know that
~l OWl
WI oy = -
Then we can write the expression above as
* ~l oWl oWl I
WI oy (~ V1l
oW2 Iar rr:-)
2
When e oWl= R, N, ~, we know that sign as- = -
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He can assume, without loss of generality, that group l
consists of the "richest" workers (highest ~O. The sign of *
is dependent on which group of workers that wants the highest
values of R, Nand n, and on which group that is at most
affected by canges in rand p. Assume e.g. that the workers
with the highest Ylwant the highest R, Nand n. Then * is
positive when e = R, Nand n. On the other hand, when e = r,
p, the sign of * is given by
0\'1
1
e 0\'1
2
e
58 ~ - ar t12"'
i.e. the difference in elasticity of income w.r.t. r and p
will determine the sign.
4) The assumption of additive separability has been made so as
to make the problem more tractable by eliminating the effect
of labour supply decisions on the degree of risk aversion.
5) In Bonin (1977), Section 3, the author discusses the effect
on labour allocation of price and production uncertainty on a
collective farm where workers can allocate labour to the
collective farm and a private plot. The main difference
between our analysis and that of Bonin, is the introduction
of a financial instrument provided by the workers themselves.
An approach similar to Bonin's is taken by Ireland (1981) in
his analysis of the disutility of supplying labour services.
By explicitly modelling the Arrow-Pratt risk premium (Section
V), the worker's labour supply is compared to the certainty
case for the labour-managed firm as well as for the
entrepreneurial firm. Both anaLyses conclude that individual
labour supply (effort) is decreased when uncertainty is
introduced, when the workers are risk averse.
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Appendix
Aye~ y = R, N, nand e = R, N, ni ri P, is defined in the text.
The second order differentials are~ where indication of signs
is valid for the simplifying assumptions made in the text:
~ . li ~. oW. 2
(A.la) ARR = r { ~ pf - ~ (__2:) } < O (second orderi sr: r;- KK (\f i)2 oR conditions)~
s , li
[pfKK m -
I + pfKL I](A.lb) ARN = r {~ r;- L (pf - n)i K~
~. i li ~. oW. oW.a(A.lc) { ~ (.;:. ~ ~ ~} O.A = r L) (W.)2 mr~ >Rn i Wo~ o ~
~. i ~. oW. oW.~ ao(A.ld) ARr r {- ~ ~ ~} O= oR ar <sr: A (w. ) 2i ~ o ~
~. li ~. oW. oW.
(A.le) ARp r {tf. - f - a ~ ~} > O= (W.)2 ar opi . L K~ ~
(A.2a) ANR = r
{~i li [pfLK r + m pfKK - I (pf - n) ]v: r;- I: Ki ~
~. oH. oH.
~ ~~}
(\v • ) 2 ~ ar > O.
a,
(A.2b) ANN
s , li= E {W~ [L (pfLL I + m(pfLK + m pfKK + PfKLI» ]i ~
~i oWi 2( ) < O (second order conditions).
(w. )2 oN
~
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~. li (A ~ . o~i. oW.(A.2c) { ~ I m) J ~ ~ ~} O.Å = E Cr;- - - (~L)2 mr Tit >Nn Wo Li ~ a
~. li ~ . oW. oW.
(A.2d) { ~ lB - ~ ~ ~} > O.ÅNr = E (w. ) 1 oN Fi ~~ a
~. li ~ . oW. oH.(A.2e) {~ r;- [fL I x l + m fKJ ~ a ~ } < OÅNp = E - L - (~v.) 2 aN opi ~ a,
~. i li ~. oH. 0\1.a(A.3a) {w7 o ~ a a }Å = E (A - L) - (w7 "'Fit oRnR i ~ o a
~. Ii A ~. oW. oW.(A.3b) {~ ( I m)- ~ ~ ~}Å = E -
(w. ):2nN \T." L L ~~i a, a,
> O
> O.
~. oW. 2
(A.3c) ~ (---=) < O.Å = - E
(W. ) 2nn i on~
~. oW. oH.
(A.3d) Å ~ a ~ O.= - E
(~'li)2 ---nr i on or
~. oW. oW.
(A.3f) ~ ~ ~ O •Å = - E
(W. ) 2 a1t op -np i ~
<,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Institutional diversity among labour-managed and participatory
firms is partly a reflec~ion of differences in the economic environment
when they were established and, in part, derives from differences in the
motivations of the founders •. Thus, for instance, a cooperative founded to
provide an infrastructure for traditionally self-employed artisans could
not be considered as the same kind of firm with the same market behaviour
as a cooperative formed by the management and other employees "buying-out"
the previous capitalist owners. Although such extreme examples are likely
to differ in many aspects of behaviour, we shall only be concerned here
with those arising from one structural factor. Our analysis will foc~s on
the behaviour of a participatory firm which is partly financed by
worker-members' shares. The structural factor in question is that of the
distribution of the ownership of the equity of the firm among its members
and the form of power or voting basis within the firm. We will concentrate
on issues arising from these matters and attempt to exclude other factors
as far as'possible.1/ The firm's decision-making process is modelled as a
sequential game and for reasons of tractability we are forced to adopt
simple functional forms for utility and production functions.
A member's influence on his firm's behaviour may have much or
little to do with the size of his shareholding. For instance, many
traditional cooperatives formally allocate one vote to each member. Of
course, actual influence may to some extent reflect seniority or skill
level which may be related to shareholding. On the other hand, a
cooperative formed from buying out the previous (capitalist) ownership may
well operate as a private limited company and the management may act as
agents for the members as shareholders rather than workers since members
have votes according to the number of shares they hold. Many participatory
2firms may adopt a voting system, de jure or de facto, which is intermediate
between one-member-one-vote and one-share-one-vote.
Of course the voting system may not give significant power to any
one member, but, in so far as majority viewpoints hold sway, so the voting
system will determine firm behaviour. For this topic to be of interest it
is necessary that members differ in their views. The origin of this
diversity is assumed to lie in an unequal distribution of shareholdings
among members. Where members differ in share ownership we may expect that
divergent views on firm policy will arise and that such conflicts may have
to be resolved by a voting process.
It has often been argued that cooperatives will prefer to raise
capital from external sources rather than from members. The reasons
suggested are either related'to property rlghts problems (the horizon
prOblem, see Jensen and Meckling (1979», or to the concentration of risk
involved in members having savings invested in their own firm.
Nevertheless, external finance is unlikely to be available unless members'
equity holdings provide both a buffer to reduce risk and a measure of the
cooperative's self-confidence. It has been suggested that external capital
may be provided if the return on this is linked to members' remuneration.
Thus risk participation bonds (see Vanek, 1977, Ch.l1 and McCain, 1977)
provide incentives to members which are compatible with external
financiers' interests. However, the prOblem arises of the direct influence
of the financiers on the firm. This would be particularly apparent if
there were just one or two financiers involved - a likelyevent if
information acquisition by the financiers implied the existence of a fixed
cost to capital supply. The tendency would be for the external financiers
to exert influence on the firm's behaviour, perhaps prompting higher
3employment or different work practices (see Ireland and Law, 1982,
pp.51-3).
In this paper we assume that equity capital is all held by
members and that this allows the firm to borrow from external sources up to
a limiting gearing ratio. Beyond this point external finance becomes
inordinately expensive. In order to acquire sufficient finance in total,
an internal factor market exists to adjust the relative payment to shares
and labour. For simplicity this relative payment is taken as fixed ex ante
of the trading position of the firm being revealed.2/ The absolute
payments reflect this trading position - in particular the revealed market
price which was uncertain at the time of share purchase.
The internal factor market can be affected by changes in
membership, since these will generally change the distribution of
shareholding, particularly the mean propensity to purchase shares.
Relative factor payments then respond to equilibrate the internal factor
market. For example, if recruiting new members led to a greater positive
skew in the distribution of shareholdings, since few new members were
likely to make large share purchases, then capital would become relatively
more scarce and the return to shares would increase relative to that paid
to labour.
Thus a link exists between the behaviour of the firm (for
example, the number of members), responses to a changing economic
environment, (for example, a response to a demand change), and the power
basis of decision-making, in terms of both the effects on, and the
consequences of, the distribution of shareholdings. This paper is an
initial attempt to investigate this link. Section II presents the model of
the participatory firm and Section III shows how the firm's behaviour is
ti
affected by the distribution of shareholding. Section IV comprises two
extensions. The first explores the possibilities for cartels and other
monopsonistic phenomena to arise within thJ internal factor market, and in
the second the assumption of a limiting gearing ratio is relaxed.
Section V presents conclusions and some speculation on future directions of
research.
II. THE MODEL
We will assume that the firm is composed of N members who
all work in the firm for a wage $w and supply capital to the firm, by
buying dollar shares at the beginning of the production period for which
they receive a value $v per share at the end of the production period.
Members have no other residual interest in the firm. Thus, at the end of
the production period, a member who has bought si shares receives an
income of $(w + vSi), which he then consumes. At the beginning of the
period he is endowed with a wealth of $mi' so that he has $(mi-si) for
consumption durng the production period. Both w and v are stochastic
when viewed from the beginning of the production period as they will depend
on demand conditions, represented by a parametric product price p which
is a random variable with mean p and variance a2•
Workers are assumed to invest in the firm the amounts Si which
maximise the expected value of their utilities.3/ The ith member's
utility is assumed to take the specific form
T' { .} > O, T" { .} ~ O (1)
where Cl is consumption during the production period, and Cz is
consumption after the production period. Thus
5( 1 ' )
which we can also write as
(1" )
where ~. v/w is non-stochastic, representing the ratio of payments to
shares and labour in the manner of a risk-participating bond, and w (and
of course v) is stochastic, depending on the revelation of product price.
Both w and v are assumed independent of member i's decision over si,
so that no one member has any monopoly power. Optimal si for member i
is that number of shares which maximises expected utility where utility is
given by (1"). Thus si satisfies
(2)
which implies, since $, mi and si ~are not stochastic and T' {'l > O,
w > O, that41
(3)
The average internal supply of finance per member is then s where
(4 )
where m is the arithmetic mean of the wealth levels of members.
6Now consider the demand for members' capital. Suppose that the
technology of the firm satisfies the following properties:
(i) the production function is F(N, K) where N is membership
and K is capital~
(il) the production function can be written as Q(Z) where
Z - min (aN, bK).
(iii ) Q(O) - O, Q'(Z»O, Q"(Z)>.O~ as Z § Zl
(iv) Q' (Z) - Q(Z)/Z at Z - z*.
Thus the production function is homothetic with zero elasticity
of substitution. The required capital per man for full employment of both
factors of production is thus alb. Suppose that for every dollar of
members' share capital raised, $A of loan from outside financiers can be
obtained. Such loans are repaid at the end of the production period at a
cost of $r per dollar borrowed. Thus an average of $k of equity capital
must be raised from the members, where k satisfies:
(1 + A)k • alb (5)
and the repayment for all capital raised by the firm ($v per dollar share
purchased, plus $r per dollar of debt finance obtained, to provide alb
dollars of capital per member for N members) is
(v + Ar)kN
We are assuming that the firm wishes to take up all of its external
7borrowing capacity up to the limiting gearing ratio of A.51 From (4),
equating kand s, yields
- -1
ljI .. (m - 2k) (6)
so that
( 7)
(8)
and 1 + IjIsi..~(mi + m - 2k)/(m - 2k) (9)
Finally, consider the stochastic wage w. The factor returns, w
and v, are defined by
w ..pQ(aN)/N - (v+Ar)k (10)
which simply states that the wage is equal to average revenue per member
minus total capital cost per member. (10) can be rewritten, using (6), as
w ..pQ(aN)/N - Ark - wkl(m - 2k)
.. (pQ(aN)/N - Ark) Cm - 2k)
Cm - k)
( 11)
Now define Q(aN)/N Æ q(N) and note that q' (N) ~ O as N ~ N* ..Z*/a< >
from (iv) above. Then, using (8), (9) and (11) in (1") yields
81(mi + m - 2k)2T{4 _ (pq(N)
(m - k)
- Ark)} (12)
As is well know~ (see Ireland and Law, 1984), in the absence at any effects
of varying membership on the distribution of m, each individual will
prefer that membership level which maximises q(N), i.e. where q'(N) - O
and N. N*. Membership is independent of price, and marginal changes in
the mean or variance of price have no effect on optimal membership, capital
and output levels. It is, however, highly likely that changing membership
will have implications for the distribution of wealth among the members.
The nature of these implications and their influence on firm behaviour are
the subject of the rest of this paper.
III. SHARE DISTRIBUTION
It is to be expected that the distribution of the members' wealth
(mi) will depend on the size and nature of the firm, and can be influenced
by changes in membership through recruitment or retirement of workers.
We will assume that dmldN < O, and hence consider the equilibrium level of
firm membership. The assumption can be justified in several ways. If new
members are being recruited, it is reasonable to assume that they have
lower wealth than older workers who may have stayed with the firm for
several periods. Thus, workers who retire are likely to have accumulated
some capital during their tenure period with the firm, and the decision
whether to replace them with a greater, equal, or smaller number of
9new recruits will affect average share supply per worker. When considering
the relation between m and the size of the firm eN) in a static context
we ~ay assume that the firm has initiallyagiven membership, but that
adjustments can be made before production takes place. Only when
membership and share purchases are in equilibrium will production occur.
The extent of membership reduction that can take place may be
limited to not replacing any workers who have just retired, if members
cannot be dismissed. In this case full adjustment to the membership
equilibrium may not be possible. However, the unconstrained membership
equilibrium is still relevant in that it indicates the direction of
adjustment that will occur.
For simplicity, we will first take the case where individuals are
not risk-averse (T'{.•f is a constant) or, equivalently, where there is no
risk (a2• O). Having analysed this case, risk and members' risk-aversion
will then be introduced.
(i) The Certainty Case
Consider the ith individual member with wealth parameter mi.
This member's utility is maximised if the membership level is Ni which
satisfies
e 13)
Differentiating (12), given that a2• O or T' {.} • O, implies that (13)
requires
10
- dm - -(m-mi)(pq(N) - Ark) dN + (mi+m-2k)(m-k) pq' (N) ,.O (14)
Now given that pq(N) - Ark> O (else w ~ O from (11 )), dmldN < C by
-assumption, mi + m - 2k > O (else si ~ O), and m - k > O (for
Ui > O ¥i), (m - mi) and q'(N) must have the same sign. Also second-
order conditions will hold if q" (N) is sufficiently negative, whatever
the form of d2iD;dN2•
We may also consider the comparative static responses of
individual ils optimal membership level Ni to changes in product price
and the cost of outside capital (r). The signs of these responses are
given by the derivatives of (14) with respect to p and r respectively..
Collecting results, we have that:
if mi < m, Ni < N* ,
Ni • N* ,
Ni > N*,
dN i/ dp < O, dNi/dr > O
dNi/dr • O
dNi/dr < O
(15)
if mi > .m,
These results reflects the membership level desired by the ith
member. The question of the way in which actual decisions are made has not
yet been considered. In this respect it is important to establish that Ni
and mi are co-monotonic, i.e. that if mi > mj then Ni > Nj. To see
this it is sufficient to show that dNi/dmi > O. Using (14) again, it is
clear that dNi/dmi has the same sign as
- (pq (N) - Ark) : + (m - k) pq '(N) (16)
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and, substituting out q'(N) in (16) from (14), this simplifies to
(mi-m)
-(pq(N) - Ark) ~ + (pq(N) - Ark) ~
(m.+m-2k)
l
which, since dm/dM < O, has the sign of
2(m-k)
(m.+m-2k)
l
> o
This proves that Ni and mi are co-monotonic. Individuals with higher
wealth parameters prefer higher membership levels. The intuition behind
this result is very simple: an increase in membership which reduces m
leads to a relative scarcity of internal finance, so that ~ increases to
persuade members to buy more shares. This is relatively more to the
advantage of members who currently buy more shares.
The co-monotonicity implies that members can be ranked according
to their wealth levels and this ranking also relates to their desired
membership level (and capital and output levels) for the firm. Thus if the
membership level decision was taken on the basis of a poll in which all
members cast a single vote, only a level which the median member, in terms
of wealth and shareholding, found ideal for him could be an equilibrium.
Any lower level of membership would lead to the median member joining
higher-wealth members to vote for an increase in membership, while any
higher level would lead to a coalition of the median with lower-wealth
members. The membership level adopted, and comparative static responses,
thus depend crucially on whether decisions are taken on a one-man-one-vote
basis, or a one-share-one-vote basis, or some alternative, and on the
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relationship between the wealth of the critical member, who can sway the
vote one way or the other, with that of the mean wealth level of the
membership. If decisions are taken by a simple majority with one vote per
"-member, then the median wealth individual has wealth m generally less
than, equal or greater than m as the m-distribution is positively skewed,
symmetric or negatively skewed. Thus if the m-distribution is
'"+ skewed m < m N < N* dN/dp < O dN/dr > O
"symmetric m,. m dN/dp ,.O dN/dr ..O
A- skewed m > m N > N* dN/dp > O dN/dr < O
If the median worker has less wealth and shares than the average,
the firm will tend to be smaller since the median worker will find it in
his interest to reduce the scarcity of capital and increase the w/v
Aratio. An opposite argument holds if m > m. Thus, although there is
a loss in efficiency, the median worker is better off as he can affect the
relative payout rates in a favourable direction for himself.
If voting is on the basis of one vote per share then the critical
Awealth level would be above m, say at -m. If voting is by some
intermediate system, say one vote per share plus some additional common
number of votes per member then the critical wealth level will be between
A. -m and m. OOfcourse, as the membershi p level changes so - Am, m and -m
may change. However, a sequence of marginal decisions can be envisaged
leading to equilibrium membership and mean wealth levels. Whether or not
the output response to a change in product price will be negative (as in
the "Illyrian" model, when labour alone is variable; see Ward, 1958), will
depend on the m-distribution and the voting system.
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(ii) Uncertainty
If demand conditions are risky (02 > O) and members are risk
averse (T" {.} < O) then the preferred membership level of the "critical"
member and thus the policy of the firm will differ. Since (12) is linear
in p and concave in N, the introduction of a small amount of uncertainty
-in product price leads (see Ireland, 1980, p.302-3) to a change in Ni of
the same direction as that arising from a reduction in product price under
certainty. Thus, using (15), uncertainty causes a risk-averse membership
to adopt a membership level nearer to N*. If mi < m and Ni < N*, then
Ni will increase towards N*; if and Ni > N* then Ni will
decrease towards N*. This result can be confirmed by differentiating
the expected value of (12):
dEUi -dM - E(T'{.}A{(m-mi)(pq(N) - r rk) : + (mi+m-2k)(m-k)pq'(N»] - O (17)
Equation (17) can be rearranged to obtain
-
-[Cm-mi) q(N) .; + (mi+m-2k)(m-k)q'(N)] E[;'{·l(p-p)] (18)
ET {.}
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Now the left-hand side of (18), denoted G, is zero if cr2 ~ O, and is
decreasing in N (for second-order conditions). In the right--hand side,
ET'{.} > O since T' {.} > O and ET'{.}(p-p) ~ O since marginal
utility is decreasing as product price increases; thus this covariance
between product price and marginal utility is negative.
Whether N is greater or less under uncertainty than with a
certain price p can be inferred from the sign of the left-hand side
of (18).
Now (18) can be rewritten as
(18')
where $ ~ -E(T' {.}(p-p)]/ET' {.} > O
Now P - $ > O since
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and T' {.}, P are both always positive. Thus G has the sign of
-(m-mi), and the effect of uncertainty is to increase N beyond the
-certainty level if mi < ~ ~nd to reduce N from the certainty level if
mi > m. These results are obviously related to those of Sandmo (1971),.
where it is shown that a risk-averse profit maximising firm produces less
when faced with an uncertain price with expected value p than when faced
with a certain price p, while Muzondo (1979), Hey (1981) and others show
that a labour-managed firm with a fixed factor but variable labour produces
more under uncertainty. Both scenarios suggest that commitments are
reduced under uncertainty: the pron t maximising firm hires less workers
and the labour-managed firm spreads the fixed capital more by taking on
more members. Our analysis here is rather different. If N > N*, we know
-that mi > m. In this case the behaviour of the firm corresponds to that
of the risk averse profit maximising firm. The "critical worker" reduces
his commitment by reducing his relative holding of risky shares. He votes
to reduce membership, raising s simultaneouslyas each individual's
shareholding is reduced. The "price" to be paid is a reduction in v
compared to w. When N < N*, and mi < m, relative commitment by the
"critical" member is reduced by increasing the membership level, as in the
labour managed firm with fixed costs. In this way the "critical" member
reduces his share of labour supply and thereby the variance in income. But
to obtain this, w is reduced relative to v. Note that as ~ increases,
the worker's purchase of shares increases, although risk has increased!
The above argument demonstrates that divergence from a membership
level of N* arises from the heterogeneity of members and the ability of
members to use recruitment decisions to manipulate the internal factor
market. Such strategic behaviour becomes less worthwhile under uncertainty
since factor prices are uncertain but loan repayment costs are not.
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(i11) Some Possible Scenarios
We will contrast three likely scenarios. First, suppose that a
previously capitalist firm is "bought out" by its management and workers.
Shareholdings are extremely positively skewed reflecting large purchases by
top management and small purchases by the shop floor workers. The
underlying distribution of m may be as sketched in Figure 1. Here,
one-man-one-vote would lead to N < N* and would be counter to the wishes
of the largest shareholders. Thus if the management led in the buy-out
operation, they would impose a one-share-one-vote system and the firm's
"critical" member may well have mi > in so that N > N*.
Contrast the above situation with that of a workers' cooperative
which has been in existence for many years. There is an approximately even
spread of wealth levels among members, reflecting the age distribution
and other factors. A one-man-one-vote system is in operation and the
A _ *median member has m: m. Thus membership is at N. One might
envisage a steady-state situation where the model we have been considering
is of'a single typical production period. At the beginning of the period,
some members with the highest wealth levels retire and are replaced by
those with the next highest wealth level whose savings have been augmented
by the previous production period's income. All members' wealth levels
have increased and new members, with low wealth, are recruited to keep
employment at N*. The production period takes place, and retirements,
recruitments and wealth adjustments are repeated.6/
Yet another possibility is different forms of long term transf'er
of'ownership rights to the workers. This may be part of the firm's
incentive schemes ("profit-sharing"), or it may be a plan for workers'
takeover of the firm through different formal organisations (e.g."wage
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earner funds"). In the first case, voting will obviously take place
according to shares. In the latter case, ~owever, it seems reasonable that
each worker 'Should be allocated CJne vote. But note that, in this case,
there may be property rights problems to be solved, corresponding to those
of the Illyrlan firm.
IV. EXTENSIONS
(i) Members' Monopsony Power
In the analysis to date, the "critical" member's preferred policy
prevailed but he was not able to do more for himself than adjust the wealth
distribution, through changing membership level, in order to achieve a
particular v/w ratio. His ability to benefit from this power was limited
by the fact that all members could buy shares. Thus he is only setting a
competitive relative price ratio; even if he has the funds, he cannot exert
monopsonistic power in the market for shares.
Two alternative possibilities emerge. First a group of members
may collude to restrict the demand for shares, and force up the v/w ratio.
Secondly, the right to buy shares (i.e. membership) may be denied to some
members. The latter is effectively a move away from full participation
towards a labour-hiring firm. One strategy is to set a minimum
shareholding so that many low wealth members choose to buy no shares at
all.
The prospect of a cartel of members using monopsony power to
force up relative payment to capital is subject to the usual problems cf
cartel instability. Thus if, say, the top h% wealth owners formed such a
cartel, they would maximise the v/w ratio subject to the demand for
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capital from the firm and the supply of capital from other members. However
the cartel member with, say, the lowest wealth would have an incentive to
leave the cartel and buy an unrestricted number of shares at the high
return supported by the cartel's behaviour. Thus a cartel, at least in the
case of a large firm with many members, is likely to be unstable,
particularly if the distribution of wealth is reasonably continuous.
The alternative possibility is that a coalition is formed,
not directly to restrict the supply of finance, but to change the rules of
share sales so as to dissuade non-coalition members from purchasing shares.
The institution of a minimum size of share purchase or high cost per share
transaction may be strategies for this purpose. For example, suppose that
there are just two types of member in the firm, those with high wealth mh
and those with low wealth m i' If the minimum shareholding that can be
purchased is set at a level such that the low-wealth members choose to buy
none at all rather than purchase the minimum, even at the higher vlw
ratio which results, then high-wealth members will obtain higher utility.
This case is reminiscent of discussions relating to discrimination against
new members; see, for example, Sapir (1980).71 All the possibilities
raised here reflect the power of a group of members to affect the rules or
the performance of the internal factor markets.
(ii) Flexible Gearing
The assumption that the firm was faced by a binding constraint as
to the amount it could borrow externally relative to internal finance
through share sales, can be replaced by the existence of an increasing cost
of external finance. Thus alb - s is the amount per member of external
finance required. Let
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fCa/b-s) , fCO) '"' O, f'C·) > O, fl! ( .) > O
be the cost per member of acquiring this finance. The convexity of fC·)
indicates the penal cost of borrowing in excess of a reasonable gearing
ratio. Using
x ,. 1/lj1 ,. w/v (21)
and (3) and (4) yields
(22)
since the firm's budget constraint can be written
xv ,.w '"'pq-fC·) - vs
so that
v ,.Cpq-fC·»/(x+s) • 2(pq-f(·»/(x+m)
using (4).
In the certainty case, maximising (22) with r~spect to x and
N, remembering that m and thus s are dependent on N, yields after some
simplification the respective first-order conditions:81
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mi+x 1
( pq- f ( •)) (1 - _ ) - '4 t' (. )(mi+x) ,.. O
2(m+x)
(23)'
pq' (N) + : (~ f' ( .) - (pq: f )) :Il O
x+m
(24)
Using (23) in (24) implies
-
pq'(N) +: (pq-f(·))
(m. +x)(m+x)
l
.. O (25)
-
so that q'(N) has the sign of : (mi~m). and if : < O
q'(N) ~.O<
< -as mi > m.
This result confirms those obtained earlier, and exactly the same arguments
can be used. Obviously, the simplification of a fixed-constraint gearing
ratio was not crucial for the conclusions of Section 3.
Although further general analysis along these lines rapidly
.becomes complex, one particular development is worth pursuing. Suppose
membership is fixed but that x is chosen to achieve the best
(for i) balance between internal and external finance. Then (23) defines
the appropriate necessary first-order condition. Performing a comparative
static exercise on (23) yields
dx*- > Odp
dx* < Odmi
dx"- > O
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Thus if product price increases, the firm adopts a higher wage to
share payment ratio, leading to heavier reliance OIl external finance. The
increased price will inevitably increase total payout to the workers of a
fixed membership firm. Consumption will increase in both periods through
an income effect. But the increased consumption in the initial period can
only come about through reduced supply of internal finance, which again
depends on the ; - ratio. The reduced internal finance is SUbsequently
made up by an increased external finance, at an increased cost. By
analogy, the introduction of uncertainty over the product price would lead
to a lower wage to share payment ratio and less reliance on external
finance. Note that increased average wealth leads to a higher w/v ratio,
while, naturally, a member j with mj > mi would desire a lower wage to
share payment ratio.
v. CONCLUSION
Changing membership leads to repercussions in the internal factor
market. Thus some members may benefit while others lose due to differences
in factor endowments. In this paper, the members have been assumed to
supply finance to the firm, and external finance is acquired complementary
to this internal finance, through credit rationing by a fixed gearing
limit, rather than as a substitute. It has been shown that members'
potential to supply capital is co-monotonic with their preference for
increases in firm size. How firms make their decisions is thus crucial
since there is no "representative" member. Rather the "critical" member
who holds the balance of power achieves the adoption of his ideal policy.
The identification of the "critical" member, and thus the firm's chosen
policy, depends therefore on both the allocation of power (for instance the
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criteria for vote allocation among the members) and the distribution of
members in relation to their capital supplies.
Our approach considered a sequential model of decision-making
within the firm. Given the membership and the relative rewards for capital
and labour provision, each member individually chooses his purchase of
shares. Given this individualistic behaviour, the relative rewards are
chosen so as to balance relative factor supplies with relative factor
demands. Given this decision rule and individualistic share purchases, the
current membership can choose to recruit new members or not replace those
who leave. Equilibrium thus comprises equilibrium behaviour in all three
stages of this sequential game. In the first stage, strategy is determined
by a voting rule; in the second by an institutional efficiency rule, and in
the third by individualistic Nash behaviour.
The firm behaviour of interest is that of membership adjustment.
Technology is assumed as simple as possible. It was shown in Section III
that "Illyrian" or orthodox behaviour would occur depending on whether the
"critical" member has a lower m parameter and thus a lower shareholding
than the member with the arithmetic mean m. For example, with a
one-man-one-vote system, a positively-skewed m-distribution would lead to
Illyrian behaviour as the critical member would be a net user of internal
finance. However, the introduction of uncertainty reduces the tendency for
membership to diverge from the efficient output-per-unit-factor-maximising
level N*.
Finally, some extensions to the basic model have been considered.
Specifically various ways in which monopoly power could be exercised by a
cartel of members were examined. It was suggested that such a cartel might
use its power to change the decision-making structure rather than to
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influence the internal factor market by restricting supplies. The
implications of relaxing the gearing constraint were also considered.
The analysis here is preliminary and reflects just one aspect of
the important behavioural consequences of the internal organisation of a
participatory firm. However, it serves to demonstrate the significance of
members' heterogeneity and the problems of assuming that no conflict of
interests arises within such firms.
Figure 1
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Share Distribution after a Management-Employee Buy-Out
f(m)
~ ~____ m
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Footnotes
* This paper was written while Askildsen was vising the University ofWarwick.
11 See, for example, Ireland and Law (1985b) for an analysis of labour
supply under conditions of endogenous monitoring. In the presen~
paper individual labour supply is held fixed and common to all
members. Other structural factors which could be considered in the
same way include the gradations of worker seniority and their skill
levels.
2/ One might consider this a "fair returns firm", see Ireland and
Law (1985a).
3/ Alternative forms of worker saving are ignored. Either workers have
only relatively low returns from saving elsewhere so that no other
form of saving is attractive, or moral pressure is exerted by the
firm to ensure that all savings are channelled into shares.
41 Problems of corner solutions have been ignored for simplicity. Thus
restrictions on the levels of mi' ~ and k necessary to achieve
interior solutions are required. These are essentially that (7) and
(8) below are positive for all i.
51 The very reasonable basis for this assumption is that the membership
prefers to bOrrow more from external financiers due to the high
disutility it suffers from foregoing marginal ·current consumption.
61 Of course our model does not incorporate a number of features of such
a dynamic system. In particular, when taking current decisions, the
median worker may take account of future decisions to be made by
future median workers in future production periods. Thus what may
well happen, is that the median worker at some stage votes for
changing the voting rules to one-share-one-vote, so as to better his
future position.
71 Of course, there is also the possibility of the formation of a cartel
of low-wealth members, establishing a maximum purchase of shares, so
as to equalize income from participation. This would result in a
shortage of capital, raising vlw, and thereby induce the low-wealth
members to increase their supply of capital. This aspect may have
some wider applications.
81 Second-order conditions are assured if q(.) is sufficiently concave
and f(·) sufficiently convex.
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